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ABSTRACT  
	
The study of action-cognition is driven by the assumption that what one can do 
motorically depends on what one can conceive of mentally, given a set of external 
opportunities (Rosenbaum, Cohen, & Jax, 2007). Therefore, a comprehensive theory 
of action development ought to integrate perceptual aspects of action processing with 
conceptual changes that give rise to increasingly abstract behaviours.  
 
 How and why children progress to higher levels of organization in the processing and 
coordination of purposeful behaviour is a question that has been at the core of 
developmental research for decades. Various competences underlying early action 
processing and decision-making have been identified and linked to sophisticated 
mental operations later in life. However, considerably less is known about the 
relationships between perceptual and conceptual abilities and how they interact to 
shape action development.  
 
Goal-pursuit is achieved with increasing efficiency during the preschool period. In 
fact, by the age of first grade children show substantial abilities to regulate actions 
into hierarchically structured sequences of events that can be transferred across 
contexts (e.g., Levy, 1980; Bell & Livesey, 1985; Livesey & Morgan, 1991). The aim 
of this project was to investigate the perceptual and conceptual processes that drive 
these remarkable advances as they emerge during the preschool years. The studies in 
this thesis investigate top-down and bottom-up interactions in the processing of 
actions at various levels of abstraction. Employing a range of novel paradigms, the 
results of four studies highlight considerable advances in preschoolers’ abilities to 
organise actions in terms of goal hierarchies. Findings further highlight that the ability 
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to extract structure at a basic level is readily achieved early in life, while higher-level 
action comprehension and planning abilities continue to develop throughout the 
childhood years.  
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CHAPTER 1 
The planning and coordination of goal-directed actions in early life 	
1.1. Introduction 	
 
It has been proposed that cognitive development ought to be understood through the 
functional perspective provided by “action”, because all aspects of cognitive 
development are reflected in actions (e.g., von Hofsten, 2007; Thelen & Smith, 1994). 
The argument that infants’ competences in goal perception and rational imitation 
relate to higher-level mental operations later in life is widely held, yet the 
developmental trajectories underlying this progression are not well understood. As 
such a comprehensive account of how early emerging abilities interact to shape action 
planning and development during pre- and primary school is clearly needed.  
 
In cognitive science, action planning constitutes a generic term that refers to both: (1) 
the processing of any type of intentional motor behaviour, as well as (2) the planning 
of a specific goal-directed activity that delivers rewarding outcomes for the acting 
individual (e.g., Grèzes, et al. 1998; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001). In the 
context of this thesis, action planning is conceptualised in the latter sense. Action 
understanding, in turn, is an internal description of an observed action that once 
achieved can be used to guide the organisation of future behaviour and thus provides 
a basis for imitative learning and more abstract forms of planning. Therefore, action 
comprehension plays a critical role for the planning of goal-directed behaviours and 
vice versa. The centrality of this influence appears especially relevant during a time in 
development during which most real-world action knowledge is acquired. As 
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Sommerville & Woodward (2005) argued: “The ability to organize individual actions 
around ultimate goals is key to not only interpreting the actions of others, but also for 
predicting future actions based on past events, for learning from and describing novel 
actions to others, and for categorizing action sequences in terms of the event 
representations to which they belong.”. We will return to this link between planning 
abilities and action comprehension in the following chapters, presenting a number of 
studies that focused either on planning or comprehension related aspects of action 
processing.   
 
Because actions can be described and understood at multiple interdependent levels, 
they can also be studied from multiple perspectives. Kilner (2011) proposed a 
categorization of actions into: (i) the kinematic level (motion trajectories), (ii) the 
motor level (patterns of muscle activity), (iii) the goal level (immediate purpose), and 
(iv) the intentional level (higher-level or overarching goals).  The primary aim of this 
project is to provide new insights concerning the development of action cognition by 
investigating fundamental action-related processes at each level.   
 
The following sections provide an overview about the perceptual and conceptual 
processes that have been implicated in the comprehension and execution of goal-
directed behaviour. We begin this review presenting evidence about how adults and 
infants perceive and structure sequential behaviour in terms of action-goal hierarchies. 
In this context, the role of perceptual regularities in human behaviour will be 
discussed and integrated with developmental accounts of action perception in early 
life. Thereafter, we turn to the neural underpinnings of the perception and planning of 
goal-directed behaviour and consider the putative mechanisms that have been related 
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to a human action network. We then review various lines of developmental research 
that provide cognitive accounts of the perceptual, regulatory, and higher-level 
processes that together shape intentional behaviour during early childhood. This 
chapter aims to review the wide range of evidence that is relevant to the current 
project, providing a background for new directions in the study of action 
development. Subsequent chapters will return to the concepts introduced in the 
following sections and discuss the theoretical accounts outlined below in relation to 
the specific studies in this thesis.  
 
 
1.1.1.	The	cognitive	representation	of	goal-directed	actions			
 Intentional actions are guided by mental representations of goal states; i.e., 
anticipated action effects (e.g., Hauf & Prinz 2005; Wood & Neil, 2007). Action 
planning allows the formation of active mental representations of a target situation, 
and thus enhances the accessibility of goal-related cues in a particular action context 
(Gollwitzer, 1999).All planned behaviours and even single movements are 
hierarchically organised in terms of individual sub-goals and their relationships to 
higher-level multimodal goals (e.g., Sommerville & Woodward, 2005). In fact, the 
organisation of actions in terms of sub-goals (Figure 1.1.) is often so transparent that 
it is used in an educational context to promote learning (e.g., tasks are frequently 
composed of a set of sub-tasks that relate to sub-goals within the main task).  
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Figure 1.1. Schematic representation of goal hierarchy in intentional behaviour. In this 
hierarchy sub-actions at superordinate levels relate to increasingly abstract goals, 
spanning from the level of raw movement to specifications of the kinematic parameters 
involved in performing the action, to higher-level aspects of action planning (e.g., 
Kilner, 2011). 
 
Identifying the links between sub-actions of a particular hierarchy across a range of 
contexts is critical for both the comprehension and planning of goal-directed actions. 
In naturalistic settings, the hierarchical structure underlying many action sequences 
does not need to be planned entirely de novo (e.g., Rosenbaum, Cohen, & Jax, 2007). 
Sub-goals within a sequence may well be realised with considerable autonomy (Byrne 
& Russon, 1998). Habits, for example, can be conceived of as mental representations 
of action-goal links that are triggered when action goals are activated by contextual 
cues. As such, habitual actions require considerably fewer planning demands than 
infrequently executed actions (e.g., Wood & Neil, 2007). The emergence of novel 
behaviours, in turn, calls for adaptations of prior plans into increasingly complex and 
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novel sequences. In relation to cognitive development, this means that, on the one 
hand the ability to construct action plans improves to allow higher-level goal-pursuit, 
and, on the other hand, a mechanism by which learned action plans are modified must 
be in place to explain adaptive behaviours and learning. We return to this argument in 
the first empirical chapter of this thesis (Chapter 2) across two experiments that 
examined preschoolers’ abilities to extract goal-relevant information from observed 
behaviour based on prior event knowledge.      
Beyond identifying event structure and hierarchical relations underling goal 
attainment, implementing action plans requires a mechanism by which actions are 
evaluated and regulated in respect to outcomes. The evaluation of actions in terms of 
outcomes is referred to as performance monitoring (e.g., Botvinick et al. 2001). 
Figure 1.2. illustrates the relationship between performance monitoring and its central 
role for behavioural adaptation. Several formal theories aim to provide comprehensive 
accounts of the mechanisms that give rise to the regulation, coordination, and 
sequencing of goal-directed actions (e.g., Botvinick et al. 2001; Braver, 2012; Cooper, 
Ruh, & Mareschal, 2014; Norman & Shallice, 1986). Such accounts of cognitive 
control stress the role of a central executive or performance monitoring system that 
continuously updates information about the current performance against predicted 
outcomes. As a result, deviations from the predicted goal state can be detected and 
counteractive mechanisms can be generated to optimise current as well as future 
actions. Such an evaluative mechanism, in turn, has been argued to promote long-term 
learning (see Ullsperger, Danielmeier, & Jocham, 2014).  
Performance monitoring is therefore a critical top-down mechanism in the 
transformation of observed behaviour into goal-directed actions. The next section will 
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discuss the role of perceptual mechanisms that give rise to action comprehension in 
early life. We then consider how the ability to parse everyday action sequences into 
units develops and gradually enables young children to make sense of complex 
observed behaviour. We will return to the role of conflict monitoring in the following 
chapter.  
 
 
Figure 1.2. Feedback loop implicated in adaptive behaviour. To optimize outcome 
predictions, weighted differences between the expected and actual outcomes trigger 
flexible adjustments in behaviour. Performance monitoring and the evaluation of 
outcomes are thought to be critically mediated by cortical networks in frontal and 
parietal brain regions (e.g., Badre & Frank, 2012). Figure from: Ullsperger, 
Danielmeier, & Jocham, 2014.   		
1.1.2.	Action	perception	in	early	development			
Despite well-documented dissociations between action and perception in early life 
(e.g., DeLoache, Uttal, & Rosengren 2004), the existence of bidirectional links 
between action execution and action observation is supported by ample evidence 
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implicating analogous cortical mechanisms (e.g., Nitshitani & Hari, 2000; Rizzolatti, 
Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001).  
 
It has been argued that observed actions are consistently interpreted in terms of goals 
and intentions by the second year of life (e.g., Csibra, Gergely, Brockbank, Biro, & 
Koos, 1999; Gergely, 2001; Keen, 2011). There is much debate concerning the 
precise mechanisms that drive this early comprehension of movements as goal-
directed. To understand the development of early action perception several 
outstanding questions need to be addressed. For example, what kind of information 
about intentionality is actually available in the surface flow of movement and which 
aspects can infants detect?  Also, what strategies are involved in the observation of 
continuous action sequences and how are these skills acquired in ontogenetic 
development?  
 
Interpreting actions as either goal-directed or accidental calls for a mechanism of 
parsing the visual input into discrete action units. Thus, the capacity to track and 
encode intentionality in the surface flow of action depends on a number of prior skills 
that allow the segmentation of continuous sequences into goal-relevant components. 
Research in this direction suggests that the detection of distinct actions that coincide 
with intentions might be achieved in various ways.  
 
Knowledge-driven accounts of action segmentation can only explain how existing 
action concepts are modified on the basis of prior event knowledge, but fail to explain 
how novel events are segmented at intentional boundaries. An interesting alternative 
explanation, that considers top-down processes in conjunction with bottom-up 
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processes, suggests that sensory characteristics, that serve as more direct cues to 
detect the structure inherent in ongoing behaviour, constitute the initial basis for 
segmenting event sequences into distinct actions (e.g., Baldwin, Baird, Saylor & 
Clark, 2001, Zack, 2004). In the absence of prior event specific knowledge, action 
segmentation could be accomplished on the basis of movement features that correlate 
with the agent’s intentions. It is therefore plausible that sensitivity to structure 
detection constitutes the critical mechanism underlying action segmentation during 
infancy and early childhood because these are periods during which prior event 
knowledge is frequently lacking (e.g., Mendoza & Baldwin, 2014).  
 
Moreover, most everyday events contain an abundance of statistical regularities that 
correlates with goal-directed intentions embedded in the action stream. This may arise 
from predictable patterns of body motion, limb trajectory, changes in gaze direction, 
and timing of action sequences. Baldwin et al. (2001) propose that even infants are 
able to tap into such statistical patterns, in a way similar to the way they use structural 
information to segment continuous strings of syllables into word units (an analogy 
that has been frequently used, see Baldwin et al., 2001, Baird & Baldwin, 2001). 
Along this line of reasoning, Baldwin et al. tested 10- to 11-month-olds’ responses to 
interruptions of goal-directed events and discovered that these infants did indeed 
show increased interest when the sequence was paused in the middle of an intentional 
action, but not when paused between boundaries of activity. The authors concluded 
that action sequences were parsed in terms of low-level structure detection, 
suggesting that infants in this study picked up on statistical regularities of predictable 
motion patterns and temporal dynamics. Such a mechanism of action parsing does not 
rely on conceptual appreciations of intentionality and causal relations.  
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The notion of structure detection in hierarchically organized action is, therefore, 
critically implicated in early action comprehension. However, structural information 
alone cannot explain complex causal inferences and judgments about an actor’s 
intentions. Discerning intentions in everyday behaviour is by no means 
straightforward and frequently requires observers to detect coherence among discrete 
actions, while simultaneously disambiguating multiple goals in relation to specific 
contexts. Highly context dependent action knowledge is acquired with experience and 
is likely to interact with more general types of event processing (e.g., Baldwin, Baird, 
Saylor & Clark, 2001, Zack, 2004).  
 
In summary, perceptual sensitivity to physical and temporal regularities that coincides 
with intentional boundaries plays a pivotal role when context-specific information and 
knowledge about others’ motivations is not yet discernable. In this connection a 
constructivist account of intentional action has been put forward (Baldwin et al., 
2001), suggesting that infants initially interpret goal-directed behaviour in terms of 
low-level structure detection, which over time facilitates a gradual development 
towards more fine grained and meaningful analysis of the observed behaviour. This 
progression is thought to ultimately result in higher-level action representations that 
support causal understanding as well as interpretations of intentionality.  In this sense, 
early structure detection skills might bootstrap higher-level representations of 
intentional goal-directed behaviour.  However, there is currently little evidence 
regarding the precise mechanisms that mediate the encoding and retrieval of action 
knowledge in young children. The neural and cognitive architecture of action 
representation will be discussed in the following section.   
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1.1.3.	Action	concepts	and	the	neural	substrates	of	action	processing	
 
Over the last couple of decades research has presented in-depth and direct 
descriptions of the various neural networks underling the representation of 
knowledge. Neuropsychological evidence has fostered the development of 
comprehensive theoretical accounts of the mechanisms implicated in the retrieval of 
conceptual knowledge for categories of entities such as people, animals and objects 
(e.g., Cappa, Perani, Schnur, Tettamanti & Fanzio, 1998; Damasio, Damasio, Tranel 
& Brandt, 1990; Gainotti & Silveri, 1996; Martin, Wiggs, Ungerleider & Haxby, 
1996; Tranel, Damasio & Damasio, 1997; Humphreys & Ford, 2001). In particular, 
clinical findings from studies using neuroimaging, brain stimulation techniques, and 
neural modelling in adults now greatly shape our understanding concerning the 
cognitive architecture of knowledge representation (see Damasio & Damasio 1994 for 
a detailed discussion). Comparatively less research has explored how conceptual 
knowledge for action is cognitively represented and mediated by neural networks.  
Indeed, with the exception of neuropsychological studies investigating planning 
deficits in patients affected by apraxia and action disorganisation, a review of the 
literature reveals that there is little research on the cognitive and neural foundations 
subserving everyday action planning in healthy subjects (let alone developmental 
evidence).   
 
A good starting point into this literature is to think about how actions are represented 
at a cognitive level. Action features of any particular action must be represented by 
cognitive codes: in other words action concepts. Tranel, Kemmerer, Adolphs, 
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Damasio & Damasio (2003) propose that action concepts (or conceptual knowledge 
for action) constitute embodied knowledge about the movements and behaviours of 
both animate and inanimate entities. According to this definition, and in line with 
psychophysiological studies of brain activity during action and perception (e.g., Di 
Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese & Rizzollatti, 1992; Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese & 
Rizzolatti, 2000), action concepts not only contribute to the planning of our own 
actions but also guide our interpretation of other’s action and motor events in general.   
 
The close link between perception and action, proposed by James (1890) and 
subsequently developed within ideomotor frameworks, has long been capitalised on 
within the experimental action research. Based on the assumption that perception and 
action operate on a common representational domain, the existence of a strong 
functional link has been described for decades (e.g., Bortoletto, Mattingley, & 
Cunnington, 2011; Gibson, 1966, 1979; Greenwald 1970, 1972; James, 1890; Lotze, 
1952) and is now supported by neuropsychological evidence (e.g., Humphreys, 
Riddoch, Forti & Ackroyd, 2004). However, to date relatively little research has been 
initiated with the intention of investigating the internal representational structure 
underling this relationship.  
 
It has been hypothesized that in order to accurately explain action planning, action 
concepts must have a causal, spatial, and temporal organization, as well as one 
dimension involving intentions and another related to body parts (see Tranel, 
Kemmerer, Adolphs, Damasio & Damasio, 2003). This supposition certainly 
resembles the early philosophical analysis of action representation by Searle (1983), 
who argued that the cognitive representation of action ought to be anticipatory in the 
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sense that the effects of “own” and “other” actions need to be proactively advanced, 
and thus not only temporarily precede action execution but can even be completely 
detached in time and space (e.g., imagined actions).  
 
In what follows, various neural systems implicated in the retrieval of action concepts 
will be summarised. It is important to note that this section only provides an overview 
of the numerous neuropsychological studies with adults, and is thus by no means 
exhausted.   
 
Above all, structures associated with everyday action planning have been identified in 
higher-order association cortices, especially within the left premotor/prefrontal, left 
parietal, and left posterior middle temporal cortex (e.g., Chatterjee, 2001; Grézes & 
Decety, 2001; Giovannetti, Schwartz & Buxbaum 2007; Jeannerod, 1997; Schwartz, 
Montgomery, Buxbaum, Lee, Carew, Coslett, Ferraro, Fitzpatrick-DeSalme, Hart & 
Mayer, 1998; Kemmerer, Rudrauf, Manzel & Tranel, 2012). Left premotor and 
prefrontal cortices (Figure 1.3.), both extensively associated with cognitive control, 
also seem to play a fundamental role for the visuomotor processing of action. It is 
within the premotor region that Rizzolatti and Fadiga discovered mirror neurons in 
the macaque brain, now well-known for their characteristic activation during both 
movement production and observation of action. Moreover, canonical visuomotor 
neurons have been observed to fire reliably in response to the mere presentation of 
prehensile objects, and thus appear to play a pivotal role in the planning of actions 
that involve the use of tools (e.g., Bracci, Cavina-Pratesi, Ietswaart, Caramazza, & 
Peelen, 2012).  
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Processing of tool objects within this cortical region has been reported in monkeys 
(see Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese & Rizzolatti, 2000) as well as humans (see Chao & 
Martin, 2000). Closely related to this observation is evidence from neuroimaging 
studies that clearly highlights the role of premotor/prefrontal cortices in executing, 
observing, and imagining actions involving prehensile movement (e.g., Binkofski, 
Buccino, Posse, Seitz, Rizzolatti & Freund, 1999; Kilner, Neal, Weiskopf, Friston & 
Frith, 2009). Following this lead, Johnson-Frey, Maloof, Newman-Norlund and Farrar 
(2003) discovered that activity within the inferior section of the prefrontal cortex is 
not distinctly evoked by the kinematic motion of the hands per se, but rather in 
response to hand-object interactions, and thus in response to the realised goal of the 
observed prehensile action. 
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Figure 1.3. Frontal brain regions implicated in action planning and flexible adaptation 
of behaviour.  Cognitive control in goal-directed actions is mediated by activity in 
frontal brain regions, such as the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). Behavioural adaptations are thought to be achieved by 
means of reinforcement learning principles. Reinforcement learning is governed by 
mid-brain dopaminergic networks, which in turn interact with frontal structures (e.g., 
Holroyd & Coles, 2002).  Figure from: www.developingchild.harvard.edu, 2011. 
 
 
More posterior, somatosensory information is believed to be translated into an 
adequate format for action planning. Specifically the parietal cortex appears to be 
implicated in the production of standard hand actions such as reaching and grasping 
(e.g., Jeannerod, Arbib, Rizzolatti & Sakata, 1995). Moreover, networks within the 
parietal cortex are significantly activated during both observing purposeful hand 
movements (e.g., Bonda, Petrides, Ostry & Evans, 1996) and imagining hand actions 
(e.g., Gerardin, Sirigu, Lehéricy, Poline, Gaymard, Marsaul, Agid & Le Bihan, 2000).  
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Finally, the characteristic motion patterns of agents’ and object’s movements evoke 
regions within the posterior middle temporal cortex (e.g., see Dumoulin, Bittar, 
Kabani, Baker, Le Goualher, Pike, & Evans, 2000 for a detailed review). Several 
studies support the possibility that the left posterolateral temporal region, in 
particular, is implicated in representing more schematic aspects of actions, such as 
information about entities and dynamic relations between agents (e.g., Bedny, 
Caramazza, Grossman, Pascual-Leone & Saxe, 2008a; Grossman, Koenig, DeVita, 
Glosser, Alsop, Detre & Gee, 2002). Indeed, research indicates that temporal regions 
specifically contribute to the processing of action concepts that are organized more 
abstractly and in terms of conceptual properties, rather than sensory-motor experience 
related to visual and motion attributes (e.g., Bedny et al. 2008).  
 
In view of the evidence reviewed, an interesting question that arises is whether the 
neural networks supporting action concepts overlap with those associated with the 
retrieval of conceptual knowledge in general. Tranel et al. (2003) turned to this 
question in a neuropsychological study that aimed to compare conceptual knowledge 
for people, tools and actions across patients with circumscribed left or right 
hemisphere damage. Tranel et al.’s study is particularly noteworthy here because the 
authors aimed to separate out action concept retrieval from lexical processing (i.e., 
retrieval of verb knowledge) by using pictorial stimuli. Neuropsychological profiles 
were related to lesion sites on a set of tasks designed to measure retrieval of action 
concepts and conceptual knowledge for people and tools. The results of this study 
were brought into connection with previous findings of impaired retrieval of 
conceptual knowledge for discrete entities following right hemisphere damage 
(anterior, inferior, temporal and occipital lesions, see Tranel, Damasio & Damasio, 
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1997). Intriguingly, conceptual knowledge for people and actions appeared to rely on 
distinct neural systems, whereas brain regions presumably involved in the retrieval of 
conceptual knowledge for tools showed a partial overlap with those related to action 
concepts. The authors argued that this finding is not entirely surprising given that 
knowledge about tools tends to be defined by characteristic motion patterns (e.g., a 
hammer hammers, a screwdriver screws, etc.). Additional support for a distributed left 
lateralised network implicated in action planning comes from functional 
neuroimaging studies with healthy subjects (e.g., Bracci, Cavina-Pratesi, Ietswaart, 
Caramazza & Peelen, 2012; Johnson-Frey, Newman-Norlund & Grafton, 2005).  
 
Finally, it is noteworthy that there are a number of methodological impediments to 
this line of research. For instance, investigating habitual and everyday action planning 
in the laboratory environment poses considerable challenges. Many of the mistakes 
and action slips that can potentially inform us about everyday action planning require 
a high level of resemblance to real-world conditions for them to occur (see Schwartz 
2007 for a similar point).  
 
In summary, significant progress has been made in relating planning impairments to 
lesions in specific areas of the brain. However, clinical samples tend to be diverse and 
the relation between brain damage and behavioural impairments is by no means 
straightforward. Nonetheless, neuropsychological efforts continue to provide insight 
into the neural underpinnings of action planning by incorporating multiple formal 
measures of concept retrieval, lesion-deficit statistical mapping, and power analysis of 
lesion overlap. Indeed, careful considerations of findings from lesion studies (e.g., 
Norman & Shallice, 1986), together with computational accounts (e.g., Cooper & 
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Shallice, 2000), indicate that typical planning deficits demonstrated by patients could 
well be understood as an exaggeration of typical planning errors that occur under 
reduced cognitive resources due to fatigue, distraction, and divided attention (e.g., 
Gold & Park, 2009; Giovannetti, Schwartz & Buxbaum 2007; Schwartz, 2007; 
Schwartz, Montgomery, Buxbaum, Lee, Carew, Coslett, Ferraro, Fitzpatrick-
DeSalme, Hart & Mayer, 1998).  
 
From a developmental perspective, mechanistic accounts of action processing are first 
and foremost grounded in behavioural evidence. However, the maturation of action 
related brain networks has been addressed in several longitudinal studies. For 
instance, using mechanical tensor maps in 3- to 15-year-olds, Thompson et al. (2000) 
identified several waves of peak growths affecting most noticeably the corpus 
callosum in a rostral-causal direction. Repeated scanning of children from the age of 3 
to 6 years revealed that the fastest growth rates during the preschool period occurred 
in frontal callosal networks that regulate the planning and organization of new 
actions. The finding of rapid structural changes in this area is in line with PET studies 
reporting considerable increases in glucose metabolism in the frontal cortex from 2 to 
4 years of age (e.g., Chungani, Phelps, & Mazziotta, 1987). Relatedly, Gogtay et al. 
(2004) used MRI scanning techniques to visualize the development of grey matter 
density across the cortex. The results of this study suggest that lower-order 
somatosensory and visual cortices mature prior to higher-order associative cortices. 
Consecutive scanning between the ages of 4 – 21 years indicated that maturational 
changes in frontal lobes begin in the primary motor cortex and progress anteriorly 
over superior and inferior frontal areas, as well as laterally over parietal regions. As 
such, regions associated with motor and sensory basic functions are first to develop, 
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while brain regions that are linked to executive functions, attention, and motor 
coordination undergo a protracted development until adolescence. Interestingly the 
development of left hemisphere regions (prefrontal and inferior parietal areas) was 
observed to mature earlier than equivalent right hemisphere cortices, presumably 
reflecting the fact that most children in Gogtay et al.’s study were right-handed. The 
authors of this study proposed that the cellular substrates for these cortical changes 
originate from a combination of dendritic pruning, myelination, as well as substantial 
changes in the packing density in different cortical regions.  
 
In the next section we turn to several lines of developmental research that have 
provided in-depth descriptions of early action planning and associated regulatory 
abilities. Specifically, evidence of young infants’ perception of goal-directed 
behaviour will be related to higher-level inferences about complex action-outcome 
relationships. In addition, it will be argued that findings within the problem-solving 
research relate to young children’s abilities and limitations in action planning. Finally, 
this chapter concludes with some considerations on the preschool period as a time in 
development during which critical executive skills undergo substantial advances.   
 	
1.1.4.	Action	planning	and	the	regulation	of	sequential	behaviour			
Action and decision making research in human adults has demonstrated that action 
planning occurs under strict capacity limitations and thus fully rational planning, in 
terms of exact estimations of action outcomes, is highly infeasible (see Botvinick & 
Toussaint, 2012). Nonetheless, simple strategies are acquired to achieve reliable 
action planning in most everyday activities. Perhaps the most significant advances in 
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the ability to plan, monitor, and correct actions can be observed in young children’s 
behaviour.   
 
The current consensus among developmental researchers is that at the age of two 
years, toddlers’ self-generated actions are goal-driven and that the perceived actions 
of others are interpreted in terms of goals. Consequently, toddlers are to some extent 
able to match a representation of a goal with an outcome. Nevertheless, relatively 
little is known about action planning after this point in ontogenetic development. In 
other words, once an action can be planned with respect to a goal what are the 
developmental changes that drive young children’s increasing ability to organize their 
actions in ever more complex, hierarchically-organised, action sequences? This gap in 
the literature is somewhat surprising given that children demonstrate remarkable 
improvements and flexibility in their goal-directed behaviours during the preschool 
years.  
 
A main line of research investigating how perception, motor skills and cognition 
come together in intentional behaviour during childhood revolves around the 
development of problem solving abilities. As mentioned above, by the second year of 
life action planning is clearly evident in toddlers’ intentional actions, as demonstrated 
in a variety of problem-solving tasks (see among others Chen & Siegler, 2000; Chen 
et al. 2010; Claxton, et al. 2009; Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder, 1978; Keen, 2011, 
Koslowski & Bruner, 1972; Manoel & Moreira, 2005; McCarty, Clifton & Collard, 
1999, 2001). However, although toddlers might have all the relevant cognitive 
components to solve a problem, they might fail to organize them into a successful 
action sequence (e.g., Koslowski & Bruner, 1972; Bates, 1980).  
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In a typical problem-solving task, children plan sequential actions and anticipate 
action effects, while at the same time working to maintain a clear goal structure in 
mind. The development of these abilities is clearly interdependent. For example, Chen 
et al. (2010) tested 18- to 21-month-olds on their ability to build a wooden block 
tower, and found that when he retested the same children at the age of 3 years, 
children who tackled this task better at a younger age now showed significantly 
greater skills in their fine motor control. Although, in this particular study, the main 
focus was kinematic precision and movement timing, building a block tower does 
require children to engage in action planning that involves an organization of various 
consecutive steps. In addition, all children in this study mastered the task and were 
able to complete relatively high towers, indicating that the children monitored the 
effectiveness of their actions and made appropriate corrections when necessary. 
However, developmental evidence suggests that before three to four years of age, 
toddlers’ action correcting strategies are rather limited (e.g., Jones, Rothbart & 
Posner, 2003; Zelazo & Müller, 2002).   
 
Further evidence relevant to problem-solving, comes from studies investigating young 
children’s abilities to plan ahead in search of an optimal solution. Kaller et al. (2008) 
tested 4- and 5-years-olds in a classic ‘Tower of London’ task and discovered that 
although all children were able to generate correct action plans internally, only 5-
years-olds demonstrated optimal anticipatory planning abilities. A classic ‘Tower of 
London’ task arguably measures higher-level problem solving abilities. However, 
solutions may well be discovered by means of a step-by-step forward processing 
approach, rather than on the basis of anticipatory sub-goal planning. The results of 
	 33	
this study, therefore, point towards age-related effects in terms of search depths for 
the most appropriate solution, as well as backward validation of performed sub-
actions within a sequence. Backward validation is a concept that is closely related to 
performance monitoring. In the context of sequential actions, backward validation 
allows the detection of errors and thus adaptations (and indeed re-planning) of action 
even before outcomes occur.  
 
In close analogy to the problem-solving literature are works investigating the 
development of self-regulatory behaviours in preschool children (e.g., Carlson & 
Moses, 2001; Jones, Rothbart & Posner, 2003; Luria, 1973). The central role of 
executive functions for the planning, regulation, and control of action sequences, has 
been established in numerous studies with neuropsychological patients and typically 
developing children (e.g., Bush, Luu & Posener, 2000; Casey, Trainor, Giedd, Vauss, 
Vaituzis, Hamburger, Kozuch & Rapoport, 1997; MacDonald, Cohen, Strenger & 
Carter, 2000). Specifically, it is possible that executive functions are strongly 
involved in maintaining mentally specified goals during the execution of action plans, 
while inhibiting goal-unrelated actions that might be triggered by contextual features. 
This argument is supported by behavioural studies focusing on inhibition of inferring 
response tendencies in young children (see among others Carlson & Moses, 2001; 
Diamond & Taylor, 1996; Luria, 1959; Posner & Lang, 1999; Simpson & Riggs, 
2007).  
 
During the preschool period, the ability to inhibit prepotent actions and engage action-
related executive control undergoes dramatic developmental changes (Figure 1.4.). 
For instance, in a cross-sectional study by Jones et al. (2003), 3- and 4- years-old pre-
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schoolers were asked to follow the instructions given by one toy animal (typically 
self-directed actions such as touching their noses), while ignoring the commands of 
another. Results show a remarkable increase from 22% ability to inhibit incorrect 
responses in the 3-year-olds to 90% in the 4-years-olds. In addition, 4- but not 3- 
years-olds in this study demonstrated increased awareness of performance errors, as 
indicated by a reliable slowing in reaction times following incorrect actions. The 
authors interpret this finding as strong evidence for a change in the ability to respond 
to conflicting information, and put forward the idea that both the ability to make use 
of inhibitory control and executive attention in action ought to expand greatly during 
preschool years1. However, similar studies measuring children’s abilities to carry out 
actions under conflicting conditions report on going development that reaches at least 
into the seventh year of life (e.g., Rueda, Fan, McCandliss, Halparin, Gruber & 
Posner, 2004). Davidson et al. (2006) compared 4- to 13-years-olds’ performance in 
an executive control subtask (within a battery of higher-level tasks) that was in many 
ways analogous to the task employed by Jones et al. (2003). What Davidson and 
colleagues found was that inhibitory control of responses was exercised at a 
significantly greater cost for 4-year-olds than 6-years-olds.  
 
Together these results indicate that self-regulatory processes, involved in the ability to 
maintain, modify, and delay distal goals undergo important changes during the fourth 
year of life and most likely are subject to a long developmental progression that 
continues well into late childhood. 
																																																								
1It should be noted that there is an ongoing debate about whether error detection in this context develops prior to 
inhibitory control (as suggested by Posner & Rothbart 1998), or if in fact the ability to detect action errors depends 
on similar mechanisms as inhibitory control of action, which thus far has not been explicitly investigated. 
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Figure 1.4. The development of executive functions. Data from 476 participants 
ranging in age from 3 to 85 years on the NIH Toolbox for the Assessment of 
Neurological and Behavioural Function (NIH-TB). Results suggest rapid development 
of executive function skills between the ages of 3 and 5 years. Figure from: Weintraub 
et al. (2013).   
 
 
Finally, it has been suggested that advances in executive functions go hand in hand 
with developing an understanding of mental states, and that this would hold true for 
one’s own thoughts and beliefs as well as for those of others. Similar to previously 
outlined findings from executive control studies, the developmental link between self-
regulatory behaviour and theory-of-mind has been observed to become especially 
evident around the fourth year of life, when children perform correctly on tasks that 
require them to exert a considerable amount of self-control (e.g., day and night Stroop 
task, Gerstadt, Hong,  & Diamond, 1994; Window tasks, Russell, Mauthner, Sharpe, 
& Tidswell, 1991; DCCS card sorting test, Zelazo, 2006). It is generally agreed that 
around the same time in development children master most variations of ‘false-belief’ 
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tasks (e.g., other’s false beliefs, memory of own false belief, second-order false belief; 
for a review see Montgomery & Koeltzow, 2010). The argument that self-processes 
and a theory-of-mind understanding develop in tight connection seems sensible given 
that children before the fourth year of life have a good understanding of how people 
will act in terms of goals, but fail to understand that sometimes people have wrong 
beliefs about how to act or might carry out unsuccessful actions in pursuit of goals. 
Conceivably, on going experience in a wide range of action contexts and an improved 
understanding of self-processes involved in goal-directed behaviour might ultimately 
facilitate the transfer of knowledge from one situation to another. 
 
 
1.2.  Methods to study early planning and regulation of goal-directed 
behaviour 		
The cognitive abilities and mechanisms underlying the perception and execution of 
higher-level actions have been studied in many productive ways. Over the last 
decades various research methods have been combined to provide explanations of the 
transactional processes underlying goal-directed behaviour.  
 
Attempts to relate findings across cognitive domains have produced convergent 
evidence using multiple methodologies such as behavioural assessments, eye-
tracking, motion capturing, TMS, heart-rate monitoring, and functional imaging 
techniques. When studying young children and infant development, fundamental 
methodological and ethical issues cannot be overlooked. For instance, because MRI-
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based neural imaging methods are typically not feasible for use with very young 
children, research exploring the neurocognitive profile of preschool children in 
relation to action planning is almost completely lacking.  Moreover, studying action 
development the preschoolers is especially problematic because action-related 
processes are greatly affected by striking inter-individual variability and reduced 
within-individual reliability (e.g., Kushnerenko, Ceponiene, Balan, Fellman, & 
Naatanen, 2002; Morr, Shafer, Kreuzer, & Kurtzberg, 2002; Thierry, 2005). 
Nevertheless, some methods have been adapted to the study of child development 
reasonably well and provide valid means with which to investigate the dynamic 
internal processes that underlie goal-directed behaviour.  
 
In the chapters that follow, we discuss different methods specifically chosen for their 
suitability for answering the questions we are interested in. The next section will 
discuss the pros and cons of behavioural methods, EEG, and motion-capture 
techniques with respect to the study of goal-directed behaviour in preschoolers. More 
in-depth descriptions of these methods and their application for the purpose of this 
project can be found in the specific method sections of each study.  
 	
1.2.1.	Behavioural	studies		
Behavioural paradigms provide an important methodology to study action 
development. Some of the earliest systematic descriptions of young children’s 
behavioural performance on problem-solving tasks continue to shape current accounts 
of action development (e.g., Inhelder, Sinclair, & Bovet, 1974; Piaget 1926; Stern, 
1926).  
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Despite the long tradition of using behavioural tasks in developmental psychology, 
comparing performance across studies with even subtle methodological differences is 
never straightforward. As discussed in the previous sections, the use of standardised 
tests and well-controlled laboratory-based experiments has contributed fundamentally 
to what we now know about action perception and problem solving during the 
preschool period.  However, there appears to be an increasing awareness within the 
action research community that the field needs to move towards more ecologically 
valid tasks that can provide insights into how young children plan and control actions 
in everyday environments. While there is no one way of measuring the relationship 
between performance on any task and everyday ability, there is a strong argument for 
including both higher and lower demand variables to investigate cognitive processes 
that are engaged in realistic environments (e.g., Chaytor, Schmitter-Edgecombe, & 
Burr, 2006). In Study 1 (Chapter 2) we ask how planning interacts with external 
opportunities during the execution of a realistic action sequence. Study 2 (Chapter 3) 
presents evidence from an ecologically valid behavioural task in which the 
completion of a set of subordinate rules results in goal attainment at higher levels.  
 
As mentioned above, behavioural experiments provide a fitting methodology to 
investigate action cognition in the context of the current project and in the study of 
action development overall. Not withstanding a trend in cognitive science towards 
multi-method approaches, behavioural measures continue to enrich studies that 
primarily employ other methods such as EEG and motion capturing. For example, in 
Study 4 (Chapter 5) behavioural data complements EEG data to answer the question 
of whether preschoolers’ explicit judgement of action-goal relationships relates to 
mid-latency electrophysiological activity. Given that identical behaviour can result 
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from different mechanisms, behavioural measures alone struggle to provide direct 
evidence for hypothesised mechanisms underling behavioural performance. Arguably, 
there are no theoretical reasons to limit detailed investigations of action cognition to a 
single research method. However, combining methods is not without its challenges 
and may even have considerable pitfalls, such as involving researchers from diverse 
scientific backgrounds that may differ greatly in their experimental approach (see 
Yoshikawa, Kalil, Weisner, & Way, 2008 for a discussion of this).  
 
While behavioural methods generally inform us about overt performances (e.g., 
performance accuracy), numerous behavioural tasks also provide suitable indirect 
measures that tap the underlying cognitive processes (e.g., in terms of reaction times, 
or types of errors). Behavioural measures can be adapted to provide engaging and 
child-friendly tasks, which in turn allows researchers to run substantially more and 
longer test trials than possible with most other methods.  However, there are also a 
number of pitfalls associated with the use of behavioural methods with preschoolers. 
 
Testing preschool children can be challenging for many reasons. First of all, the 
degree to which behavioural responses can be obtained critically depends on 
children’s abilities to comprehend and retain verbal task instructions. As mentioned 
above, during the preschool period, children demonstrate large inter-individual 
differences in terms of virtually all cognitive abilities. Therefore, tasks need to be 
appropriate for a wide range of language, working memory, attention, and motoric 
capacities. Task instructions should be easily comprehensible, while the tasks 
themselves need to strike a balance between being engaging and quantifiable. 
Secondly, preschoolers’ difficulties to regulate emotional responses constitutes one of 
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the main reasons for high dropout rates in this age group. Therefore, preschoolers’ 
temperament, motivation, and willingness to comply behaviourally, need to be taken 
into account, especially when testing without the presence of caregivers.   
 
1.2.2.	Electrophysiological	measures	(EEG/	ERP)			
Electroencephalography (EEG) and more specifically event-related potentials (ERPs) 
provide a safe and suitable measure of stimulus-related brain activity in adults and 
young children (Figure 1.6.). ERPs are averaged variations in scalp potentials (i.e., 
summed voltage generated by groups of transitorily polarized neurons) that are time-
locked to the onset of distinct external stimuli or behavioural responses.  
 
ERP methods provide a powerful measure of electrophysiological patterns of brain 
activity with a millisecond temporal resolution. Because the voltage of cells other 
than those aligned at a 90 degree angle to the cortex is mostly cancelled out, what 
EEG methods pick up is for the most part activity that originates from large groups of 
co-linear pyramidal cells that fire in synchrony (see Lucks, 2005). The electrical 
activity within a given region of the brain gives rise to positive and negative 
waveforms of distinct ERP components. Distinct ERP components are interpreted as 
reflecting the neural processes generated by the underling brain regions2. The distinct 																																																									
2 ERP components at every electrode site reflect a mixed signal of both the electrical activity of scalp 
regions underling recording sites as well as activity propagated from other regions of the brain. 
Conceptually, components are considered as neural signals that originate from specific 
neuroanatomical modules and that is functionally related to certain conditions or operations. Some 
components, such as the N400, in fact consist of multicomponent conglomerations and further 
advances in source localizations techniques are needed in order to isolate individual sub-components 
that give rise to the N400 (see Lucks 2005).  
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topographical distributions of two ERP components is therefore taken as evidence that 
distinct neural processes are implicated, while differences in voltage amplitude and 
time-course are frequently considered as modulated by the same underlying neural 
source (see Lucks 2014 for a comprehensive discussion of ERP methods). For 
instance, in Study 4 (Chapter 5) we discuss distinct mid-latency ERP components that 
have been implicated in the processing of dynamic human actions.  
 
 
Figure 1.6. Geodesic Sensornets (EGI Inc., Eugene, Oregon). EEG data acquisition 
during a reaching task (A). Typical layout of a high-density sensor array comprised of 
128 recording channels (B). Source: http://www.cbcd.bbk.ac.uk/babylab.  
 
 
EEG/ERP techniques make it possible to measure real-time brain activity, thus 
providing an excellent method for studying the time-course of action processing with 
a millisecond temporal resolution. Another major advantage for the study of child 
cognition is the fact that ERPs offer insights into the “hidden” brain responses that 
underlie complex cognitive processes without the need for overt manifestations of 
behaviour. ERPs essentially reflect brain activity generated when specific mental 
!
!
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operations are performed, and thus provide a non-invasive measure with which to 
investigate the mechanisms involved in both perceptual and conceptual aspects of 
action processing.  
 
While generally delayed in infants, the overall time-course of ERP components 
appears to be otherwise comparable in infants and adults. In fact, several studies have 
evaluated the extent to which infant and adult ERPs reflect equivalent components 
(e.g., de Haan, Pascalis, & Johnson, 2002; Pascalis, de Haan, & Nelson, 2002). 
Therefore, EEG/ERP methods can critically inform us about the development of 
neural activity underlying action perception and planning abilities. However, 
interpreting brain activity across development and in relation to behavioural findings 
is by no means straightforward. In addition, there are a number of challenges involved 
in recording ERPs during the preschool period (see below). As a results evidence 
relating 3- and 5-year-olds ERPs to infant and adult data is almost completely lacking. 
 
As others have pointed out (e.g., Thierry, 2005) electrophysiological measures of 
child cognition are noisy and technically difficult to obtain. This appears to be 
especially the case during the preschool period. In fact, for ERP paradigms the 
preschool years are the kind of in-between period that makes data acquisition 
notoriously problematic. A typical developing preschooler’s motor behaviour is not 
constrained by the physical limitations that positively impact on the ERP signal-to-
noise ratio during infancy, while the abilities to inhibit prepotent responses and 
regulate emotions are yet to develop.    
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The vast majority of developmental ERP evidence concerns perceptual processing 
and automatic attentional responses, probably because these are the type of operations 
that are expected from very young children. Moreover, difficulties in capturing 
children’s visual attention over the minimum number of trials required for ERP 
analyses have led to a preference for auditory stimuli over the use of visual 
stimulation. In fact, auditory stimuli may even be presented during sleep, which 
dramatically reduces motor artefacts.  
 
It should also be noted that time-locking of ERPs to the onset of visual events works 
generally best when stimuli are static and appear suddenly. In realistic behaviour, 
however, goals neither appear nor disappear suddenly, nor are actions static in nature. 
Clearly, in order to inform us about natural sequential behaviour, ERP methods need 
to be adapted to allow the presentation of dynamic events.  Chapter 5 will return to 
this point in the context of a study in which we used video material of naturalistic 
actions to investigate preschoolers’ perception of higher-level goals.   
 
Finally, probably the most infamous shortcoming of EEG methods is the inverse 
problem 3 and the current lack of widely accepted techniques to reliably localise the 
source of neural generators. The generators of ERP components are not directly 
measurable and the number of likely dipoles that give rise to individual components 
can only be approximated using constraining techniques.   
 																																																								3	The inverse problem refers to the circumstance that electricity does not travel in a straight line and 
ERPs generated in any part of the brain can be detected at very distant sites (depending on how many 
cells are activated, the distribution of neural tissues, the cortical structure, etc.).  Moreover, when 
electrical currents hit the skull, ERPs are smeared laterally. Thus, any one distribution of voltage 
measured at the scalp could be generated by an infinite number of dipoles (see Lucks, 2005).	
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1.2.3.	Motion	capture	
 
Motion capture is the process of sampling and recording a live motion sequences with 
the aim of translating it into motion data that allows for a 3D reconstruction of the 
performance. In other words, transforming a live performance into a digital version of 
the action. Figure 1.5. shows a typical setup for indoor motion capture.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.5. Example of optical system setup and data reconstruction. Optical marker-
based motion capture systems use spherical passive retro-reflective markers 
(approximately 4 mm diameter), which are then traced by multiple cameras at about 
100Hz sampling rate. A marker can be placed anywhere on the participant’s body (A). 
Marker positions are reconstructed three-dimensionally and kinematic information is 
extracted for motion analyses (B).  Source: http://www.qualisys.com. 
 
 
Investigating kinematic parameters such as motion trajectories, acceleration, and 
deceleration is one step forward in answering the question of why movement has the 
form it does. Clearly, the discrete motion segments of complex actions are not solely 
shaped by the passive dynamics of our bodies. Especially in the execution of 
!
!
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sequential activities, individual segments are joined and connected in a way that 
reflects considerable planning and control. From an embodied cognition perspective, 
motion kinematics are not completely specified a priori, but rather emerge in real 
time from interactions between the properties of the body with internal control 
structures and the environment (e.g., Wilson & Golonka, 2013).  Capturing motion 
therefore provides an indirect measure of interacting resources distributed across the 
brain and body as motion unfolds in specific contexts.   
 
In relation to goal-directed behaviour, several studies have used motion capture 
techniques to examine the spatiotemporal representation of reaching actions in adults 
(e.g., Tipper, Howard, & Houghton, 1998; Tipper, Howard, & Jackson, 1997). While 
participants have little or no awareness of motion patterns involved in common 
actions (e.g., reach-to-grasp actions), they nevertheless show systematic differences in 
the kinematic parameters of object manipulation as a function of object category and 
position (e.g., Jervis, Bennett, Thomas, Lim, & Castiello, 1999). Therefore, an 
important advantage of this method is that it captures planning related processes that 
implicitly impact on the kinematic output and even anticipated movements.  
 
Various motion capture technologies (e.g., optical, mechanical, and magnetic 
systems) are suitable for investigating the physical interactions that take place during 
goal-directed actions.  Optical systems have the important advantage that sensors can 
be arranged flexibly. In contrast to mechanical systems, optical motion capture 
requires minimal marker configuration on the body, leaving joints unconstrained, and 
thus the flow of motion unimpeded. This makes optical systems highly suitable for 
the study of natural goal-directed actions in children. The sensors used in optical 
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systems are virtually unbreakable and, overall, well-tolerated by children and even 
infants. Moreover, optical systems allow the capture of large-scale movements in 
open environments with an overall high sampling rate.  
 
However, some of the drawbacks of optical motion capture systems are that they are 
limited to positional data (angles need to be calculated) and occlusion of sensors 
causes marker identification issues during post-processing.  
 
In Study 5 (Chapter 6), we present an experiment in which we employed optical 
motion-capture techniques to explorer how the processing of perpetual and conceptual 
features affects real-time kinematic motor output in adults and across childhood (6 -
12-year-olds). 	
1.3. Objectives 		
To summarise the forgoing sections, this project used a range of novel behavioural 
tasks, ERP methods, and motion capture techniques to investigate how preschoolers 
perceive goal-directed events and use this knowledge in their own execution of 
hierarchically structured sequential behaviour. Combining these methods allowed us 
to investigate the developmental trajectories of action-related processes at different 
levels of abstraction, ranging from the level of raw movement, to cognitive processes, 
as well as the neural mechanisms involved.  As we shall see in the following chapters, 
the preschool period constitutes a time in development during which planning and 
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control abilities undergo important advances with respect to goal pursuit. Specifically, 
the project aimed to: 
 
1) Investigate the impact of action perception on 3- and 5-year-olds’ planning of a 
familiar action sequence. 
 
2) Evaluate preschoolers’ strategic action planning in an ecologically valid task. 
 
3) Contrast the degree to which 3- and 5-year-olds endogenously detect the need to 
adjust top-down control in the face of conflicting information. 
 
4) Identify the neural mechanisms that are functionally implicated in the semantic 
analyses of higher-level goals across preschoolers and adults.  
 
5) Assess how covert cognitive processes influence the kinematic parameters of 
adults’ and children’s reach-to-grasp actions. 
 
The individual studies in this project address a wide range of action related processes, 
spanning from the perception and comprehension of other people’s actions to the 
ability to plan and and organise one’s own behaviour. However, from the evidence 
reviewed above it should be clear that action comprehension and production are 
fundamentally linked. As we shall see in the next chapter, observing other people 
engage in a sequential event critically influences preschoolers’ subsequent execution 
of the sequence. As argued above, the overall lack of developmental evidence 
concerning action cognition during the preschool period stands in sharp contrast to the 
remarkable improvements that preschoolers reflect in carrying out complex goal-
directed behaviours. The current project set out to identify the critical mechanisms 
and processes that drive action development during this crucial time in development. 
To this end, most of the studies described in the next chapters focus on preschoolers 
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three to five years of age. Some studies, however, sought to situate preschoolers’ 
performances and electrophysiological profiles in respect to children near the end of 
the childhood years and adults. All findings are discussed in relation to action 
representation at specific levels of abstraction, ranging from the perception of 
complex goal hierarchies to the planning of a reach-to-grasp action. Together, the 
next five chapters provide novel and wide ranging insight that advances the field of 
action cognition in understanding the developmental trajectories implicated in 
hierarchical event processing.  Before moving on to a detailed description of the 
individual studies, the next section will briefly outline the methods used in this 
project. 
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CHAPTER 2 	
The Planning and Execution of Natural Sequential Actions in the 
Preschool Years4 	
2.1.	Introduction				
Preschool children’s abilities to learn from observation has been the focus of 
considerable theoretical and empirical work. A wealth of developmental research 
suggests that young children reliably over-imitate modelled actions. Across two 
experiments, we asked whether a single misleading demonstration significantly 
impacts preschoolers’ planning and execution of a familiar event sequence. In 
Experiment 1, we found that despite sufficient task knowledge, 3- and 5-year-olds 
readily incorporated irrelevant modelled actions into their own performances. In 
Experiment 2, we found that when the underlying event structure was spatially cued, 
over-imitation was no longer apparent in preschoolers’ re-enactment of the sequence. 
These findings serve as evidence for a tight coupling between perceptual and 
conceptual processing systems in early action planning. Taken together, findings from 
both experiments suggest that over-imitation behaviour in these tasks results from a 
failure to evaluate the observed links between procedural components of the sequence 
in respect to the overarching goal of the task. These results further contrast with the 
existing developmental literature by suggesting that, in the context of familiar actions, 																																																								4 	Freier, Cooper, & Mareschal, (2015). The planning and execution of natural 
sequential actions in the preschool years. Cognition, 144, 58-66. 	
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over-imitation significantly decreases during the preschool period. Findings are 
discussed in the context of preschoolers’ abilities to plan and execute sequential 
actions.  		
2.1.1.	Goal-directed	sequential	actions		
		
Natural actions tend to unfold over extended periods of time in hierarchically 
structured sequences. Within this hierarchy, higher-level goals are represented at the 
top level and are composed of more basic goals, which in turn are organised into sub-
goals at the next level, descending in this manner to the lowest level (e.g., Barker & 
Wright, 1954; Grafton & de Hamilton, 2007; Lashley, 1951). Successful action 
planning involves at least some knowledge about how the intended outcomes can be 
achieved. Thus structuring hierarchical events into discrete goal-directed units plays a 
fundamental role in determining which components that make up an action sequence 
are necessary in order to accomplish our goals, and which action features should be 
left unspecified, thus making fast adaptation to contextual variations possible (e.g., 
sub-movements of a given action that determine the manner with which the action is 
carried out). As mentioned in Chapter 1, formal theories in psychology have argued 
that goal / sub-goal hierarchies are central to both parsing observed sequences and 
planning ones own wilful behaviours (see among others Cooper, & Shallice, 2006; 
Lashley, 1951; Norman, & Shallice, 1986; Rosenbaum, Cohen, & Jax, 2007; Zacks & 
Swallow, 2007; Zacks & Tversky, 2001). In the same vein, several lines of research 
have argued that imitation of goal-directed actions is fundamentally mediated by 
hierarchically structured event representations (e.g., Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & 
Gattis, 2000; Byrne & Russon, 1998). However, little is known about how 
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representational hierarchies are acquired in a way that assures consistent goal 
attainment while at the same time allowing enormous flexibility in the organisation of 
sequential actions.  
 
Furthermore, natural everyday actions tend to be embedded into a continuous flow of 
dynamic goal-directed behaviour. Pauses marking the boundaries of distinct actions 
are rare (see Asch, 1952; Baldwin, Baird, Saylor, & Clark 2001; Heider, 1958; 
Newtson & Engquist, 1976). At the same time, natural actions are frequently 
disrupted mid-sequence by unpredicted events or actions that relate to outcomes other 
than the primary goal. This discontinuity poses a particular challenge for the parsing 
of sequences composed of sub-actions with varying degrees of familiarity. In order to 
learn from the observation of a natural behaviour, actions relevant to specific goals 
must first be discovered within the stream of motion that makes up the event. Equally, 
goal-irrelevant elements embedded within an observed action sequence need to be 
identified as such and later disregarded when re-enacting the sequence. 
 
Despite the remarkable abilities that even toddlers demonstrate in parsing complex 
sequential actions of others (e.g., Baldwin, et al. 2001), relatively little is known about 
the development of action processing during the toddler and preschool years. This gap 
in the literature is surprising given that this is when children become particularly 
adept at taking observed behaviour into account in order to achieve internally and 
externally specified goals.  
 
Within the social domain, a wealth of evidence has spoken to the importance of 
imitative behaviour as a driving force for the acquisition of cultural knowledge and 
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early appreciations of other’s intentions (see Over & Carpenter, 2012, for a recent 
review). For instance, 3-year-olds reliably imitate the complex structure underlying 
novel multistep event sequences, indicating a good ability to parse dynamic behaviour 
systematically and to relate it to goals (e.g., Whiten, Flynn, Brown & Lee, 2006). 
Indeed, preschool children appear to reproduce even complex events so consistently 
that they may include irrelevant elements of the observed behaviour. This sort of 
indiscriminate imitation, also referred to as over-imitation (Lyons, Young, & Keil, 
2007) or over-copying (Whiten, Horner, & Marshall-Pescini, 2005), has been 
considered a kind of default mechanism by which children learn to perform new 
actions through observation (Whiten et al. 2005). This line of thinking is further 
supported by findings from social learning studies in 3- to 5-year-olds (see Horner & 
Whiten, 2005; McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn, & Horner, 2007), indicating that preschool 
children copy a model’s actions although some elements of the sequence are clearly 
irrelevant in order to reach the outcome. Lyons et al. (2007) further demonstrated that 
a strong tendency to over-imitate modelled actions persists even when preschoolers 
are specifically asked to perform only the necessary steps of the action sequence and 
leave “silly extra things” out. The authors suggest that given that causal factors are 
not always transparent in human actions, blanket copying of behaviour enables 
children to assimilate new skills even when the underlying causal relations are poorly 
understood. Indeed, there are good reasons why children should exhibit susceptibility 
to over-imitation, as copying may facilitate the complex skill acquisition and only 
occasionally lead to inappropriate actions, which in turn will be corrected later in 
development (Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 2009).  
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Findings demonstrating young children’s tendency to overly copy actions they 
observe are particularly striking when considered in the light of studies claiming 
relatively sophisticated “rational imitation” in preverbal infants as young as 12-
months (Zmyj, Daum, & Aschersleben, 2009; Schwier, van Maanen, Carpenter, & 
Tomasello, 2006), and 14-months of age (Gergely, Bekkering, & Kiraly, 2002). 
Similarly, infants appear to re-enact actions constrained by enabling relations more 
systematically than when links between actions are arbitrary (e.g., Bauer & Fivush, 
1992; Brugger, Lariviere, Mumme, & Bushnell, 2007). It thus appears that a tendency 
to over-imitate observed behaviour emerges later in ontogenetic development. 
 
Imitation of causally irrelevant actions has been observed to increase from the age of 
three to five years (McGuigan et al., 2007) and arguably becomes even more reliable 
with increasing age  (e.g., Marsh, Ropar, & Hamilton, 2014; McGuigan, Makinson & 
Whiten, 2011; McGuigan, et al., 2012). There are various explanations as to why the 
degree of over-imitative behaviour ought to increase with ongoing development (e.g., 
Horner & Whiten, 2005; Kenward, 2012; Kenward, Karlsson & Persson, 2011; 
Lyons, Damrosch, Lin, Macris & Keil, 2011; McGuigan, Gladstone & Cook, 2012). 
These resemble one another only in the deep divide that they draw between cognitive 
and social factors.  
 
To avoid confounds with prior event knowledge, over-imitation in adults and children 
has been explored using novel and relatively abstract tasks. However, as discussed 
above, in real life settings observers tend to have some prior knowledge regarding the 
task at hand or may even entertain expectations about events given the context in 
which they are carried out. As others have noted, when an action sequence is not well 
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understood most sub-actions preceding the outcome are likely to be encoded as 
causally significant at any point in development (Kenward, et al. 2011; see also 
Williamson & Markman, 2006).  Moreover, there is currently no evidence suggesting 
that either social mechanism or causal reasoning singlehandedly accounts for over-
imitation behaviour in young children and adults. While recently more comprehensive 
perspectives have been put forth (e.g., Marsh, Ropar, & Hamilton, 2014; Over & 
Carpenter, 2012), an integrative account of over-imitation incorporating contributions 
from social factors, causal reasoning, and prior knowledge to higher-level event 
processing is clearly missing. 
 
The primary aim of our first study was to examine over-imitation in the context of a 
familiar target sequence involving the manipulation of a set of well-known objects. 
To this end children viewed a pre-recorded video demonstrating a woman preparing a 
sandwich (the overarching goal) among various goal-irrelevant distractor actions. 
Thereafter, children were prompted to complete the task themselves. Prior evidence 
suggests that toddlers are somewhat reluctant to reorganise familiar sequences that are 
newly modelled in relation to the temporal order in which they are presented (e.g., 
Bauer & Thal, 1990; O’Connell & Gerard, 1985). It thus appears rather unlikely that 
when re-enacting a relatively familiar event sequence preschoolers would give up 
already established representations and exhibit blanket copying of a misleading 
demonstration. Alternatively, one might expect to observe a trade-off between the 
preschoolers’ reluctance to override existing event knowledge and the tendency to 
over-imitate modelled actions. 
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In view of the developmental research discussed above, we predicted that 3- and 5-
year-olds would weight the misleading demonstration differently. More specifically, 
we expected that younger children would struggle to identify irrelevant sub-actions as 
such and may further show overall greater susceptibility to perceptual influences of 
the action context (e.g., the array of objects per se). In turn, older children were 
expected to structure the observed event in terms of specific procedural components 
and their relative outcomes, and thus disregard irrelevant actions that did not fit the 
sequential hierarchy.  
To preview our findings, we observed that in the absence of a misleading 
demonstration both 3-and 5-year-olds demonstrated comparable competencies to 
carry out the familiar target sequence. When, however, children viewed a misleading 
demonstration prior to task performance clear patterns of over-imitation behaviour 
emerged in both age groups. Moreover, we found that the tendency to re-enact 
irrelevant actions decreased during the preschool period. We argue that the ability to 
assess sequential actions in terms of goal hierarchies is a demanding task even when 
goal-related elements are well understood.  
2.2.	Experiment	1		
We presented 3- and 5-year-olds with either a misleading demonstration of the target 
action (a woman preparing a sandwich) or an unrelated event (a woman wrapping a 
gift). Experiment 1 thus involved four groups of participants in a 2x2 multifactorial 
design. Prior investigation confirmed that preschool children are frequently exposed 
to meal preparing activities, while having negligible experience in carrying out these 
actions themselves. The extent of children’s experience with the target action was 
further assessed using a questionnaire that parents completed during the test session. 
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The study was approved by the institutional ethics committee and conducted 
according to the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
2.2.1.	Methods			
Participants	
	
Preschool children’s performances were investigated across two age groups: 3    
(range = 36-47 months; M = 40.4 months; SD = 2.9 months) and 5 years (range = 60-
70 months; M = 64.7 months; SD = 2.8 months). All conditions included 15 children 
(total N = 60; female = 34). Parental consent was obtained for each participant. 
Parents also completed a questionnaire assessing the level of direct experience 
children had in performing the target sequence, as well as the degree to which the 
event did indeed constitute a familiar sequence for the child. All children included in 
the final sample had observed the target action numerous times within an everyday 
context and were also familiar with watching video material. None of the children 
included in this study had ever independently performed the entire sandwich making 
sequence.  
 
Procedure		
	
All children participating in this study were tested individually within local 
preschools, and all testing was video recorded for later analysis. Within each age 
group children were randomly assigned to either: (1) a misleading demonstration 
condition (a woman preparing a sandwich), or (2) an unrelated demonstration 
condition (a woman wrapping a gift). The aim of the later was to assess 3- and 5-year-
olds’ abilities to perform the target action based on prior experience alone. This 
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control condition was included to provide an estimate of children’s baseline 
knowledge in this task. Moreover, this condition served to assess whether 3-and 5-
year-olds’ performances reflected similar levels of object exploration and whether 
children showed preferences for certain objects.  
 
Children in each condition watched a pre-recorded action sequence (either sandwich 
preparation or gift wrapping), which showed a continuous stream of everyday 
behaviour and included a total of 13 objects. At the beginning of each clip, the female 
demonstrator looks at the camera and then goes on to perform 13 discrete sub-action 
(6 goal-directed sub-actions and 7 distractor sub-actions). In order to minimize 
ostensive influences on the children’s subsequent action, she does not direct her gaze 
into the camera during this time. All individual sub-actions are summarised in Table 
2.1. Goal-directed and irrelevant actions occur interleaved and without breaks 
between individual elements of the sequence. Figure 2.1. shows the stimulus setup for 
the misleading demonstration condition.  
 
Every participant watched a single demonstration followed by one test phase. Without 
further instructions, the experimenter asked each child to view either the misleading 
or unrelated pre-recorded event (approximately 2 minutes in duration). During this 
time the experimenter stepped back and monitored that all children viewed the entire 
demonstration. Thereafter, children were guided to a child-sized table, where they 
encountered all objects displayed in the misleading demonstration. Children were 
prompted to perform the task with a picture illustrating a generic jam sandwich and 
the instruction “Can you make me a jam sandwich, while I speak to your 
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mum/dad?” 5 . The experimenter and the caretaker withdrew and directed their 
attention away from the child towards the parent questionnaires. Caretakers were 
instructed not to look at their children or comment on their performance until the 
children had verbally indicated that the final goal of the task had been reached.  
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Spatial distribution of goal-relevant (3) and distractor objects (10) in the 
pre-recorded action sequence. The demonstration involved 13 discrete actions in a 
continuous sequence. Relevant (6) and irrelevant elements (7) of the sequence were 
presented interleaved. In the test phase of Experiment 1, all children encountered the 
objects displayed as shown in the misleading demonstration. 
																																																								5	Over-imitation paradigms frequently highlight that demonstrated actions should be precisely copied, 
by either ostensively signalling or directly instructing children to imitate (e.g., “Watch what I do and 
do it just like I did”,  “Watch what happens because I’m going to let you have a go in a minute.”). In 
our task we aimed to keep instructions neutral in an attempt to avoid biasing towards over-imitation 
behaviour.	
	 59	
 
Table 2.1. Discrete Sub-actions in the Experimental Condition 
 
Goal-Relevant Actions 
 
Goal-Irrelevant Actions  
1.  Taking a bag of sugar out of a transparent 
glass jar. 
 
2.  Taking the lid off a large red jar and 
filling it with the sugar (1.). 
3. Taking two slices of bread out of their 
packaging. 
 
 
4. Placing the bead slices (3.) next to each other 
on the workspace. 
 
5.  Taking a small mixing bowl. 
6. Opening a jar of jam.  
7.  Scooping the jam (6.) into the mixing 
bowl (5.) and stirring it. 
 
8. Selecting a knife from a set of tools.  
9.  Taking a second bag of sugar and pouring 
its content into the red jar (2.). 
 
10. Spreading jam (6.) onto the bread (3.). 
 
 
11.  Putting the lid on the red jar (2.) and 
shaking it. 
 
12. Combing the two pieces of bread (4.). 
 
 
13.  Peeling a banana and placing it on the 
workspace next to the sandwich. 
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Scoring		
	
Several measures were developed to assess preschoolers’ abilities to plan and execute 
the familiar target sequence, as well as to quantify the degree of over-imitation 
evoked in this task. All recorded test sessions were transcribed and coded by two 
independent coders in terms of intrusion of irrelevant actions, sequencing errors, 
number of objects manipulated, and total time acted. These measures were defined as 
follows:  
  
Intrusion scores: All actions carried out on objects classified as “distractor objects” 
were either irrelevant or superfluous to attaining the overarching goal and were thus 
considered intrusions of distractor actions. This measure was operationalised by 
dividing the time acting on distractor objects by the total performance time (from 
making contact with the first object to affirming that the goal had been reached). 
Intrusion scores therefore provide an index of the proportion of over-imitation 
behaviour in relation to the overall performance. Similar proportion scores have been 
used in previous studies to tap over-imitation behaviour (e.g., “irrelevant imitation 
score”, McGuigan et al. 2007; McGuigan & Whiten, 2009).  
 
Error rates: An error classification was derived from previous research on sequential 
behaviour in healthy participants (Ruh, Cooper & Mareschal, 2010) and from research 
with neuropsychological populations (Schwartz et al., 1998). Any behaviour that fell 
under the following categories contributed to one error score: sequencing errors; i.e. 
omissions and anticipations of sub-actions, perseveration; i.e. repetition of 
successfully implemented sub-action or failure to terminate actions, and object 
substitutions; e.g. using a screwdriver to spread jam instead of a knife.  
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Number of objects manipulated: The three objects needed to accomplish the task were 
coded as relevant objects. All other objects that children overtly manipulated were 
coded as distractor objects. This measure thus correlates with intrusion scores. 
However, while intrusion scores give an estimate of the proportion of time spent 
occupied with distractor objects, the number of objects that had been manipulated 
during that time provides additional information regarding the number and range of 
distractor actions that children produced.    
 
Total time: Performance times were measured from the first object manipulation to 
indicating that the goal had been reached. Therefore, this measure provides valuable 
information regarding discrepancies between action planning and execution. For 
instance, it might be expected that 5-year-olds generally act faster in this task because 
they do not exhibit difficulties manipulating objects that require fine motor dexterity 
(such as a knife). If, in fact, differences in overall performance time are due to 
differences in the skilled manipulation of goal-relevant objects, it should be expected 
that 3- and 5- year-olds differ only in terms of the total time needed but not on the 
number of objects used to accomplish the goal.  
 
In addition to these primary measures several behaviours were coded but excluded 
from more detailed analyses due to their rare or unsystematic occurrence. For 
instance, mid-sequence pausing, picking up of objects without performing any 
identifiable action, and correcting actions were all coded but their low frequencies     
(< 1%) did not permit further analyses.  
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2.2.2.	Results			
Preliminary testing indicated no violations of multivariate assumptions. Initial 
analyses revealed no significant main effects or interactions of gender or direct 
experience with the task as indicated by parents in the questionnaires. Interrater 
reliability analysis indicated substantial consistency among coders (Cohen’s kappa = 
0.76). Performance differences across conditions (misleading demonstration / control) 
and age groups (3 years / 5 years), in terms of the combined performance measures 
(Intrusion scores / Error rates / Relevant objects manipulated / Irrelevant objects 
manipulated / Total time), were analysed using a between-groups multivariate 
ANOVA. In order to investigate the relation of Age group and Condition with each 
dependent measure separately, the original alpha level was adjusted to .01.  
 
Table 2.2 summarises all means and standard deviations.  Initial multivariate 
analyses, revealed statistically significant differences between 3- and 5-year-olds on 
the combined dependent variable F(5, 52) = 6.14, p < .001; η!"= .37, as well as a 
significant multivariate main effect for Condition F(5,52) = 13.4, p < .001; η!"  = .56. 
In addition, we found a significant interaction between Condition and Age group 
F(5,52) = 4.75, p = .001; 	η!"  = .31. Univariate analysis indicated that the interaction 
between Age group and Condition was highly significant in terms of Intrusion scores 
F(1,56) = 18.6, p < .001; η!"  = .25, such that, in contrast to 5-year-olds, 3-year-olds 
were on average over three times more prone to perform distractor actions after 
having observed the target sequence including distractor actions (M = 46%, SD = 24% 
vs. M = 14%, SD = 16%),  but were in fact consistently less engaged in distractions in 
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the control condition than were 5-year-olds (M = 1%, SD = 3% vs. M = 4%, SD = 
11%).  
 
Figure 2.2. illustrates scores for each age group and condition. Further significant 
interaction effects of Age and Condition were observed in relation to the Total 
performance time F(1,56) = 8.02, p = .006;  η!"  = .13 and Distractor objects 
manipulated F(1,56) = 15.6, p < .001; η!"  = .22, indicating that 5-year-olds acted 
generally faster than 3-year-olds, but this difference was far more pronounced in the 
misleading demonstration condition (M = 4.36 min., SD = 2.12 min. vs. M = 9.36 
min., SD = 4.60 min.) than in the control condition (M = 2.60 min., SD = 1.31 min. vs. 
M = 3.34 min., SD = 2.25 min.). Similarly, approximately equal numbers of distractor 
objects were manipulated by 3- and 5-year-olds in the control condition (M = 0.5, SD 
= 1.9 vs. M = 0.3, SD = 0.5) but not in the misleading demonstration condition, with 
5-year-olds manipulating fewer objects than 3-year-olds (M = 1.9, SD = 2.0 vs. M = 
5.1, SD = 1.9).  
 
These results suggest that although Age group as a factor explains 37% of the 
observed variance, Condition appears to be the more influential factor on the 
combined performance measure. Indeed, considering the effect of Condition for all 
dependent variables separately, univariate tests showed substantial main effects for 
Intrusion scores F(1,56) = 45.4, p < .001; η!"	 = .45, total time F(1,56) = 26.7, p <.001; 
η!"  = .32, and number of Distractor objects manipulated F(1,56) = 66.5, p < .001;	η!"  = 
.54. No significant main effects or interactions were found for Error rates or Number 
of relevant objects manipulated.  
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Figure 2.2. Means of intrusion scores, number of distractor objects manipulated, total 
time, and error rates, plotted by age group and condition. 
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Table 2.2. Descriptive Statistics 1 
 
 Condition Age Mean SD N 
Error Rates 
 
experimental 3 .67 .72 15 
5 .47 .52 15 
control 3 .60 .73 15 
5 .53 .52 15 
Intrusion Scores 
 
experimental 3 .46 .24 15 
5 .14 .16 15 
control 3 .01 .03 15 
5 .04 .11 15 
Time Total in 
minutes 
experimental 3 9.36 4.59 15 
5 4.36 2.12 15 
control 3 3.34 2.55 15 
5 2.60 1.31 15 
Number of 
relevant objects 
manipulated 
experimental 3 2.80 .41 15 
5 3.00 .01 15 
control 3 2.88 .35 15 
5 2.90 .26 15 
Number of 
distractor objects 
manipulated 
experimental 3 5.07 1.94 15 
5 1.87 2.03 15 
control 3 .47 .74 15 
5 .27 .46 15 
SD = standard deviation; N = number of participants. Error Rates = total number of errors.  Intrusion 
scores = time acting on distractor objects divided by total acting time. 
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2.2.3.	Discussion			
Real-life sequential actions are frequently interrupted by actions other than those 
directly relevant to achieving one particular outcome. The ability to parse dynamic 
events into goal-relevant and irrelevant components plays a pivotal role in learning 
from observation. In Experiment 1, we asked whether preschoolers’ planning and 
execution of a familiar event sequence was significantly influenced by prior viewing 
of a misleading demonstration. 
 
Overall, results in Experiment 1 indicate that 3- and 5-year-olds demonstrated similar 
competencies to perform the target sequence based on prior event knowledge alone. 
Moreover, results suggest that preschoolers in both age groups did not demonstrate a 
general preference to manipulate objects in any particular order (e.g., the first three 
objects within the line-up). Our control data confirms that both age groups were well 
able to identify actions that were linked to the overarching goal of the task in a 
meaningful way, and were further able to relate sub-actions in terms of their 
hierarchical organisation. However, in contrast to 5-year-olds, 3-year-olds’ re-
enactment of the target action was significantly more influenced by a single 
misleading demonstration. A strong tendency to incorporate irrelevant actions was 
apparent in terms of all outcome measures. After having viewed a misleading 
demonstration 3-year-olds overall required not only more time, but also used ten 
times as many distractor objects to accomplish the target sequence. In fact, 3-year-
olds closely matched their performance to the observed demonstration in the sense 
that after watching the misleading demonstration half of their actions were irrelevant 
to producing the overarching goal. Their actions instead bore a strong resemblance to 
the demonstrated sequence, in which the time dedicated to relevant and irrelevant 
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elements was effectively the same. The event knowledge of 5-year-olds appeared to 
be more consolidated, facilitating re-enactment of action outcomes rather than 
producing the exact manner with which a particular goal had been achieved.  
 
The tendency to copy irrelevant aspects of a demonstrated sequence is well 
established in the developmental literature and should increase during the preschool 
years (e.g., McGuigan et al. 2007; McGuigan & Whiten, 2009; Yu & Kushnir, 2014). 
There are various reasons why we observed the reverse pattern in the context of a 
familiar event. Studies investigating over-imitation typically instruct children to 
retrieve objects from novel opaque or transparent boxes. On these tasks the precise 
movements of the retrieval action provide a measure for over-imitation (e.g., pressing 
a button, pulling a lever). As Kenward and colleagues have argued (Kenward, et al. 
2011), for action performance to truly qualify as overly imitative children must be 
able to tell apart necessary from unnecessary actions and yet choose to perform them 
as a result of having seen a demonstration including both. Our control condition 
clearly demonstrates that preschoolers in both age groups had sufficient prior 
knowledge to plan and execute the target action as such, yet children in the 
experimental condition (and more so the younger children) opted to perform 
irrelevant actions as a result of a single demonstration.  
 
Secondly, over-imitation has been explored in paradigms in which misleading 
demonstrations were presented over multiple successive trials (e.g., Horner & Whiten, 
2005; McGuigan, et al. 2007; Kenward, et al. 2011; although see also Lyons et al. 
2011; Lyons, et al. 2007; Yu & Kushnir, 2014). The repeated presentation of 
irrelevant actions at a fixed time-point within an overall poorly understood sequence 
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should be expected to increase the likelihood that these actions will indeed be 
encoded as necessary components of the event hierarchy. In natural events, goal-
related elements tend to be relatively stable whereas random elements usually vary. It 
is well known that even infants track statistical regularities in observed events when 
learning about action-effect contingencies and causal relations (e.g., Kirkham, 
Slemmer, & Johnson, 2002; Sobel & Kirkham, 2006; 2007). Arguably, when a 
misleading action sequence is ostentatiously demonstrated over multiple trials, then 
even adults may search for explanations as to why irrelevant elements should be 
incorporated. Importantly, such alternative explanations may not relate to the primary 
goal of the event in any obvious way. Meyer and Baldwin (2011) showed that when 
adults segment on going behaviour into sub-actions, they seem to rely on frequency 
information with which motion elements co-occur rather than predictive information 
relating the various sub-actions. One interpretation put forth by Baldwin and 
colleagues (2001) is that the sub-actions used in their task were not tied together by 
overarching goals. Thus, co-occurrence frequencies may have gained relevance 
because participants were unable to generate predictions about the event. These 
findings again highlight the importance of anchoring perceptual information to goals.   
 
Thus, a tentative hypothesis for the developmental pattern observed in the current 
study is that younger preschoolers struggle to relate consecutive sub-actions to 
concrete outcomes within the goal hierarchy. It should be noted that according to this 
view, over-imitation behaviour in our task results from a failure to break down the 
observed event sequence in a meaningful way rather than as a consequence of inferred 
causality or a desire to socially comply. This suggests that cuing lower-level goals 
may considerably improve performance in this task. A wealth of research has spoken 
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to the interplay between action and perception in lower- and higher-level action 
processing in both infants (e.g., Daum, Vuori, Prinz, Aschersleben, 2009; Thelen & 
Smith; 1994) and adults (e.g., Haazebroek, Van Dantzig, Hommel, 2013). One way to 
investigate this hypothesis further is to examine whether children would benefit from 
external cues that facilitate the detection of temporal links between procedural 
subcomponents of the event. In Experiment 2, we address this issue by arranging the 
array of objects spatially in line with the serial order of the task. 
 
2.3.	Experiment	2	
The aim of Experiment 2 was to establish whether preschoolers’ re-enactment of a 
misleading demonstration is, at least in part, controlled by external perceptual cues. 
More precisely, we examined whether cueing the underlying event structure would 
allow even the youngest children in this study to privilege goal-directedness over 
over-imitation. To this end, we aligned the array of objects spatially according to the 
temporal structure of the action sequence. As mentioned at the outset, in everyday 
action contexts of varied complexity, preschool children are likely to consider 
multiple sources of information to organize events, depending on the strength of their 
prior knowledge, and the availability of social as well as contextual signals. Indeed, 
one would expect perceptual cues to gain relevance in the absence of more 
consolidated event knowledge. As children increasingly rely on top-down knowledge 
to organize the problem space in familiar actions, the presence or absence of such 
perceptual cues should cease to impact on performance. Consequently, we anticipated 
that 3-year-olds in particular would benefit from external cues in this task. 
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	 2.3.1.	Methods				
Participants		
	
As in Experiment 1, we recruited a sample of 30 3-year-olds (range = 36 – 45 months; 
M = 40.5 months; SD = 2.64 months, female = 18) and 30 5-year-olds (range = 60-70 
months; M = 64.4 months; SD = 3.04 months, female = 15). All children were 
randomly assigned to experimental and control conditions (15 children per group; N = 
60). Parental consent was collected for all participants in this study. To be included in 
the final sample children had to meet the same criteria as for Experiment 1. The study 
received approval from the institutional ethics committee and was conducted 
according to the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
Procedure			
The methods, scoring, and analysis procedures were adopted from Experiment 1 with 
the following exception: all objects displayed in the performance phase were spatially 
positioned in a serial left-to-right order and thus according to successive sub-actions 
of the sequence. Distractor objects were lined up after the last relevant object. The 
order of distractor objects was the same as in Experiment 1.  
 
2.3.2.	Results			
Preliminary analyses revealed no significant effects or interactions of gender and task 
experience on any dependent measures. Interrater reliability among coders was high 
(Cohen’s kappa = 0.89). First we analysed performance differences across conditions 
(misleading demonstration / control) and age groups (3 years / 5 years) in terms of our 
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combined performance measure (intrusion scores / sequencing errors / number of 
objects manipulated / total acting time). The original alpha level was adjusted to .01 
for all following analyses of individual measures.  
 
Table 3 summarises all means and standard deviations. A between-groups 
multivariate ANOVA revealed that the interaction between Age and Condition was 
not significant. Nor was the main effect of Condition. However, the main effect of 
Age group was marginally significant F(4,53) = 2.5, p = .05; 	η!"  = .16. Follow-up 
univariate analyses of variance suggest that this effect was mainly driven by Total 
time of performance F(1,56) = 8.5, p = .005; η!"  = .13. On average 3-year-olds 
required about 1.3 minutes longer to perform the target actions than 5-year-olds (M = 
4.09 min., SD = 1.78 min. vs. M = 2.82 min., SD = 1.66 min.). Although performance 
in both age groups was generally fast, this time difference corresponds to an increase 
of 56% in the 3-year-olds compared to 5-year-olds in the misleading demonstration 
condition alone (M = 4.65 min., SD = 1.59 vs. 2.99 min., SD = 2.10 min.).  No other 
factors reached significance. In terms of Condition, 3- and 5-year-olds manipulated a 
comparable number of distractor objects across the misleading demonstration (M = 
1.3, SD = 1.7 vs. M = 0.53, SD = 0.74) and control groups (M = 1.0, SD = 1.3 vs. M = 
0.73, SD = 1.4).  
 
Comparing across Experiments 
In order to directly compare results from our two experiments, we ran an additional 
set of analyses including Experiment as a factor. Multivariate analyses of variance 
confirmed highly significant interaction effects between Experiment and Condition 
F(5,108) = 13.77, p < .001; η!"  = .39 as well as Experiment and Age Group F(5,108) = 
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4.91, p < .001; η!"  = .19. Furthermore, we observed an Experiment x Condition x Age 
Group interaction F(5,108) = 6.53, p < .001; η!"  = .23. Follow-up univariate tests, 
using the Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .01, revealed that Relevant objects 
F(1,112) = 10.0, p = .002; η!"  = .08, Distractor objects F(1,112) = 15.6, p < .001; η!"  = 
.12, Total time F(1,112) = 7.67, p = .007; η!"  = .06, and Intrusion scores F(1,112) = 
18.6, p < .001; η!"  = .14 all reached significance. In fact, Errors was the only factor for 
which the three-way interaction did not reach significance.   
 
In addition we found a main effect for Experiment F(5,108) = 223.73, p < .001; η!"  = 
.91 indicating that children in Experiment 2 performed significantly better compared 
to children in Experiment 1 in terms of Intrusion scores F(1,112) = 64.92, p < .001; η!"  
= .37, Total time F(1,112) = 164.41, p < .001; η!"  = .59, Relevant objects F(1,112) = 
270.4, p < .001; η!"  = .71,  and Distractor objects F(1,112) = 32.5, p < .001; η!"  = .22 
(see Table 2 and 3 for means and standard deviations).   
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Table 2.3. Descriptive Statistics 2 
 
 Condition Age Mean SD N 
Error Rates experimental 3 .27 .46 15 
5 .47 .52 15 
control 3 .40 .73 15 
5 .33 .49 15 
Intrusion Scores  experimental 3 .14 .17 15 
5 .02 .04 15 
control 3 .12 .17 15 
5 .08 .17 15 
Time Total  experimental 3 4.65 1.58 15 
5 2.99 2.10 15 
control 3 3.52 1.82 15 
5 2.60 1.09 15 
Number of 
relevant objects 
manipulated  
experimental 3 3.00 .00 15 
5 3.00 .00 15 
control 3 3.00 .00 15 
5 3.00 .00 15 
Number of 
distractor objects 
manipulated 
experimental 3 1.33 1.72 15 
5 .53 .74 15 
control 3 1.00 1.03 15 
5 .73 1.43 15 
SD = standard deviation; N = number of participants. Error Rates = total number of errors.  Intrusion  
scores = time acted on distractor objects divided by total acting time.  
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2.3.3.	Discussion			
The ability to organise event representations and infer how procedural components 
connect within sequential actions undergoes considerable development during 
toddlerhood that lasts well into the preschool years (e.g., Fivush & Mandler, 1985; 
Koslowski & Bruner, 1972). In Experiment 2, we investigated whether preschool 
children would overcome over-imitation behaviour in a sequential task as a result of 
increased external event structure. To this end, we re-arranged our object display from 
Experiment 1 in line with procedural components of the event hierarchy. Bottom-up 
processing was expected to aid the discovery of temporal relations among consecutive 
actions within the sequence.  
 
Findings in Experiment 2 are in good agreement with the pattern of results observed 
in our initial experiment (Figure 2.3). Both 3- and 5-year-olds were able to plan and 
perform the familiar multistep target sequence. Results further show that, when 
objects were spatially aligned in accordance with the serial order of the event, 
children no longer demonstrated over-imitation on any of our behavioural measures. 
Figure 3 illustrates the general pattern of results across both age groups in the 
example of intrusion scores. More precisely, a 32% decrease of over-imitation 
behaviour was observed in 3-year-olds when directly compared to Experiment 1, 
mirroring the result previously observed for 5-year-olds. Although there was certainly 
less scope for improvement for 5-year-olds in this task, their performance between 
Experiment 1 and 2 also improved with a decline in intrusion scores of 12%, leaving 
5-year-olds’ performance in the misleading demonstration condition indistinguishable 
from age-matched control children on all measures. Moreover, the results from this 
experiment clearly diverge from the pattern observed in our initial experiment in 
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which Condition was the principal factor of the observed differences. In fact, 
developmental differences in terms of performance time, in the absence of any other 
age-dependent effects, are almost certainly attributable to 5-year-olds’ greater 
dexterity.  
 
 
Figure 2.3. Intrusion scores collapsed across age groups plotted by Condition in 
Experiment 1 and 2. 
 
2.4.	General	Discussion	
 
Engaging in purposeful behaviour requires attention to those aspects of the 
environment that are appropriate for our intentions and disregard for others which 
may cause interference. Much of the knowledge needed to carry out novel actions is 
acquired by observing others. From a developmental perspective, an intriguing 
question is how young children reliably learn from observation despite the many 
opportunities and demands coming form naturalistic surroundings. 
 
The ability to match the representation of a goal with an outcome has long been 
thought of as a departure point for more sophisticated analysis of intentional human 
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behaviour. Indeed, preschool children appear to quickly learn from demonstrations 
and show increasing flexibility when integrating newly acquired knowledge with 
existing event representations. Considerable research has spoken to how toddlers and 
even infants develop an understanding of observed actions by establishing simple 
explanatory relations between various elements: the action, the goal state, and the 
constraints of the physical reality (e.g., Csibra, Bíró, Koos, & Gergely, 2003; Csibra, 
Gergely, Bíró, Koos, & Brockbank, 1999; Gergely, Nádasdy, Csibra, & Bíró, 1995; 
Csibra & Gergely, 2009). This is all the more impressive given that goal-directedness 
in action is highly context dependent (e.g., Gergely & Csibra, 2003).  
 
In natural everyday settings preschool children entertain expectations about many of 
the events unfolding before them. When performing an action for the first time, prior 
event knowledge interacts with more immediate influences of the specific action 
context. In this study, we presented 3- and 5-year-olds with a familiar event sequence 
that was composed of both actions that could be linked to specific goals and actions 
that did not appear to serve the overarching goal of the sequence in an interpretable 
way.  
 
The psychological mechanisms underlying the tendency to overly copy observed 
actions are not well understood. There has been much speculation in recent years as to 
why children and adults sometimes re-enact even overtly irrelevant actions while 
other times imitate selectively. One major line of thinking relates to the idea that 
children are inclined to copy all observed actions in a social context, regardless of 
their causal relevance, because they either naturally believe (Csibra & Gergely, 2009; 
2011), or are somehow led to believe by the experimenter (Lyons, et al. 2011), that 
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ostentatiously demonstrated actions ought to be performed. According to this 
reasoning, the degree of over-imitation is expected to become more pronounced with 
increasing age. Once children engage in pedagogical settings, their wish to produce 
modelled outcomes is likely to increase along with the desire to comply socially.  
 
An alternative hypothesis postulates that the over-copying of observed actions aids 
the achievement of goals when the underlying causal relations are not well understood 
(e.g., Horner & Whiten, 2005; Kenward, et al. 2011; Whiten, Horner, & Marshall-
Pescini, 2005; Whiten, et al. 2009). The idea that children assume that even irrelevant 
demonstrated actions must serve an unknown purpose seems especially feasible in 
situations where tasks are novel. However, this hypothesis may also be extended to 
explain why children over-imitate in more familiar contexts. Thus, regardless of 
whether the children in our task considered sub-actions as causally linked to the 
overarching goal, it is certainly possible that they perceived the distractor actions as 
serving a hidden purpose linked to ancillary goals.    
 
Our results strongly suggest that, despite the high familiarity with the target action, 
preschool children’s planning was perceptually informed by both a prior 
demonstration and the presence of external cues in this task. In particular young 
children’s re-enactment reflected a high susceptibility to over-imitation behaviour as a 
result of a single misleading demonstration. Importantly age effects associated with 
strong over-imitation tendencies disappeared when procedural components of the 
sequence were spatially cued. Given that such cues were sufficient to eradicate 
performance differences between conditions, social accounts of over-imitation cannot 
provide a comprehensive explanation for the observed pattern of results in this 
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particular task. However, we do not take this to mean that children never over-imitate 
in order to socially conform or that their re-enactment of modelled actions is not also 
influenced by the demonstrator-child interaction. In the current study we were 
cautious to avoid social signals that are well-known to impact on over-imitation 
behaviour in children (e.g., eye contact, real-life demonstrations, peer interactions, 
social valances, group membership; see Zmyj & Seehagen, 2013, for a recent review 
of studies using real-life and televised demonstrations performed by adults and peers). 
Moreover, various characteristics of agents (e.g., adult vs. peer model, in-group over 
out-group model) have been observed to influence imitative behaviour based on 
factors such as the perceived reliability of the demonstrator and group membership 
(e.g., Buttelmann, Zmyj, Daum, & Carpenter, 2013; McGuigan, et al., 2011; Wood, 
Kendal, & Flynn, 2012; Zmyj, Aschersleben, Prinz, & Daum, 2012). For this reason, 
the same adult model demonstrated all event sequences in this study. In spite of this, 
we observed a great deal of over-imitation behaviour. Over-imitation in our task 
decreased when action planning was externally supported, suggesting that the ability 
to organise observed actions in terms of hierarchically nested sub-actions critically 
influenced preschoolers’ tendency to faithfully copy modelled actions. Our findings, 
therefore, raise the distinct possibility that over-imitation of fairly familiar events may 
result from a failure to organise the entirety of observed behaviours in a meaningful 
way rather than an active attempt to mimic observed actions as faithfully as possible.  
 
With respect to the observed developmental effects, one could argue that action 
planning of a familiar event ought to improve between the ages of three and five as 
older children have more experience with our target sequence. Conceivably, ongoing 
experience in a wide range of action contexts and improved self-regulation during the 
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first five years of life could ultimately facilitate the transfer of knowledge from one 
situation to another. In addition, the ability to maintain and modify a relative distal 
goal, shifting attention from one sub-task to another, and inhibit prepotent actions, is 
expected to undergo profound changes during the fourth year of life (e.g., Kaller, 
Rahm, Speer, Mader & Unterrainer, 2008, for a similar point). However, this 
argument cannot readily explain the developmental trend in our study, as both 3- and 
5-year-olds were well able to structure their own actions according to task demands in 
the absence of a misleading demonstration, as well as when serial step-by-step 
planning was facilitated spatially. This observation is in line with the notion of graded 
goal representations supporting mechanisms of cognitive control in young children 
(Munakata. O’Reilly, & Morton, 2007; Munakata & Yerys, 2001). According to this 
view goal-directed events are represented with varying strengths over the course of 
development. While strong event representations are required to endogenously 
generated cognitive control to guide information processing, weaker representations 
may still produce accurate outcomes if exogenously cued (e.g., Munakata & Yerys, 
2001; Towse, Lewis, & Knowles, 2007). Results from the current study endorse this 
view and further suggest that more consolidated event representations of 5-year-olds 
may have reinforced the detection of conflict between irrelevant actions and the 
overarching goal of the observed sequence. In fact, the ability to monitor cognitive 
control to support sequential actions has been found to improve between three and 
five years of age (Freier, Cooper, & Mareschal, in press).  
 
In the current study, only half of the demonstrated sub-actions could be linked to the 
overarching goal in a meaningful way. In the absence of any knowledge of how to 
link observed actions to specific outcomes and the overarching goal, one could still 
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generate two ecologically valid predictions: (1) that actions are generally goal-
directed, and (2) that sub-actions that follow each other tend to form part of the same 
goal-directed sequence. Our results therefore favour the interpretation that young 
preschoolers struggled to organize relevant and irrelevant sub-actions in relation to 
the overarching goal of the event, and thus ascribed hidden purposes to irrelevant 
distractor actions. Our findings further suggest that spatial features of the event 
context significantly influence how young children perceive and construct complex 
sequential actions. The present study thus adds to existing work by suggesting that 
over-imitation behaviour in a familiar sequential task is significantly modulated by 
the ability to represent observed actions in terms of underlying goal hierarchies. 
Advances in young children’s organisation of complex hierarchical actions is 
ultimately reflected in their ability to incorporate observed actions flexibly into their 
own behaviours and to generalise action-outcome relations to novel events.  
 
We now turn to the question whether preschoolers’ planning abilities are influenced 
by inferences about the causal structure of the event. To tackle this question we 
presented children with a novel sequential task, in which causal links between event 
and outcome guided potential interventions.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Preschool	Children’s	Control	of	Action	Outcomes6		
3.1.	Introduction	
 
 
 
Naturalistic goal-directed behaviours require the engagement and maintenance of 
appropriate levels of cognitive control over relatively extended intervals of time. In 
two experiments, we examined preschool children’s abilities to maintain top-down 
control throughout the course of a sequential task. Both 3- and 5-year-olds 
demonstrated good abilities to access goals at the lowest level of the representational 
hierarchy. However, only 5-year-olds consistently aligned their response choices with 
goals at superordinate levels. These findings suggest that the ability to maintain top-
down control and adjust behavioural responses according to goals at multiple levels of 
abstraction undergoes a marked improvement throughout the preschool period. 
Results are discussed in relation to current accounts of cognitive control and the 
monitoring of conflict in sequential action.  
 
 
3.1.1.		Cognitive	control			
A clear transition from being primarily activity oriented to increasing action control 
and attention to task requirements can be observed during the toddler period and early 																																																								6 	Freier, Cooper, & Mareschal, (2015). Preschool children’s control of action 
outcomes. Developmental Science. 	
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childhood (Bullock & Lütkenhaus, 1988). Some	 of	 the	 fundamental	 prerequisites	for	 representing	 action	 goals	 are	 laid	 out	 during	 first	 year	 of	 life	 (e.g.,	Sommerville	 &	Woodward,	 2005).	 For	 instance,	 it	 has	 been	 observed	 that	 6-9	month-old	infants	are	able	to	perceive	simple	actions	as	directed	towards	goals	(e.g.,	Woodward,	1998,	2003).	Similarly,	12-month-old	 infants	appear	to	reflect	some	degree	of	flexibility	in	their	interpretation	of	actions	as	goal	directed	or	not	depending	 on	 the	 causal	 context	 of	 the	 event	 (e.g.,	 Gergely	 et	 al.	 1995).	Along 
with this emerging goal-directedness there appears to be an increase in the extent to 
which toddlers monitor the effectiveness of their actions and learn how to coordinate 
multiple means-ends relations (e.g., Brownell, 1988; DeLoache, Sugarman, & Brown, 
1985; Jennings, 2004). During the preschool years, advanced attentional control in 
rule-guided behaviour aids the accomplishment of ever more spatially and 
temporarily distal goals. There is substantial evidence suggesting that increased 
engagement of executive sub-functions in goal-directed behaviour is strongly 
predicted by age (Anderson, & Reidy, 2012; Espy, Kaufmann, McDiarmid, & Glisky, 
1999; Lehto, Juujärvi, Kooistra, & Pulkkinen, 2003). In particular, before the age of 3 
to 4 years, children’s executive control and action-correcting strategies appear to be 
limited (e.g., Jones, Rothbart, & Posner, 2003; Zelazo & Müller, 2002). This is a time 
of increasing abilities to endogenously generate cognitive control in pursuit of higher-
level goals.  
 
The degree to which cognitive control is recruited varies considerably depending on 
the task, in part because complex action sequences are composed of hierarchically 
nested sub-actions. For instance, everyday actions that involve the realisation of 
numerous goals, at multiple levels of abstraction, are likely to demand higher levels of 
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cognitive control than sequences of a simpler goal structure (e.g., Amso, Haas, 
McShane, & Badre, 2014). Similarly, relatively unpractised actions may increase the 
demand for top-down control relative to well-known routines in which goal relevant 
knowledge may be accessed fairly automatically (e.g., Cooper, Ruh & Mareschal, 
2014; Cooper & Shallice, 2006; Wood & Neal, 2007). However, relatively little is 
known about how goal hierarchies are managed during the preschool years. 
 
The introduction chapter outlined several theoretical models that provide frameworks 
for how cognitive control may reduce the occurrence of conflict in tasks that require 
the parallel processing of competing inputs (e.g., Botvinick et al. 2001; Cooper & 
Shallice, 2000; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Norman & 
Shallice, 1986; Schneider & Detweiler, 1987). In these models control is implemented 
by biasing information processing towards the overarching goal of a particular task, 
thus resulting in a reduction of conflict during task performance.  
 
Current mechanistic explanations of cognitive control propose that specific brain 
regions within the prefrontal cortex (PFC) support the strategic retrieval of knowledge 
representations from working memory (e.g., Badre, 2008; Chatham & Badre, 2013; 
Badre & Wagner, 2007; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Koechlin & Summerfield, 2007). 
Wide-ranging neuropsychological research suggests that frontal circuits supporting 
cognitive flexibility, planning, and the organisation of goal-directed behaviour 
undergo profound changes during the preschool years, and continue to develop into 
early adulthood (e.g., Anderson, 1998; Brydges, Reid, Fox, & Anderson, 2012; 
Diamond 2002; Giedd & Rapoport 2010; Levin et al. 1991; Luria, 1973; Posner & 
Rothbart, 1998; Yakovlev & Lecours, 1967; Welsh, Pennington, & Groisser, 1991).  
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In adults, a wealth of neuroimaging evidence has substantiated the view that the 
hierarchical structure of goal-directed behaviour is represented by the pattern of 
activation along the rostral-caudal axis of the PFC, with activity in more anterior 
subregions linked to the processing of increasingly abstract goals (e.g., Badre, 2008; 
Badre & D’Esposito, 2007; Badre & Frank, 2012; Braver & Bongiolatti, 2002; 
Bunge, Kahn, Wallis, Miller, & Wagner, 2003; Christoff &. Gabrieli, 2000; Hazy, 
Frank, & O’Reilly, 2006; Fuster, 2004; Koechlin 2008; Koechlin, Ody, & Kouneiher, 
2003; Koechlin & Jubault, 2006). From a developmental perspective, cognitive 
control has been primarily investigated behaviourally, with a focus on how children 
resolve competition within a particular level of a goal hierarchy. However, little is 
currently known about how children engage cognitive control to structure sequential 
behaviour in which goal attainment is linked to complex hierarchies of rules. In 
adults, the ability to abstract from rules and goals at various subordinate levels has 
been found to directly influence accuracy and response time in hierarchical learning 
tasks (e.g., Badre & D’Esposito, 2007). In a recent study, Amso et al. (2014) 
demonstrated that age-related performance effects between children (7- to 10-year-
olds) and adolescents (12- to 15-year-olds) were explained by the ability to flexibly 
abstract from superordinate rules rather than by the number of competing alternatives 
within a particular response level of the task. These results suggest that updating 
higher-level rules in working memory is one of the main mechanisms driving 
developmental effects in this task. A question that remains unresolved is how the 
ability to consistently retrieve and maintain goal-relevant representations from 
working memory, in a top-down manner, develops in early childhood.   
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In the current study we investigated preschoolers’ abilities to organize a set of sub-
actions within a relatively long sequential task, and adjust top-down control according 
to a single higher-level goal. This sets the current task apart from more classic 
paradigms that examine cognitive control in children and adults by looking at how 
participants engage, disengage, and switch across multiple goals that compete within 
a particular representational layer. Frequently cognitive control in children is explored 
with card-sorting paradigms (e.g., DCCS: Zelazo, 2006; WCST: Grant & Berg 1948; 
FIST: Jacques & Zelazo, 2001), in which card sorting accuracy to a changing set of 
sorting criteria is measured. However, these paradigms do not address how goal 
hierarchies are maintained over extended periods of activity. In addition, in classic 
card-sorting tasks conflict resides within the parallel processing of readily observable 
features of the task materials. Each stimulus cues various conflicting dimensions that 
map onto relevant and irrelevant rules (e.g., shape vs. colour). Whether one rule or the 
other is currently relevant depends on the particular trial type. Therefore, card-sorting 
paradigms essentially measure how cognitive control is engaged and disengaged 
across set-shifting operations. In contrast, we sought to assess how cognitive control 
is sustained and how the demand for ongoing cognitive control is evaluated over the 
course of a sequential activity. Indeed, exerting control and evaluating the need for 
sustained top-down control are distinct aspects of cognitive control (e.g., Carter, et al. 
2000; Botvinick et al. 2001).  
 
Various fMRI and PET studies corroborate the view that flexible switching and rule 
maintenance are dissociable by delineating the topographic organisation of the 
prefrontal cortex (e.g., Badre & Frank, 2012; Badre & D’Esposito, 2007; Bunge, et 
al., 2003; Chatman, Frank, & Badre, 2014; Crone, Donohue, Honomichl, Wendelken, 
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& Bunge, 2006; Reverberi, Görgen, & Haynes, 2012). Collectively, these studies 
suggest that the maintenance of rule representations and rule switching are 
neurologically dissociable. Specifically, selective updating of working memory has 
been linked to striatal activation, whereas the maintenance of goal-relevant 
information in memory systems appears to be supported by frontal brain areas (e.g., 
Barch, Braver, Nystrom, Forman, Noll, & Cohen, 1997; Chatham & Badre, 2013, 
Leber, Turk-Browne, & Chun, 2008; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Ragozzino, 2007). 
 
Using a novel ecologically valid sequential task utilising a highly familiar activity, we 
sought to: (1) evaluate preschool children’s abilities to generate endogenously 
cognitive control in order to attain abstract goals, and (2) investigate whether there is 
a substantial developmental change during the preschool period in the way children 
allocate strategic control to guide action selection.  In real life settings goal-directed 
actions are hierarchical in nature, and thus monitoring the effectiveness of complex 
actions requires the maintenance of goal-relevant information at different levels of 
abstraction while continuously updating new contextual information into working 
memory. In Experiment 1, we asked 3- and 5-year-olds to perform a colouring 
activity in which three colours had to be equally used to colour-in a line-up of animal 
shapes. Therefore, throughout this task, children were required to maintain 
representations of the abstract goal and a strategy of how to achieve it over an 
extended period of time. At a lower level of the hierarchy, children then mapped 
selected strategies onto the colouring stimuli. However, there was no external 
feedback provided that would have cued appropriate adjustments to the colouring 
activity. Thus effective goal attainment in this task was critically influenced by 
children’s ability to evaluate their response choices in terms of the higher-level goal. 
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Experiment 2 extended the task by requiring the children to periodically report the 
overarching goal, thus ruling out the possibility that poor performance with respect to 
the abstract goal might be due to memory failure. 
 
 
 
3.2.	Experiment	1		
3.2.1.	Methods			
Participants 
The final sample consisted of twenty-nine 3-year-olds (range= 37-47 months; mean 
age= 40.4 months; SD= 3.1 months: 17 females) and 29 5-year-olds (range= 60-70 
months; mean age= 64.6; SD= 3.1 months; 15 females). One additional 3-year-old 
and two 5-year-olds were tested, but excluded from further analysis because their 
response selection indicated a failure to understand the task. We return to this point in 
the following section. All children in this study were recruited from local nurseries 
and primary schools. Formal parental consents and children’s verbal approval was 
obtained prior to testing. The study was approved by the institutional ethics 
committee and conducted according to the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki.
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Materials and Procedure 
 Each child received one sheet of paper depicting the outline of six farm animals7	
lined up horizontally (see Figure 3.1). Beneath these animal shapes, an arrow cued 
response direction running from the left to right side of the paper. Children also 
received three crayons in different colours, with the colours for each child selected at 
random from the crayon pack. All children were instructed to colour-in the animal 
shapes, following the arrow depicted beneath. They were informed that it was 
important not to leave any animals uncoloured. Children were also instructed to use 
each of their colours equally often. This colour criterion represented the overarching 
goal of the task and was therefore further explained. Children were first shown an 
equivalent picture illustrating an equal distribution of colours across colour-in shapes, 
which was then removed during the test session. Of note, this exemplary picture did 
not include any of the stimuli or colours that were available to children in this task. 
The example picture further illustrated that colours could be assigned to any animal 
shape irrespective of real-life features.   
 
																																																								7	Two of the animals appeared twice in the line-up of shapes. The reason for this was to confirm that 
children had indeed understood the task, and thus demonstrated an attempt to reach the overarching 
goal, rather than selecting responses based on perceptual similarities or prior animal-colour 
associations (e.g., colouring all pigs pink, yielding “colour-by-shape” errors). 	
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Figure 3.1. Stimuli display in the colouring task. 
 
 
Importantly, none of the instructions in this task involved number concepts. In 
addition, the abstract concept “equally often” was further clarified prior to testing via 
simple examples of quantity relations using a popular preschool game in which 
children distribute small objects into two cups and thereafter estimated whether both 
cups contained equal amounts8.  
 
Children were also encouraged to ask questions if they had any difficulties 
understanding the colouring game. The starting point was set at the leftmost animal. 
After children had coloured in the first shape of the line-up they were reminded once 
that each colour should be used equally often. The task did not include feedback 																																																								8	Abundant evidence indicates that toddlers (e.g., Antell & Keating, 1983; Carey, 2009; Gelman, 1972; 
Gelman & Gallistel, 1986) and even infants (e.g., McCrink & Wynn, 2004; Wynn et al., 1992) are well 
capable of making numerical discriminations, suggesting that a concept of equality in the mathematical 
sense (as integers) is not necessary in order to judge numerical relations between small sets. In our 
study, children only needed minimal, if any, numerical competences for successful performance. 
Counting was neither requested nor required to accomplish the overarching goal based on perceptual 
matching mechanisms. Dividing the six shapes by three was possible but not necessary for accurate 
performance. Cycling colours for instance, is one strategy that led to accurate performance without the 
need to keep count of a single colour.  	
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because it was designed to test specifically whether pre-school children would 
generate cognitive control endogenously to guide action selection.  
 
Coding 
The relative degree of control that children directed towards either the overarching 
goal of the task or the colouring activity per se was assessed via multiple measures. 
Children who met the colour criterion, i.e., those who used each of their three colours 
exactly twice, were coded as achieving the higher-level goal. Children who coloured-
in all shapes, using one or various colours, but had done so irrespective of the colour 
criterion, were coded as achieving the activity but not the goal. Children who initially 
acted towards an accurate outcome but departed from it at a particular point in the 
line-up of shapes, i.e., those who grouped or cycled colours on a subset of shapes, 
were coded as paying attention to the overarching goal but unsuccessfully.  
 
A second measure of interest was the number of colours used to complete this task. 
Although children were instructed to use all of their three colours to meet the 
overarching goal, subordinate goals (e.g., colouring-in all shapes left to right) could 
be accomplished using one or two colours only.  
 
A third measure assessed the exact point within the series of shapes at which children 
first departed from acting towards an appropriate outcome (first detectable 
discrepancy), assuming they did not achieve the higher-level goal. As responses in 
this task were made in a serial order, using a total of three colours, the first point at 
which insufficient monitoring of the overarching goal could become apparent was the 
third shape in the line-up. 
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Finally, we assessed the type of strategy children employed. One effective strategy to 
satisfy the colour criterion, without leaving any shapes uncoloured, was to switch 
colours between every shape, cycling through the three colours (cycling approach). 
Alternatively, the same colour could be applied for each pair of two consecutive 
shapes (grouped approach). It was further possible to mix both, grouped and cycling 
approaches (mixed approach) while progressing through the line-up. Children who 
did not employ any apparent strategy were coded as approaching the task 
unsystematically (random).  
 
In addition to overall performance, number of colours and strategy use, children’s 
error correcting responses, (e.g., switching of colours mid-trial and colouring over 
already coloured shapes). However, children in neither age group demonstrated 
evidence of error correcting behaviours in this task. 
 
 
3.2.2.	Results			
Even the youngest children in this study demonstrated an appropriate understanding 
of equality relations in the cup game as suggested by correctly stating whether two 
cups held equal amounts of items. This observation is in good agreement with a wide 
range of evidence for the development of a concept for numerical equivalence in 
children well before the age of three years (e.g., Griffin & Case, 1996; Feigenson et 
al., 2004; Izard et al., 2009; Izard, Streri, & Spelke, 2014; Xu & Spelke, 2000; 
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Starkey, Spelke, & Gelman, 1990; Wynn, 1992). All participants therefore moved on 
to the colouring task. 
 
 Preliminary analysis revealed no significant effects of gender so results were 
collapsed across males and females. Figure 3.2 illustrates the performance of 
preschoolers in terms of age group, strategy, and overall outcome. Chi-square test for 
independence revealed a significant association between Age group and Outcome, χ² 
(2, n=58) = 23.89, p < .001, with 5-year-olds achieving the overarching goal nearly 
eight times more frequently than 3-year olds (55% vs. 7%). Most 3-year-olds 
accomplished the activity but did not produce the higher-level goal (62% vs. 7%), 
although a small proportion in this age group did pay attention to this goal but 
unsuccessfully (31%).  
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Figure 3.2. Outcome plotted by age group and strategy in Experiment 1. All 
preschoolers engaged in the colouring activity. Only children who reached the colour 
criterion were coded as achieving the overarching goal of the task. Children who acted 
towards the overarching goal but departed from an accurate outcome at a particular 
point in the sequence were classified as paying attention to the goal but unsuccessfully.  
 
 
In terms of the number of different colours used to complete the task, a significant 
association between Number of colours and Age group was observed χ² (2, n=58) = 
10.89, p = .004. Over half of the 3-year-olds applied a total of three colours (55%), 
while the rest of the children in this age group made use of either one (24%) or two 
(21%) colours only. In contrast, the vast majority of 5-year-olds brought all of their 
colours into play (94%) and only two participants in this age group approached the 
task using only one (3%) or two colours (3%) respectively.  
 
In order to identify whether age affected the point within the line-up of animals at 
which children lost sight of the overarching goal, the first divergence from the colour 
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criterion was analysed and compared across age groups (see Figure 3.3.). A chi-
square test indicated a significant association between the first detectable Discrepancy 
and Age group χ² (4, n=58) = 18.01, p = .001. As with the previous measures, there 
was an overall higher level of discrepancy between the overarching goal and the 
actual outcome in the younger age group compared to 5-year-olds (93% vs. 45%). 
However, there was also a consistent pattern of younger children diverging from goal-
directed response choices earlier within the sequence of shapes. Indeed, almost half 
the 3-year-olds in this task first deviated from goal-oriented performance when 
colouring-in the third shape within the serial line-up (42%). Again, it should be noted 
that the third shape in the line-up was the first point at which divergence was 
detectable in this task. A smaller percentage of 3-year-olds choose colours accurately 
until reaching the fourth shape in the series (17%), the fifth shape (24%), and some 3-
year-olds lost sight of the overarching goal on the very last shape they coloured in 
(10%). In contrast, 5-year-olds who failed to reach the overarching goal did not 
demonstrate the same pattern as younger children in terms of the first detectable 
divergence. In fact, the percentage of 5-year-olds who deviated from the overarching 
goal on the third (10%), fourth (14%), fifth (10%) and final shape (11%) was similar.  
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Figure 3.3. Number of correct response choices towards the overarching goal within 
the line-up of six shapes by age group. The third colour-in animal shape was the 
earliest point at which discrepancies were measurable.  
 
 
 
 
A final measure concerned the type of strategies children adopted in this task. A chi-
square test revealed that the association between Strategy and Age group was also 
significant χ² (3, n=58) = 23.52, p < .001. The preferred strategy of 5-year-olds 
involved a cycling approach (55%), though some children in this older age group 
acted towards the outcome using a grouped (7%) and mixed approach (31%). Only 
children in this age group who grouped their colours in pairs were always successful, 
while 62% of all 5-year-olds who cycled and 45% of those who mixed their 
approaches also succeeded. Thus, although successful children in this age group 
clearly favoured a cycling approach overall diverse and flexible strategies led to 
effective performance in 5-year-olds.  
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Conversely, fewer than half of the 3-year-olds appeared to employ any type of 
strategy at all (35% cycling and 3% grouped). The remaining children in this young 
age group approached the task seemingly acting at random (62%). The 7% of 3-year-
olds who did reach the outcome made use of a cycling strategy (100%)9.  
 
3.2.3.	Discussion			
Experiment 1 set out to assess preschool children’s abilities to engage cognitive 
control in a sequential task, in which the completion of a set of subordinate rules 
resulted in goal attainment at higher levels. If intermediate goals in this task were 
monitored sufficiently, then the demand for top-down control required to accomplish 
the higher-level goal in this task was decreased by constraining the task space. 
However, no colour in itself uniquely specified the appropriate response. No colour 
was more obviously associated with one strategy or another. The need to switch 
colours within a single trial had to be endogenously detected. 
 
Results indicate developmental differences on all measures, with 3-year-olds 
demonstrating a strong focus on the colouring activity rather than the effectiveness of 
a goal consistent strategy. Conceivably, 3-year-olds struggled to monitor the 
relatively distal overarching goal in this task. The early point at which many 3-year-
olds diverged from accurate response selections suggests that the overarching goal 
may have been neglected from the very outset of the task. In line with this argument is 
the observation that most 3-year-olds in this study did not employ any apparent 																																																								9	The number of cases in this subgroup, composed of only those children who attained the overarching 
goal, was low in the younger age group (7% - an equivalent of 2 cases) which in turn limits the 
interpretability of findings concerning the effectiveness of any one strategy over another in 3-year-olds.  	
	 97	
strategy to produce the higher-level goal and more frequently made use of one or two 
colours only. 
 
In contrast, 5-year-olds demonstrated sensitivity to higher-level goals at least at some 
point within the sequence. Strategy-guided acting was apparent in the performance of 
all but two children in this age group, with a cycling approach being the favoured and 
most successful strategy to effectively produce the higher-level goal. In addition to 
more successful planning, it is plausible that 5-year-olds implemented strategies more 
consistently because they were better able to consider future steps in light of past 
response choices than were 3-year-olds. However, the role of backtracking in 
sequential tasks remains to be explored by future works. Results from this experiment 
indicate conclusively that children in both age groups were well able to perform the 
most basic rule (colour-in all animals), but the vast majority of 3-year-olds did not 
appear to access goals at superordinate levels. As a result, most children in this age 
group achieved lower-level task requirements while failing to implement appropriate 
actions to succeed on this task. 
 
Disregard for task requirements, frequently termed “goal neglect”, has been reported 
in adult participants in the absence of error feedback and when multiple concurrent 
task requirements need to be coordinated (Duncan, Emslie, Williams, Johnson, & 
Freer, 1996). Goal neglect is further observed in neuropsychological patients with 
frontal lobe impairments (e.g., Duncan, Johnson, Swales, & Freer, 1997). Importantly, 
in goal neglect participants clearly understand the desired outcome but are unable to 
organize their actions accordingly. Duncan et al. (1996) postulate that goal neglect in 
frontal patients is linked to impairments to frontally distributed control networks, 
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while in neurologically healthy individuals it is associated with task demands that 
exceed a participant’s capacity for cognitive control (e.g., Duncan et al. 2008; 
Bhandari & Duncan, 2014). As discussed above, frontally distributed control 
mechanisms fundamentally impact the organization of goal-directed behaviours and 
undergo substantial development during the preschool years.  
 
Working memory capacity and the ability to maintain goal representations activated 
in view of competing information has been linked with goal neglect in adults (e.g., 
Kane, Conway, Hambrick, & Engle, 2007; Kane & Engle, 2003) and young children 
(e.g., Marcovitch, Boseovski, & Knapp, 2007).  The 3-year-olds’ performance in our 
task certainly resembles preschoolers’ goal-neglect elicited in tasks that require 
response choices to a set of bivalent stimuli (e.g., Marcovitch, Boseovski, Knapp, & 
Kane, 2010; Towse, Lewis, & Knowles, 2007). As others have argued, regulating 
cognitive control towards outcomes requires both accurate representations of the goal 
state and the functional availability of goal representations for top-down control 
(Towse, et al., 2007). Given the temporal dynamics in our sequential task, one may 
argue that 3-year-olds may have struggled to hold the overarching goal in active 
memory. To investigate this hypothesis further we conducted a second experiment 
asking whether preschoolers’ difficulties in our task could be explained in terms of 
broader memory limitations. 
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3.3.	Experiment	2		
3.3.1.	Methods			
Participants 
Twenty-nine 3-year-olds (range = 36-45 months; mean age = 40.5 months; SD = 2.64 
months, 18 females) and 29 5-year-olds (range = 60-70 months; mean age = 64.4 
months; SD = 3.04 months, 15 females) made up the final sample of Experiment 2. 
Formal consent was obtained from caregivers. Eight additional children were tested 
but excluded from further analysis because they had either failed to respond to the 
experimenter’s request to express the task goal mid-sequence (five 3-year-olds and 
one 5-year-old) or committed colour-by-shape errors (two 5-year-olds). None of the 
children tested had taken part in Experiment 1.  
 
Materials and Procedure 
All testing, coding, and analyses procedures were identical to those in Experiment 1, 
with the exception that children were asked to recall the overarching goal at the 
beginning of the task and after each response selection (excluding the last shape). If a 
child failed to spontaneously repeat the task goal the experimenter would ask directly 
(“How do you need to colour-in these animals?”). Only children who answered 
correctly were included in the final sample of this experiment.  
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4.3.2.	Results			
All 58 children included in the final sample demonstrated a sufficient understanding 
of equality relations prior to testing and succeeded at directly recalling the colour 
criterion before making response selections. Preliminary analysis revealed no 
significant effects of Gender.  
 
Figure 3.4. shows performances plotted by age group, strategy, and overall outcome. 
We found a significant association between Age group and Outcome as indicated by a 
Chi-square test for independence, χ² (2, n=58) = 27.64, p < .001. The majority of 3-
year-olds either achieved the activity but failed to produce the overarching goal (55%) 
or demonstrated goal-directed acting for limited sections of the sequence (35%). In 
contrast, all 5-year-olds appeared to act in line with the appropriate outcome at least at 
some point within the sequence (although 34% did not succeed on all six trials). 
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Figure 3.4. Outcome plotted by age group and strategy in Experiment 2. The colouring 
activity was accomplished by all participants. Children who reached the colour 
criterion were coded as achieving the overarching goal of the task. Performances that 
were directed towards accurate outcomes but failed to reach the overarching goal were 
coded as paying attention to the goal but unsuccessfully.  
 
 
 
Three-year-olds’ tendency to produce the activity rather than the overarching goal 
was further confirmed in terms of the number of colours used to accomplish the task. 
We observed a significant associations between Number of colours and Age group χ² 
(2, n=58) = 16.76, p <.001. All 5-year-olds utilised the full range of their colours 
(100%), whereas this was true for only about half the 3-year-olds in this experiment 
(55%). All remaining children in this younger age group applied one (14%) or two 
(31%) colours only.  
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We also analysed the first detectable divergence from the colour criterion and found a 
significant association between Age group and Divergence χ² (4, n=58) = 29.51, p < 
.001. Again, 3- but not 5-year-olds showed a strong tendency to depart from acting 
accurately early on within the sequence. In fact, 16 3-year-olds diverged from acting 
in line with the colour criterion at the earliest observable point of the sequence, while 
only one 5-year-old demonstrated equivalent performance (48% vs. 3%). A small 
proportion of 3-year-olds directed their colouring activity towards an accurate 
outcome and only diverted from doing so at the very last colour-in shape (14%). This 
final step in the line-up was the point in the sequence at which the majority of 5-year-
olds who did not reach the colour criterion demonstrated divergence from an accurate 
performance (20%).  
 
Finally, we analysed the strategies children choose to tackle this task.  Chi-square test 
for independence revealed a significant association between Strategy and Age group 
χ² (3, n=58) = 25.77, p < .001. Again, the overall preferred strategy of 5-year-olds 
involved a cycling approach (62%), followed by a grouped approach (21%) and a mix 
of both strategies (17%).  Despite the fact that only 10% of 3-year-olds succeeded on 
this task, almost half of the children in this age group showed evidence of cycling 
(42%) and 3% even attempted a grouped approach. However, the remaining children 
in this younger age group engaged in the activity without any evident strategy (55%).   
 
To identify which strategy was most effectively employed, we looked at the 
association between Outcome and Strategy separately for 3- and 5-year-olds. Figure 
3.4. illustrates the frequencies with which each strategy led to accurate task 
performance. As in the previous experiment, when 3-year-olds acted towards a 
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successful outcome they did so using a cycling approach (24% of 3-year-olds using 
this approach were indeed successful). For 5-year-olds, the pattern of strategies is 
more complex than in the younger age group. The majority of 5-year-olds who cycled 
their colours showed accurate performance (73%). Similarly, most children in this age 
group who grouped their colours in sets of two shapes did accomplish the higher-level 
goal (67%). A comparably smaller proportion of children in this age group effectively 
mixed strategies without losing sight of the colour criterion (41%). Therefore, overall 
children in both age groups most frequently and successful made use of a cycling 
strategy. However, as in Experiment 1, only 5-year-olds consistently ensured goal 
attainment when making use of this approach. Indeed, a set of additional Chi-square 
tests contrasting behaviour in Experiments 1 and 2 (i.e., including Experiment as an 
independent variable) confirmed that there were no significant differences in the 
behaviour of children across the experiments.  
 
3.3.3.	Discussion			
Results from this follow-up experiment replicate our initial findings and further 
demonstrate that children in both age groups had no apparent difficulties in recalling 
the task goal while simultaneously carrying out more immediate steps of the 
sequence. This observation strengthens our case that the colouring task poses 
particular challenges for preschoolers in terms of cognitive control rather than 
memory limitations.  Building on neuropsychological research (e.g., Duncan 1986; 
Duncan et al., 1996; Duncan et al., 1997), it has been suggested that this type of goal 
neglect is linked to competing patterns of activity that represents goals and rules 
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within the PFC to produce top-down signals for action selection (see Miller & Cohen, 
2001).  
 
As mentioned in previous sections, it should be noted that our task did not include 
concrete instructions or external cues about when to switch colours and what colours 
to switch to and therefore contrasts with other measures of cognitive control (e.g., 
card-sorting paradigms). Similarly, stimuli in our task did not bias responses in either 
a goal-compatible or incompatible manner.  In line with this reasoning, it is likely that 
the 3-year-olds in the current study struggled to generate endogenously control 
mechanisms to monitor the effectiveness of their response selections because there 
was no direct information available in the task material that would have anchored the 
abstract task goal to lower level representations.  
 
Snyder and Munakata (2010) demonstrated that endogenously generated attentional 
control develops later than exogenously cued control mechanisms in a switching 
paradigm. This study therefore supports the notion of a transition from exogenously 
guided to endogenous generated control mechanisms throughout development. It is 
our contention that developmental differences in endogenous control explain the 
observed pattern of results across 3-and 5-year-olds in our study. In contrast, our 
results do not speak to the possibility that preschoolers (especially 3-year-olds) may 
also have benefited more from external task-generated cues. The ability to integrate 
and adapt to task cues has been linked to preschoolers’ performances when faced with 
response conflict (e.g., Holt & Deák, 2014). However, it is worth noting that neither 
age group significantly improved beyond the level of performance in Experiment 1 as 
a result of direct recall in Experiment 2.  
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3.4.	General	Discussion			
Cognitive control supports action selection in goal-directed behaviour. As outlined in 
the introduction, acting towards complex distal goals not only requires maintaining 
goal representations and knowledge of procedural components in active memory, but 
also calls for adjustments in cognitive control if needed. Several theories provide 
conceptual accounts of abstract rule use and the development of cognitive flexibility 
(e.g., CCC, Zelazo et al., 2003; Attentional Inertia, Kirkham, Cruess, & Diamond, 
2003). A remaining question is how preschoolers implement higher-level goals in 
sequential tasks. Clear behavioural improvements in tasks that require the regulation 
of attentional control are observed during early childhood, but considerably less is 
known about how the need to recruit and adjust cognitive control in temporally 
extended tasks is evaluated during this time in development. Our study provides an 
initial attempt to fill this gap in the literature by investigating 3- and 5-year-olds’ 
abilities to sustain cognitive control in a sequential task in which superordinate 
processing determined accurate response selections at lower levels.  
 
A differential effect of age on all measures across two experiments suggests that the 
3- and 5-year-olds in this study exhibited distinct levels of effectiveness in producing 
the overarching goal. However, given that children in both age groups had no 
difficulties verbally recalling the task goal, as demonstrated in Experiment 2, 
performance differences are unlikely to result from a general failure to remember the 
goal state as such. In other words, 3-year-olds in this study failed in this task not 
because they lacked the representational abilities to maintain the overarching goal 
active in working memory, but because they failed to select actions at subordinate 
levels accordingly.   
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Despite a wealth of evidence suggesting that even toddlers are equipped with the 
ability to represent relatively distal future goals (e.g., Jennings, 2004) and are further 
capable of re-enacting familiar multi-step sequences in which specific procedural sub-
actions precede and follow others (e.g., Bauer & Mandler, 1989; 1992; Bauer & Thal, 
1990), the majority of 3-year-olds performed our task in accordance with automatic 
and stimulus-triggered actions rather than in pursuit of the overarching goal. 
 
Given the lack of external feedback in our task, incorrect response selections were not 
readily apparent unless children adopted a prior strategy to facilitate goal management 
at intermediate levels of the hierarchy. Importantly, goals at higher levels of the 
sequence were both more abstract and temporally extended. In this sense, the younger 
children in this study demonstrated a strong tendency to direct their attention towards 
the most stimulus-implicit and intuitive outcome (the colouring activity). Monitoring 
such a focal goal is cognitively less demanding than keeping track of a distal and 
abstract outcome in addition to more intermediate steps of the sequence.  
 
Alternatively, it may be argued that because of the relatively long response interval in 
this task, 3-year-olds performance may result from a mere failure to hold the goal 
state in memory. However, several points make this an unlikely explanation of the 
observed age differences in this study.  
 
First, it should be noted that even the youngest participants had no difficulties 
recalling the task goal at any point throughout the sequence. A systematic decline in 
goal recall over time should be expected to parallel performance levels in terms of 
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first observable divergence. However, while 3-year-olds departed from an accurate 
outcome from the earliest point within the sequence, goal recall was generally 
unaffected by the temporal dynamics in this task. Secondly, despite the fact that 
drawing parallels between task knowledge and verbal indicators can be misleading 
(see Munakata & Yerys, 2001), explicit verbal recall has been successfully used to 
assess toddlers’ and preschool children’s memory abilities in numerous tasks (e.g., 
Alloway, Gathercole, & Pickering, 2006; Bauer et al., 1998; Somerville, Wellman, & 
Cultice, 1983). Relatedly, Munakata and Yerys (2001) demonstrated that in a card-
sorting paradigm 3-year-olds had considerable difficulty when answering questions 
that included conflicting task information (e.g., “Where do the red trucks go in the 
shape game?”) but answered correctly on non-conflict trials. The authors interpret 
these findings within a framework of graded knowledge representation. From this 
viewpoint, relatively weak representations of the task space may suffice to answer 
non-conflict questions, but stronger representations of the rule are needed to tackle 
conflicting features when sorting cards and answering conflict questions. This points 
to a more general difficulty when faced with conflict.  In our colouring task, however, 
neither the action measure nor the knowledge measure involved a comparable degree 
of conflict. In fact, our task does not bias performance in favour of any particular 
response (e.g., a particular strategy).  
 
According to the conflict-monitoring hypothesis, the management of conflict can be 
conceived of as a negative feedback loop, composed of three sequential phases: (1) 
cognitive control, (2) evaluation of conflict, and (3) the intensification of cognitive 
control (Botvinick et al., 2001; see Chapter 1, Figure 1.2., p. 18). In relatively 
unpractised tasks a low level of cognitive control results in higher levels of conflict, 
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and thus the engagement of more cognitive control. But this conflict-monitoring loop 
can only operate if the mismatch between the current performance and the 
overarching goal is detected. Inadequate evaluation of the conflict between the 
colouring activity and the task goal, may lead to the recruitment of insufficient top-
down influences from the very outset of the task, despite preserving a good 
understanding of the goal state itself. The apparent random performance of most 3-
year-olds in our task is therefore likely to result from a failure to detect discrepancies 
between the colouring activity and the higher-level goal. However, a failure to detect 
a mismatch between the desired and produced outcomes is not the same as being 
unable to hold the overarching goal in active memory. Children’s direct recall of the 
colour criterion confirmed this hypothesis, suggesting that all preschoolers were 
aware of the overarching goal per se, yet failed to adjust actions at more sub-ordinate 
levels accordingly. The observation that actively representing the goal state is not 
sufficient to accomplish the task is in good agreement with the notion of young 
children’s graded mental representations (e.g., Munakata, O’Reilly, & Morton, 2007; 
Munakata & Yerys, 2001). 
 
Formal theories of cognitive control in conjunction with adult imaging data propose 
that a likely mechanism underling the evaluation of the need to adjust cognitive 
control resides within the anterior cingulate cortex (e.g., Botvinick, et al., 2001, 
Carter, et al., 1998; Carter, MacDonald, Botvinick, Ross, Stenger, Noll, & Cohen, 
2000; Kim, Chung, & Kim, 2013, Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013). This view 
presupposes that the central function of cognitive control is conflict monitoring and 
further proposes that, at least in adults, ACC activation in rule-guided behaviour may 
reflect a mechanism estimating whether more or less top-down influence is needed as 
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a function of the current level of conflict, rather than directly reflecting that cognitive 
control is currently exercised. Neuroimaging studies support this view by 
demonstrating that the strength of cognitive control engaged in tasks involving high 
levels of conflict is associated with increased neural activity recruited in frontal 
regions and ACC (e.g., Braver et al., 1997; Botvinick et al., 1999; Carter et al., 1998; 
2000; Frith, Friston, Liddle, & Frackowiak, 1991; Kerns, Cohen, MacDonald, Cho, 
Stenger, & Carter, 2004). However, Carter et al. (2000) also demonstrated that when 
strategic processes were engaged, and thus control demands decreased, ACC 
activation declined suggesting that the observed pattern of activation specifically 
reflects an evaluation of the need for current control demands. While our data does 
not directly test this hypothesis, it is clear how the evaluation of the demand for 
sustained cognitive control plays a critical role in sequential behaviour.  
 
The conflict-monitoring hypothesis therefore provides an interesting account for 
sequential tasks, like our colouring task, in which the demand for top-down influence 
in performance needs to be re-evaluated throughout the consecutive stages of the task. 
Precisely what the enhanced recruitment of cognitive control involves presumably 
depends on the particular task at hand. In the case of our colouring task one candidate 
would be the strengthening of goal representations and enhanced attention to strategy-
compatible colours at each point of the sequence, and thus the reduction of 
competition from incompatible colours.   
 
In contrast to 3-year-olds, 5-year-olds in this study endogenously detected the need to 
adjust top-down control in the face of conflicting information across multiple levels 
of abstraction. Older children overall seemed better able to retrieve goal relevant 
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information from working memory and evaluate their actions in terms of goal 
attainment. In addition, it is plausible that 5-year-olds were better able to track the 
outcomes of their actions in terms of a particular strategy they adopted in this task. 
This last point becomes especially apparent when considering performances of those 
3- and 5-year-olds who performed correctly in the beginning of the task and then 
departed from an accurate outcome in later stages of the sequence.  It is clear that 
these children engaged in strategic action planning and even carried out initial actions 
accordingly. One possibility is that a failure to evaluate cognitive control demands at 
a particular point within the sequence resulted in a deficient regulation of actions. It is 
proposed that, at this point within the sequence children failed to allocate sufficient 
cognitive control resources to bias response selection towards proper mappings 
between the action output and the internal representations of superordinate goals. At 
the behavioural level this resulted in a mismatch between the performed outcome and 
intended goal, despite being able to recall the task goal itself.  
 
Deviations from expected outcomes (e.g., reward prediction errors) are known to 
increase reliance on particular strategies over others (e.g., O’Reilly & Frank, 2006; 
Badre, Lebrecht, Pagliaccio, Long, & Scimeca, 2014). The neural mechanisms by 
which strategies are implemented and evaluated are not well understood. Subcortical 
activation in basal ganglia has been implicated in rule retrieval from memory systems 
and adjustments in top-down influence as a function of strategy efficiency. 
Specifically, tracking the efficiency of a particular retrieval strategy for goal-directed 
responding appears to be at least in part mediated by striatal activation (Badre, et al., 
2014).  
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Looking at the developmental pattern of strategy use across our two experiments it 
appears that a cycling approach was the first strategy to be spontaneously 
implemented by the preschool children in our study.  Despite the fact that a cycling 
strategy still failed to produce accurate outcomes for most 3-year-olds, 5-year-olds 
made use of this strategy very successfully to structure the problem space and ensure 
goal attainment. This observation is in good agreement with the wider problem-
solving literature, reporting performance improvements during early childhood in 
tasks that require planning ahead and anticipating outcomes of the constructive units 
that make up action sequences (e.g. Jones, et al., 2003; Posner & Rothbart, 1998; 
Kaller, Rahm, Spreer, Mader, & Unterrainer, 2008; Welsh, et al., 1991).  
 
Several computational models address the question of how adults manage competing 
sets of action strategies and decide when to create a new strategy to maximise action 
efficiency. Most notably, Collins and Koechlin (2012) proposed a model of human 
executive functions (PROBE) that predicts decision making and variations in strategy 
use in naturalistic situations. This recent model integrates several processes that have 
been implicated in the learning of complex strategies, such as task switching, 
expectedness of uncertainty, and reinforcement learning. Relating PROBE to 
individuals’ performances on classic cognitive control tasks revealed that adults’ 
monitoring capacities are limited to three to four concurrent behavioural strategies. 
The model further suggests that the formation of new strategies is based on the 
expected outcomes of currently active strategies. As such, adults infer and probe new 
behavioural strategies when those that are currently monitored fail to predict 
outcomes with sufficient reliability. Whether preschoolers form and adapt behavioural 
strategies through a similar mechanism of online monitoring is unclear. However, 
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given that the internal mappings required for such a monitoring and updating system 
are implemented in distinct prefrontal brain regions and rely, at least in part, on 
information stored in long-term memory (e.g., see Collins & Koechlin, 2012 for a 
discussion of PROBE, its biological feasibility, and relevant neuroimaging evidence) 
it is likely that the control system undergoes a protracted development into adulthood.  
 
Finally, the methodological approach taken in this manuscript offers a paradigm shift 
in preschool cognitive control research. Colouring-in is a naturalistic task typical of 
pre-school activities that can reveal a lot about planning and working memory 
updating within an ecologically valid context. This is arguably more than is offered 
by standard paradigms that rely largely on taxing the cognitive system with increasing 
conflict and competition using bivalent stimuli. Moreover, this type of approach 
negates the need to ask whether lab tasks scale up and intersect with daily behaviour 
since it draws directly on real-life behaviours.  
 
In conclusion, it is the detection of conflict between response selection and higher-
level goals that makes our task challenging for preschoolers. Children in both age 
groups demonstrated differential abilities to evaluate the demand for cognitive control 
in a continuous task in which perceptual cues to guide response selections were 
lacking. We conjecture that the ability to engage adequate cognitive control to support 
hierarchical action selection over extended time intervals improves during early 
childhood. This development is expected to impact on young children’s abilities to 
engage in sequential tasks and to organize their actions in pursuit of increasingly 
abstract goals. How the behaviours observed here are linked to functional 
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developments in other aspects of executive control remains an open question for 
future research.  
 
 
In the next chapter we present a novel EEG paradigm that we used investigate the 
neurocognitive underpinnings of realistic goal perception across the preschool years 
and in adults. In this electrophysiological study we investigated the mechanisms that 
are implicated in the semantic integration of higher-level goals into a preceding event 
context. 
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CHAPTER 4 	
Convergent ERP and behavioural evidence of preschoolers’ understanding 
of action goals  		
Understanding observed behaviour in terms of action semantics provides a structure 
to learn about a wide range of complex behaviours. How this ability develops across 
childhood is largely unknown. This study provides convergent EEG and behavioural 
evidence concerning the neural mechanisms underling realistic action comprehension. 
EEG was recorded whilst participants watched naturalistic videos of real life events, 
and was time-locked to the endings of complex action sequences. Prolonged 
midlatency event-related potentials (ERPs) were observed in response to unexpected 
event outcomes in both adults and two groups of preschoolers – an age over which 
substantial development in the control of goal-directed actions takes place. The 
findings of this study show that viewing a semantic violation of goal requirements 
elicits prolonged ERP negativities in adults, 5-year-olds, and 3-year-olds. As such, the 
results of this study indicate a functional role of ERP negativities in the analysis of 
visual events and are in good agreement with prior studies in adults. The present study 
suggests that even at the level of abstract goal integration strong incongruence effects 
are evident from an early point in development. However, while the time course of 
this effect was relatively comparable across development, the topographical 
distribution of ERP effects differed across adults and preschoolers. Linking brain 
activity to performance accuracies on a behavioural task further suggests that the 
semantic analysis of hierarchical behaviour is related to preschoolers' abilities to 
overtly judge actions in terms of higher-level goals.   
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4.1.	Introduction			
The notion of a strong functional link between the comprehension and production of 
goal-directed behaviour (e.g., Greenwald 1970, 1972; James, 1890; Lotze, 1952) is 
now supported by diverse and wide-ranging neuropsychological evidence (e.g., 
Helbig et al., 2006, 2010; Humphreys, Riddoch, Forti, & Ackroyd, 2004; Sitnikova et 
al., 2010). However, how the continuous flow of visual information is rapidly 
integrated into higher-level representations of meaning is largely unknown. The aim 
of this study was to investigate the electrophysiological underpinnings of everyday 
action processing across development. Specifically, we asked whether there are 
distinct event-related potentials (ERPs) evidenced in response to unexpected action 
endings that relate to how preschool children make inferences about complex goal-
directed events.  
 
One of the hallmarks of the preschool period is the ability to rapidly learn from 
observed behaviour and transfer this knowledge to novel situations (e.g., Whiten, 
Custance, Gomez, Teixidor, & Bard, 1996). Comprehension of simple and complex 
events is informed by past experience and is influenced by the specific context in 
which actions take place. In everyday environments, observers tend to entertain 
expectations about how observed events typically unfold given a particular action 
context. This context dependent view of meaning construction has received much 
attention from developmental researchers, and it has become apparent that even 
young infants seem to integrate contextual information flexibly into their 
understanding and prediction of action events (e.g., Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Wood et 
al., 2007). Indeed, in action comprehension, mutually constraining top-down and 
bottom-up processes shape our understanding and expectation of observed goal-
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directed behaviour from an early point in development (e.g., Baldwin, Baird, Saylor, 
& Clark, 2001; Pace, Carver, & Friend, 2013).  
 
Recent neuroscientific evidence from adults strongly suggests a bi-directional 
relationship between the computation of language and action events (see Kiefer et al., 
2011; Kiefer & Pulvermuller, 2012). In particular, ERP studies that typically examine 
the construction of meaning within the linguistic domain (e.g., N300, N400 & P600 
ERP components) have recently been adapted to study the build-up of meaning in 
everyday action comprehension (e.g., Sitnikova et al., 2003, 2008, 2010; Reid & 
Striano, 2008). In particular, the N400 component, traditionally associated with the 
semantic integration of verbal stimuli into a preceding context (see Kutas & Hillyard, 
1980a, 1980b) appears to be also evoked by action-related contextual processes. 
While the linguistic N400 and the action-evoked N400 share characteristics in latency 
and waveform, there are also important differences in the topographical distributions 
(see Amoruso et al., 2013 for a discussion of the parallels between the classic N400 
and the action-N400).  
 
In one of the earliest such studies, Sitnikova et al. (2003) observed robust N400-like 
effects over frontal and central sites as a result of presenting adult participants with 
video demonstrations of common actions carried out with inappropriate objects (e.g., 
shaving with a rolling pin). In line with this finding, Reid and Striano (2008) found 
increased N400-like effects over frontal, central and parietal brain region as a result of 
presenting subjects with unanticipated event endings compared to anticipated endings 
(e.g., bringing a spoon to the mouth with food vs. without food). In addition, 
Proverbio and Riva (2009) presented adult participants with realistic pictorial stimuli 
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depicting a wide range of meaningful or meaningless activities, and observed 
enhanced frontally distributed N400-like effects in response to actions lacking an 
interpretable goal (pseudoactions). Moreover, in an action-sentence-compatibility 
paradigm (Glenberg & Kashal, 2002), Balconi and Caldiroli (2011) found frontal and 
central N400 effects in response to inappropriate object selection, as well as when 
action matching objects were used inappropriately in terms of their instrumental 
properties. Taken together, these findings suggest both functional similarities and 
differences between action-related and linguistic N400 effects. Although little is 
known about the neural sources of the action-N400 per se, it is likely that semantic 
processing of everyday actions takes place in a distributed neural network that is open 
to both verbal and non-verbal material (e.g., Amoruso et al., 2013).  
 
In summary, growing neurocognitive evidence suggests that midlatency ERPs such as 
the action-N400 are relatively robust electrophysiological markers indexing semantic 
context-embedded processing of verbal and non-verbal material in adults. Similar to 
the action-N400, the N300 component is thought to reflect semantic processing (e.g., 
Barrett & Rugg, 1990; Holcomb & McPherson, 1994; McPherson & Holcomb, 1999) 
and is further associated with object identification (e.g., Doniger et al., 2000; 
Schendan & Kutas, 2002; Ganis & Kutas, 2003; Folstein et al., 2008). In addition, 
some previous studies identified a late posterior positivity (LPC) in response to 
incongruent event outcomes compared to congruent scenes (e.g., Sitnikova et al., 
2003). In the next section we turn to recent developmental evidence of these action-
related ERPs. 
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4. 1.1. Action-related ERP studies across development 
Electrophysiological studies focusing on everyday actions have investigated whether 
adults and infants exhibit sensitivity towards violations of rationality in terms of 
physical laws (e.g., Jastorff, Clavagnier, Gergely, & Orban 2010), outcomes 
(Proverbio & Riva, 2009; Reid & Striano, 2008), and choice of means with which an 
action is executed (e.g., Balconi & Caldiroli, 2011; Brass, Schmitt, Spengler & 
Gergely, 2007; Reid, Hoehl, Grigutsch, Groendahl, Parise, & Striano, 2009; Sitnikova 
et al., 2003).  In fact, infants’ and toddlers’ expectations about familiar actions have 
been assessed using a wide range of tasks that vary considerably in the degree to 
which they require higher-level representations of the presented events.  
 
Elementary forms of rationality are likely to be based on appreciations of physical 
laws and the kinematics involved in, e.g., reaching over a barrier (trajectory and 
velocity), whereas more complex analysis of the visual input is needed when 
assessing the affordance of an object and the motivations behind an agent´s choice of 
means. Given that boundaries of lower-level information also coincide with higher-
level goal attainment  (e.g., Newtson & Engquist, 1976; Zacks & Tversky, 2001), it is 
sometimes unclear whether sensitivity to rationality violations in young toddlers and 
infants reflects an early understanding of the goal and means-end relations, or simply 
increased processing due to the perceptual salience of the non-rational event. For 
instance, when bringing a cup of tea to the ear rather than the mouth (see Reid et al., 
2009), the deviation in path trajectory produces a perceptually salient mismatch 
between the expected and observed outcome. This initial detection of unexpected 
occurrences based on perceptual features alone may then be followed by deeper 
analysis of the action context, thus generating alternative explanations for the 
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observed behaviour. This hypothesis is supported by electrophysiological evidence in 
adults who appear to show two spatiotemporally distinct patterns of activation in 
response to disruptions of novel events (Pace & Friend, 2013). Findings suggest that 
adults rely on an early mechanism for perceptual analysis (peaking around 50-150ms 
after stimulus onset) when detecting action disruptions, as well as a later mechanism 
(250-350ms) indicating conceptual processing of event information. It is this latter 
component that shares characteristics with the linguistic N400 and N300. 
Interestingly, when Pace et al. (2013) compared ERPs from adults to data from 24-
month-old toddlers, disrupted events still elicited more negative waveforms than 
completed actions, but no distinct peaks were found. Although Pace et al. did not 
investigate action processing in terms of rationality per se, irrelevant actions can be 
perceived as disrupting the ongoing stream of behaviour.  
 
In the current study, EEG was recorded while two groups of preschoolers (3- and 5-
year-olds) and adults viewed video clips of common scenarios (e.g., making a cup of 
tea, watering a plant, and applying toothpaste to a toothbrush). All objects presented 
in the videos fit a broader action context (e.g., beverage preparation, household task, 
bathroom activities). Unexpectedness of outcomes resulted from the mismatch 
between the final actions with its prior event context. Changes in electrophysiological 
activity elicited by video stimuli provide a naturalistic measure to study the 
neurocognitive processes involved in young children’s comprehension of realistic 
everyday actions.  
 
Beyond the use of naturalistic video clips, four main characteristics set the current 
study apart from prior develop
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sequential nature of realistic events by presenting participants with event sequences 
composed of three subsequent sub-actions. Secondly, all events in this study convey 
common real-world actions, in contrast with previous developmental studies using 
novel and abstract events. Thirdly, we manipulated goal requirements in this study 
while keeping the perceptual salience comparable across conditions. Previous studies 
presented perceptually salient manipulations of rationality (e.g., bringing a spoon to 
the forehead), which made lower-level analyses of motion trajectories a likely 
candidate mechanism to rapidly identify the mismatch between expected and 
perceived action outcomes. Finally, in the current study, congruent action endings fit 
the preceding event sequence semantically, whereas incongruent endings do not 
match the event context. However, in contrast to previous works in which outcomes 
were presented or implied on congruent trials but were completely lacking in the non-
matching condition, we present clear outcomes in both conditions. All stimuli 
therefore differ uniquely in terms of the congruency of outcomes with respect to the 
specific event context. 
 
To investigate the development of mechanisms underlying the semantic analyses of 
sequential actions, we recorded adults and preschoolers ERPs in a task that required 
the passive viewing of various event sequences. Following this test session, 3- and 5-
year-olds engaged in an additional behavioural task, in which actions had to be 
explicitly related to higher-level outcomes10. We hypothesized that incongruent event 
endings would elicit more negative midlatency ERPs compared to contextually 
matching outcomes linked to the increased semantic processing efforts provoked by 
nonmatching scenes. In addition, we expected that adults and preschoolers would 																																																								10	Only preschoolers were tested on the picture-matching task as ceiling effects of adults’ performance accuracies 
emerged during piloting.	
	 121	
overall show comparable ERP latencies as a result of incongruence effects. Finally, 
we anticipated that young children’s behavioural accuracies and reaction times (RTs) 
on the picture-matching task would relate to the semantic mechanisms reflected in the 
N300/N400 mean amplitudes.   
 
4.2.	Methods	
 
4.2.1. Participants 
Adults were recruited through the departmental database of volunteers, an electronic 
platform for research volunteers. Parents of preschool participants were contacted 
through the Babylab database. All participants were native English-speakers, had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and a gestational age ranging from 38 - 42 
weeks. The final samples constituted 12 adults (M = 28.7 years, SD = 6.2, 5 female).  
In total 46 preschoolers were recruited for this study, however, 15 children (nine 3-
year-olds, and six 5-year-olds) were excluded from analyses due to excessive 
movement or fussiness. Thus, the final sample of preschoolers comprises data of 16 3-
year-olds (M = 41.2 months, SD = 5.7 months, 10 female) and 15 5-year-olds (M = 
64.8 months, SD = 6.1 months, 7 female). Formal consent was obtained from adults 
and caregivers, and preschoolers verbally agreed to take part. Adults of child 
participants were refunded for travel expenses and children received small gifts 
(Babylab t-shirts, stickers, bags).  
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4.2.2. Materials and procedure 
 
The EEG stimuli consisted of video clips of three real-life events: watering flowers, 
making a cup of tea, and applying toothpaste to a toothbrush (Figure 4.1). Each event 
was comprised of three sequential actions. Actions one and two set up the specific 
action context of the event. Action three represented the outcome of the event, which 
was either (1) congruent, relative to the preceding event context, or (2) incongruent, 
and thus potentially semantically mismatched the observer’s predictions. All 
participants viewed both outcomes of all events resulting in six distinct stimuli 
presented at random. It should be noted that congruency was thus dependent on the 
predicted overarching goal of each event, rather than whether the objects manipulated 
were contextually relevant or used appropriately in terms of their instrumental 
properties.  
 
Stimuli were filmed with a digital camera (Canon HF R60) and were transformed into 
short silent clips of equal length (4.5 seconds) using a video editing software (Final 
Cut Pro, Apple Inc.). To overcome issues with time-locking, a blank frame was 
introduced before the onset of the final action. The appearance of this blank screen 
was similar to an occluder in the sense that it occluded the end of Action 2 and the 
scene reappeared at the first frame of either a congruent or incongruent outcome 
(critical frame). It was thus not possible to anticipate whether a trial would end in a 
congruent or incongruent outcome before the appearance of the critical frame. For 
each event sequence, blank screens were adjusted in luminance by calculating the 
m
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All actions were cantered in the middle of the scene. ERP’s were then time-locked to 
the onset of the critical frame. 
 
Participants were seated in a dimly lit room approximately 30 inches away from a 20-
inch monitor screen. Instructions were simply to view the videos.   
 
 
Figure 4.1.  Example of event sequence presented in the EEG task. Still frames taken 
from video stimuli representing consecutive sub-actions of a common event sequence. 
(a) Example of stimuli display ending in a context congruent and (b) incongruent 
outcome. 
 
 
Stimuli in the behavioural task consisted of 44 black and white picture drawings (see 
Figure 4.2). On each trial, a picture illustrating an action (e.g., baking) was first 
presented on the screen for 4 seconds. This drawing then disappeared and a second 
picture was presented in the centre of the screen, illustrating outcomes that either 
matched (e.g., cake) or mismatched (e.g., scarf) the action depicted in the preceding 
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picture. This picture remained on the screen until the children had decided on the 
relatedness of each pair of drawings by means of a key press. Stimuli were presented 
on a 15-inch Macintosh laptop. Keys were highlighted with large colour stickers. 
Children were instructed to press the green key for matching and the red key for non-
matching actions and action goals. Prior to testing children also received two practice 
trials. Reaction times and response accuracies were recorded for later analyses. All 
children performed a total of 22 test trials equally composed of matching and 
mismatching picture pairs presented at random.  
 
 
Figure 4.2. Picture-matching task. Example of pictorial stimuli used in the behavioural 
task. A first picture illustrated common household actions (Picture 1). Preschoolers 
indicated with a key press whether this action related to the outcome presented on a 
second picture (top right: matching trial, bottom right: mismatching trial). Response 
times and accuracies served as measures on this decision-making task.  
 
 
2.3. ERP Recording and Analyses 
All testing was video recorded and synched with the electrophysiological signal. 
Continuous EEG was recorded from 128 electrode Geodesic Sensornets (EGI Inc., 
Eugene, Oregon) at a sampling rate of 500Hz (see Figure 4.3). The continuous data 
!
Picture!2:!matching!trial!!!!
Picture!2:!mismatching!trial!!!!
Picture!1:!ac3on!!!
4000msec! RT!!
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was low (40Hz) and highpass (1Hz) filtered offline, segmented into 1100ms long 
segments (200ms before and 900ms after the onset of the critical frame), and 
inspected offline for artifacts. First, three different algorithms were used to detect eye 
movements, eye blinks, and bad channels. Moving averages of 80ms were performed 
for these three operations. The difference between fast and slow running averages of 
channel amplitudes were measured and compared to detect bad segments. Channels in 
which activity fell outside the 200µV range on 20% of the trials were automatically 
marked as bad. For vertical and horizontal eye channel deviations, amplitude 
differences between eye channels were calculated and compared against a voltage 
threshold. Amplitudes that exceeded the 140µV range were marked as blinks (high 
frequency noise). Amplitudes that deviated from a 55µV range were considered eye 
movements (low frequency drifts). All segments containing eye movements, blinks, 
and numerous bad channels were excluded from further data processing.			
ERP segments were visually inspected for further artifacts as well as participant’s 
visual attention and accepted or rejected on a segment-by-segment basis. On average, 
adults provided 30 clean attended trials (SD = 2.05) and preschoolers 13 (SD = 
3.01)11. After bad channel replacement and re-referencing to the average electrode, 
the signal was baseline corrected using a 200ms baseline.   
 
 
																																																								
11  Because of technical, practical, and ethical issues in recording child data, difference in trial number are not 
unusual. In fact, infant and child ERPs evoked with a minimum number of trials, are frequently contrasted with 
ERPs obtained with considerably higher number of trials in adults (e.g., Handy, 2004). Importantly, the average 
numbers of trials were comparable in 3-year-olds and 5-year-olds in this study, suggesting that preschoolers’ ERPs 
were affected by similar signal-to-noise ratios.  
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To assess the validity of the three event sequences in this study, segments 
corresponding to distinct actions were first averaged for each participant, then a grand 
average was computed across participants in each age group, and compared visually 
by overlapping the grand average from distinct actions in each condition. This 
visualization of distinct actions revealed that the overall pattern of ERP averages was 
comparable for all events. Therefore, individual actions were combined into either 
congruent or incongruent event sequences. Finally, a grand average with two 
categories (congruent / incongruent) was computed for each age group.  
 
For the selection of time windows a strong hypothesized approach was adopted. 
Based on prior work using video recording of real-life actions in adults (Sitnikova et 
al., 2003, 2008), ERP mean amplitudes were extracted for three consecutive time 
windows of interest: (1) one time window corresponding to the N300 component 
(250-350ms post the onset of the critical frame), (2) one time window corresponding 
to the action-N400 component (350-600ms), and (3) one late time window 
corresponding to a late positive component (600-900ms). For preschoolers the 
midlatency time window was adjusted by 100ms (450-650ms), because prior works 
suggest a considerable delay in the infant and toddler action-N40012. In addition, an 
early time window corresponding to the visual N1 component (150-200ms) was 
analysed at frontocentral sites.  
																																																								12	Previous works used a 600-800ms time window for 9-month-olds (e.g., Reid et al., 2009).	
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Figure 4.3. Electrode montage 128 high-density Geodesic Sensornet (EGI Inc., 
Eugene, Oregon). 
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3.	Results	
 
Prior analyses revealed no significant ERP differences elicited by the three distinct 
actions within each condition in adults and each group of preschoolers 13. Because 
prior research of nonlinguistic action processing suggests that the construction of 
meaning takes place in a distributed network including frontal, lateral, and posterior 
sites (see Amoruso et al., 2013) planned analyses of a relatively broad scalp 
distribution were conducted. Mean amplitudes were averaged and statistically 
compared across left, midline, and right channels at fronto-central and centro-parietal 
scalp regions, with Condition (congruent / incongruent) and Site (left / midline / right) 
as within-participant factors. The results of separate analyses of variance for repeated 
measures are presented below. To correct for violations of the assumption of 
sphericity, a Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment was applied to the degrees of freedom 
(original df reported). Paired-sample t-tests with Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels 
were conducted to follow-up significant effects. Table 4.1 summarizes the results of 
the statistical analyses for adults and pre-schoolers respectively.  
																																																								13	Mean amplitudes evoked by distinct actions were analyzed in a subset of 5 participants per age group. Data was 
extracted and analyzed using a mid-latency time window of 350-600ms post stimuli onset for adults and 450-
650ms post stimuli onset for preschoolers. 
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Table 4.1. 
Results of statistical analyses (F values) contrasting ERPs time-locked to the first frame of congruent and 
incongruent final actions in adults (n = 12), 3-year-olds (n = 16), and 5-year-olds (n = 15). 
Age 
Region 
(number of 
electrodes) 
Contrast 250-350 msec 
 
(N300) 
 350-600 msec 
 
(N400) 
600-1000 msec 
 
(LPC)  
 
Adults 
 
Fronto-
central 
 
 
C 
C x S 
 
9.273** 
n.s. 
 
22.389** 
16.470** 
 
9.175** 
24.186** 
  
LH (24) 
CZ (12) 
RH (24) 
 
C 
C 
C 
 
3.363** 
2.798** 
n.s. 
 
3.315** 
4.185** 
5.480** 
 
2.596* 
2.638* 
6.957** 
 
3-years-
olds 
 
 
Centro-
parietal 
 
C 
C x S 
 
4.838* 
n.s. 
 
6.665* 
6.686* 
 
4.730* 
7.188** 
 
 
 
LH (19) 
CZ (8) 
RH (19) 
 
C 
C 
C 
 
n.s. 
2.279* 
2.343* 
 
n.s. 
3.147** 
2.846** 
 
n.s. 
2.503* 
2.914** 
 
 
5-years-
olds 
 
Centro-
parietal 
 
 
C 
C x S 
 
8.014** 
4.692* 
 
17.845** 
6.922* 
 
24.927** 
6.555** 
 
 
 
LH (19) 
CZ (8) 
RH (19) 
 
C 
C 
C 
 
3.161** 
2.918** 
n.s. 
 
2.511* 
5.298** 
2.713** 
 
2.779** 
5.168** 
4.282** 
Note: LH = left hemisphere, CZ = midline region; RH = right hemisphere; C = main effect of congruency, df 
= 1, 11; C x S = Congruency x Site interaction, df = 2, 22 for adults. C = main effect of congruency, df = 1, 14 
for 5-year-olds and df = 1, 15 for 3-year-olds; C x S = Congruency x Site interaction, df = 2, 30 for 3-year-
olds and df = 2, 28 for 5-year-olds. 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
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4.3.1.	Adults	
	
Early visual N100 
Multivariate analyses did not yield significant effects for Condition within the 150ms 
- 200ms time window.  
 
Early component and N300 
A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect for Condition at fronto-
central scalp regions (F(2, 22) = 9.27, p < .01, !"  = .46).  Follow-up tests indicate 
that mean amplitudes were significantly more negative in response to incongruent 
final actions at left hemisphere (t(11) = 3.36, p = .006, M = -3.06, SD = 1.59) and 
midline sites (t(11) = 3.36, p = .01, M = -3.43, SD = 2.82) relative to congruent action 
endings (left: M = -1.49, SD = 1.27; midline: M = -2.27, SD = 2.07).  
 
At centro-parietal regions a main effect for Condition (F(2, 22) = 9.27, p < .01, !"  = 
.46) suggested the reverse pattern. Follow-up analyses indicated that this effect was 
driven by congruent endings, which evoked less positive mean amplitudes at right 
hemisphere (t(11) = 3.27, p = .01, M = 1.35, SD = 1.47) and midline sites (t(11) = 
4.09, p = .01, M = 2.78, SD = 1.92) compared to incongruent final scenes (right: M = 
2.90, SD = 1.74; midline: M = 4.19, SD = 2.31).  
 
Midlatency component and N400 
At fronto-central regions, a repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a main effect for 
Condition (F(2, 22) = 22.39, p = .001, !"  = .67) as well as a significant interaction 
between Condition and Site (F(2, 22) = 16.47, p = .001, !"  = .77). Planned 
comparisons suggest that this interaction was driven by significant differences across 
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hemispheres. At left electrodes sites congruent outcomes elicited more negative 
amplitudes (M = -1.46, SD = .67) than incongruent trials (M = -.47, SD = 1.25). At 
right hemispheres and midline sites, however, incongruent scenes resulted in a highly 
significant increases in amplitude negativity  (right: t(11) = 5.48, p < .001, M = -4.61, 
SD = 3.04; midline: t(11) = 4.19, p = .002,  M = -3.99, SD = 2.85) compared to 
congruent actions (right: M = -.77, SD = 1.59; midline: M = -1.71, SD = 1.76). Figure 
4.3a illustrates the combined mean amplitudes for fronto-central channels.   
 
At centro-parietal scalp regions, mean amplitudes were significantly less positive in 
response to congruent final endings F(2, 22) = 14.94, p = .003, !"  = .58, (left: t(11) 
= 3.82,    p = .003, M = 1.78, SD = 1.03; midline: t(11) = 3.71, p = .003, M = 2.01, SD 
= 1.35, right: t(11) = 3.12, p = .01, M = 1.41, SD= 1.18) compared to incongruent 
final scenes (left: M = 3.49, SD = 1.74; midline: M = 4.42, SD= 2.78, right: M = 2.85, 
SD= 1.42). 
 
Late component and LPC 
A significant effect for Condition (F(2, 22) = 9.18, p = .01, !"  = .46) as well as a 
Condition x Site Interaction (F(2, 22) = 33.39, p < .001, !"  = .75) was observed at 
fronto-central sites, with enhanced mean amplitude positivity evoked by congruent 
outcomes at right electrode sites (t(11) = 6.96, p < .001, M = -0.44, SD = 1.31) 
compared to incongruent final scenes (M = -2.97, SD = 1.85). No main effects or 
interactions were observed at centro-parietal channels.  
 
 
 
	 132	
4.3.2.	3-year-olds	
	
Early visual N100 
There was no significant difference between conditions 150ms - 200ms post onset of 
the critical final actions at frontocentral sites.  
 
Early component and N300 
Multivariate tests revealed that ERP mean amplitudes at centro-parietal electrode sites 
significantly differed in terms of Condition (F(2, 15) = 4.84, p = .04, !"  = .24).  
However, comparing the effect of Condition across sites yielded significant results 
(given the conservative alpha levels) at midline (t(15) = 2.28, p = .03) and right 
hemisphere electrodes (t(15) = 2.34, p = .03). Mean values in this time window 
indicate that incongruent outcomes evoked overall larger mean amplitude negativity 
(left: M = -2.47, SD = 6.59; midline: M = 2.11, SD = 6.63, right: M = -1.45, SD = 
5.66) than congruent final actions (left: M = 0.68, SD = 5.33; midline: M = 6.49, SD = 
6.26, right: M = 2.25, SD = 5.31).  
 
Midlatency component and N400 
In the time window corresponding to the action-N400, mean amplitudes measured at 
centro-parietal scalp regions significantly differed as a function of Condition, F(2, 15) 
= 6.66, p = .02, !"  = .31 (Figure 4.3b). In addition, analyses revealed a significant 
interaction between Condition and Site F(2, 30) = 6.69, p = .01, !"  = .31. Follow-up 
analyses yielded significant effects only at midline (t(15) = 3.14, p = .007) and right 
hemisphere sites (t(15) = 2.84, p = .01), with incongruent action endings eliciting 
more ERP negativity (midline: M = 1.01, SD = 7.53, right: M = -1.59, SD = 6.23) than 
congruent outcomes (midline: M = 7.35, SD = 7.92, right: M = 3.39, SD = 6.88).   
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Late component and LPC 
In the 600-900ms epoch, congruous final actions evoked a significant mean 
amplitudes positivity across centro-posterior sites, as suggested by a significant 
interaction effect between Condition and Site, F(2, 30) = 7.19, p = .006, !"  = .32. 
There was also a significant main effect for Condition, F(2, 15) = 4.73, p = .04, !"  = 
.24. Follow-up analyse indicated midline (t(15) = 2.51, p = .02) and right-
lateralization (t(15) = 2.91, p = .01) of this late positivity in response to congruent 
action endings (midline: M = 4.31,  SD = 4.51, right: M = 2.24, SD = 4.08) compared 
to incongruous final actions (midline: M = 0.03, SD = 6.67, right:  M = -1.72, SD = 
4.53). 
 
4.3.3.	5-year-olds	
	
Early visual N100 
No significant effects were observed in the early perceptual/sensory time-window at 
frontocentral sites.  
 
Early component and N300 
A significant effect for Condition was observed at centro-parietal regions in the N300 
time-window (F(2, 14) = 8.01, p = .01, !"  = .36). Follow-up comparisons revealed 
that incongruent action endings evoked significantly more negative mean amplitudes 
at midline (t(14) = 2.91, p = .01, M = 5.75, SD = 1.31) and left (t(14) = 3.16, p = .007, 
M = -0.13, SD = 4.56) electrode sites than final actions that were congruent in terms 
of the preceding action context (midline: M = 11.57, SD = 9.95, left: M = 2.61, SD = 
4.01). No significant differences were observed at fronto-central brain regions. 
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Midlatency component and N400 
In the midlatency time window (Figure 4.3c), a significant effect was observed at 
centro-parietal channels for Condition (F(2, 14) = 17.84, p = .001, !"  = .56) as well 
as a significant interaction between Condition and Site (F(2, 28) = 6.92, p = .009, !"  
= .31). Further analyses revealed overall a higher degree of mean amplitude negativity 
in response to incongruent outcomes (left: M = 2.11, SD = 4.20; midline: M = 8.49, 
SD = 7.89, right: M = 5.85, SD = 5.49) than congruent final scenes (left: M = 4.09, SD 
= 4.63; midline: M = 13.55, SD = 7.58, right: M = 8.52, SD = 4.52). This difference in 
mean amplitude reached statistical significance at left (t(14) = 2.51, p = .02), midline 
(t(14) = 5.29, p < .001) and right electrode sites (t(14) = 2.71, p = .01).  
 
Late component and LPC 
There was a significant effect for Condition (F(2, 14) = 24.92, p < .001, !"  = .64) as 
well as a significant interaction effect between Condition and Site (F(2, 14) = 6.55, p 
= .007, !"  = .32) at centro-parietal scalp regions. Planned comparison indicated that 
congruent action outcomes elicited significantly more positive mean amplitudes at all 
electrode sites  (left: M = 3.22, SD = 2.97; midline: M = 8.78, SD = 4.78, right: M = 
6.31, SD = 3.03) relative to incongruent final scenes (left: M = 0.93, SD = 3.46; 
midline: M = 3.38, SD = 4.95, right: M = 2.87, SD= 3.02) 
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Figure 4.4. Combined mean amplitudes at (a) fronto-central channels in adults, and centro-parietal channels in (b) 3-  and (c) 5-year-olds. Graphs represent brain 
activity recorded at multiple electrode sites in response to the presentation of congruent and incongruent critical frames and 200ms preceding these events. 
Highlighted areas (grey) correspond to the N400 time-windows for adults and preschoolers.
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4.3.4. Behavioural results 
 
Behavioural performance on the picture-matching task was assessed in terms of accuracy 
levels (number of correct responses) and reaction times across age groups, and within 
groups as a function of condition and overall performance level. In what follows, separate 
sets of analyses for overall accuracy and reaction time measures will be discussed. 
Thereafter, behavioural results will be integrated to provide a comprehensive overview of 
performance on this task and in each group of participants. Finally, behavioural results 
will be linked with results from ERP measures and the theoretical importance of this 
relationship will be discussed.  
 
4.3.4.1. Overall accuracy 
To assess group differences on the picture-matching task in terms of Accuracy (the mean 
count of correct trials) and Reaction time, an initial multivariate analysis of variance was 
conducted controlling for high vs. low performances levels (below median score / above 
median score). The cut-off between low and high scores (Performance level) was 18 
accurate trials/22 for 3-year-olds and 20 accurate trials/22 for 5-year-olds. Splitting the 
data into low (n = 15) and high (n = 16) scores based on group medians permitted 
comparisons of measures while taking into account broader developmental trends (e.g., 
high performing 3-year-olds tend to have mean accuracies of nine correct trials in each 
condition, as do low performing 5-year-olds).   
 
Preliminary assumption testing was conducted to assess homogeneity of variance-
covariance matrices, multicollinearity, normality, linearity, univariate and multivariate 
outliers. Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels of .025 were used for all separate analyses.  
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Results indicated no serious violations of multivariate assumptions. A statistically 
significant main effect for Age, F(2, 26) = 6.01, p = .001, !"  = .41, with 5-year-olds 
achieving overall higher Accuracy scores (M = 20.13, SD = 1.36) than 3-year-olds  (M = 
17.13, SD = 2.83) was observed. Table 4.2 summarizes the mean values across high and 
low Performance levels in both age groups. Follow-up univariate tests revealed that the 
only difference to reach significance between groups was the number of correctly 
performed trials in the matching condition (F(1, 27) = 10.55, p = .003, !"  = .28). No 
significant effects for Age were observed on non-matching trials. Within groups, 
inspection of the Accuracy means confirmed that the overall lowest scores were obtained 
by low-performing 3-year-olds in response to matching trials (M = 6.56, SD = 2.61), 
while high-performing 3-year-olds reached comparable scores across matching (M = 
9.43, SD = .79) and non-matching trials (M = 9.71, SD = .95). 
 
The observation that group differences in Accuracy were driven by performance on 
matching trials was further supported by a simple effect of Performance level, F(2, 26) = 
11.04, p < .001, !"  = .46. When performance levels were considered separately, only 
matching trials yielded statistically significant differences (F(1, 27) = 11.67, p = .001, 
!"  = .20), suggesting that mean scores were relatively comparable across low- and high-
performers on non-matching trials but substantially differed in the matching condition.  
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Table 4.2. 
 
Performance accuracy on the picture-matching task 
                                                                Age 
Performance Level Mean SD N 
Accuracy on matching trials                      3-year-olds 
 
 
 
 
5-year-olds 
                                     
 
 
Total 
 
Accuracy on non-matching trials           
 
3-year-olds 
 
 
 
 
5-year-olds 
 
 
 
Total 
below median accuracy 6.56 2.60 9 
above median accuracy 9.43 .78 7 
    
below median accuracy 9.33 .81 6 
above median accuracy 10.33 .70 9 
    
below median accuracy 7.67 2.46 15 
above median accuracy 9.94 .85 16 
    
below median accuracy 9.00 2.23 9 
above median accuracy 9.71 .95 7 
    
below median accuracy 9.50 .83 6 
above median accuracy 10.78 .44 9 
    
below median accuracy 9.20 1.78 15 
above median accuracy 10.31 .87 16 
    
Note: Descriptive statistics for Accuracy across Conditions and Performance levels. Performance levels represent high and low scores in each age group. Low and high 
performance levels correspond to scores below and above the median accuracy values respectively. The cut-off between performance levels was a score of 18 correct 
responses in 3-year-olds and 20 correct responses in 5-year-olds. The maximum of correct responses is 11 on matching and non-matching trials, corresponding to a total of 22 
trials on the picture-matching task. SD = standard deviation. 
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4.3.4.2. Reaction times 
Initial visual inspection for outliers resulted in the exclusion of one participant in each 
age group. For follow-up tests, an adjusted alpha level of .025 was used. First, reaction 
time mean scores were grouped and compared in terms of Condition (matching / non-
matching) and Age (3 years / 5 years), yielding a significant effect of Age (F (1, 26) = 
10.13, p = .004, !"  = .28).  Mean scores indicate that overall 5-year-olds showed faster 
reaction times (M = 2.12 sec., SD = .42 sec.) than 3-year-olds (M = 2.90 sec., SD = .82 
sec.). Follow-up univariate tests controlling for Performance level 14 revealed that within 
age groups, children with low Performance levels demonstrated significantly slower RTs 
(3-year-olds: M = 3.47 sec., SD = .73 sec.; 5-year-olds: M = 2.36 sec., SD = .36 sec.) 
than high performers (3-year-olds: M = 2.13 sec., SD = .41 sec.; 5-year-olds: M = 1.89 
sec., SD = .31 sec.), F (1, 26) = 13.66, p > .001, !"  = .34. In contrast, no significant 
effect was observed when taking into account the correctness of responses within each 
condition (i.e., whether a correct or incorrect response was made within matching / non-
matching trials). Thus, this analysis suggests that children who achieved high levels of 
overall accuracy had faster RTs, but there was no indication that reaction times differed 
in respect to trials that then resulted in correct and incorrect responses. In other words, 
those children who performed better on the task overall, were also faster to execute their 
response choices irrespective of whether this selection then resulted in a correct or 
incorrect outcome. Table 4.3 summarises RTs in terms of Condition and Accuracy. 
 
																																																								14	Performance levels were defined by the same median cut-off used for Accuracy analyses (18 and 20 correct trials for 3- 
and 5-year-olds respectively).	
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Table 4.3. 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics: reaction times and accuracy on the picture-matching task for 3- and 5-year-olds (N = 29). 
 
 
Note: Summary of behavioural measures in the picture-matching task (22 trials). RT = reaction time; M  = mean; SD =standard deviation; Range = minimum and maximum 
value. 
 
 
Variables     
3-year-olds (n = 16) 5-year-olds (n = 15) 
M	 SD	 Range M	 SD Range 
Mean RTs all correctly answered trials 2.85 .87 1.68 - 4.45 2.08 .41 1.54 – 2.77 
Mean RTs all incorrectly answered trials 2.98 .81 1.85 – 4.37 2.47 .63 1.62 – 4.09 
Mean RTs correctly answered congruent trials  2.92 1.05 1.47 – 4.78 2.05 .36 1.45 – 2.83 
Mean RTs incorrectly answered congruent trials 2.87 .85 1.66 – 4.34 2.39 .54 1.62 – 3.55 
Mean RTs correctly answered incongruent trials 2.78 .83 1.67 – 4.92 2.11 .48 1.63 – 3.04 
Mean RTs incorrectly answered incongruent trials 2.94 .88 1.94 – 4.82 2.72 1.03 1.79 – 4.64 
Number of correctly answered congruent trials 7.81 2.45 2 - 10 9.93 .88 8 - 11 
Number of correctly answered incongruent trials 9.75 2.79 4 - 11 10.27 .88 9 - 11 
Overall accuracy 17.13 2.82 10 - 20 20.13 1.36 18 - 22 
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4.3.5. Relating ERPs and behavioural results 	
To determine how change within the midlatency time-window relates to changes in 
behavioural performance, electrical activity measured over selected electrode sites was 
regressed to behavioural accuracy on the picture-matching task.  
 
Performance accuracy in relation to electrophysiological activity 
 
A regression model was applied to investigate the relationship between brain activity and 
performance accuracy on the picture-matching task. Mean amplitudes that correlated 
sufficiently with behavioural performances (r > .2) were entered into a linear regression 
model. This resulted in a total of 9 predictor variables: left parietal congruent (LP_C), 
centroparietal congruent (CP_C), right parietal congruent (RP_C), left frontal congruent 
(LF_C), frontoparietal congruent (CZ_C), right frontal congruent (RF_C), left frontal 
incongruent (LF_I), central incongruent (CZ_I), and right frontal incongruent (RF_I). 
Accuracy is represented in scores out of 22 trials (11 per condition). All independent 
variables in this model were coded as voltage in microvolts (µV). 
 
Preliminary analyses revealed no violations of normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, or 
multicollinearity assumptions as indicated by collinearity statistics. Overall the model 
yielded a significant regression equation (F(9, 21) = 2.69, p < .02) with an adjusted R-
squared 15 value of .34 (R² = .53). Individual coefficients and effect sizes are summarized 
in Table 4.4. Standardized coefficients suggest that mean amplitudes in LP_C ( = -1.13, 
p = .002) and CP_C ( = 1.33, p = .004) made the strongest contributions in explaining 
Accuracy levels. Semipartial correlation coefficients indicate that LP_C uniquely 
accounted for 28% of the variance in Accuracy followed by 22% contribution from CP_C. 																																																									
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Table 4.4	
Summary of regression analyses for ERP activity predicting Accuracy on the color-matching task across 3- and 5-year –olds (N = 31) 
 Accuracy across 3 –and 5-year-olds 
Variable  B SE B β 
LP_C -.44 .12 -1.13** 
CP_C -.43 .13 -1.33** 
RP_C -.15 .11 -.36 
LF_C .08 .11 .18 
CZ_C .17 .19 .36 
RF_C -.14 .22 -.27 
LF_I .13 .14 .35 
CZ_I -.06 .15 -.17 
RF_I .13 .12 .33 
R2 .53 
.34 
2.69* 
Adjusted R2 
F 
Note: Performance level was dichotomized as low (< median) vs. high (> median) performance in each age group. LP_C = left parietal congruent;  CP_C =  centroparietal 
congruent; RP_C = right parietal congruent; LF_C = left frontal congruent; CZ_C = frontocentral congruent; RF_C = right frontal congruent; LF_I = left frontal incongruent; 
CZ_I = central incongruent; RF_I = right frontal incongruent. Event related activities at relevant sites were centered at their averaged mean amplitudes 450-640ms post 
stimuli onset. B = unstandardized beta coefficient; β  = standardized beta coefficient; SE = standard error; R2 = explained variation/ total variation. *p  <  .05.  **p  <  
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4.4.	Discussion	of	ERP	&	behavioural	data		
Complex actions are situated in a context of hierarchical action-goal relationships. 
The comprehension of sequential behaviour is, thus, guided by the likelihood of 
related actions occurring. In this sense, associative weights between sub-actions shape 
our expectations about upcoming events, and are modulated by specific action 
contexts (e.g., Wurm & Schubotz, 2012). In this study, we manipulated the 
congruency of final sub-actions to match or mismatch a preceding action context. 
Guided by prior research in adults, we identified several consecutive ERP 
components that are considered to be of functional significance in the semantic 
analyses of verbal material, gestures, and actions (i.e., N300 / N400).  
 
The absence of significant differences across conditions within the N1 time-window 
suggests that comparable levels of attentional resources were engaged at the onset of 
congruent and incongruent final scenes. A lack of such early effects further suggests 
that final actions did not significantly differ on low level features of the visual stimuli. 
Differential activation in adults’ and preschoolers’ grand averages across congruent 
and incongruent trials was visible 250ms following stimuli onset. However, these 
congruency effects differed spatially for adults and preschoolers. Across participants, 
average waveforms contained significant deflections at ~ 300ms and ~ 400ms post-
stimuli onset and were more negative for incongruent actions than congruent actions. 
This observation suggests that the overall time-course involved in the cognitive 
processes underlying semantic integration of actions into a greater event context 
might be similar for congruent and incongruent actions.  
Finally, significant interaction effects as a function of congruency at fronto-central 
regions in adults and centro-parietal sites in preschoolers, suggest prolonged 
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processing of the dynamic visual stimuli used in this study. While congruent actions 
evoked prolonged waveforms that were significantly more positive than waveforms 
elicited by incongruent actions, we did not observe a clear positive peak that would 
relate to the LPC component reported in previous studies (600ms - 900ms at fronto-
central regions; e.g., Sitnikova et al., 2003).  In the next sections, we first discuss 
adults’ ERP results and then turn our focus to preschoolers’ brain activity observed in 
this study.  
 
ERP findings in adults 
A negative peak was evident at approximately 280ms after the onset of the critical 
frame. This peak was significantly more negative for incongruent actions than 
congruent final actions. The latency of this effect shares similarities with the adult 
N300 component identified in several prior studies using familiar and novel actions 
(e.g., Pace, Carver, & Friend, 2013). Sitnikova et al. (2008) observed fronto-central 
N300 effects (~250ms post stimuli onset) at anterior electrode sites in response to 
incongruent final actions of real-life video stimuli like those presented in the current 
study. The N300 component thus appears to reflect modality-dependent conceptual 
aspects of non-verbal stimulus processing (e.g., West & Holcomb, 2002). 
 
A second negative peak was present at about 390ms following incongruent actions. 
The reduced latency and more frontal distribution of the action-N400 component 
compared to the linguistic N400 (typically peaking approximately 400ms post-
stimulus onset at centro-parietal sites, Kutas & Federmeier, 2011) is in good 
agreement with prior electrophysiological research in adults using video stimuli of 
real-life actions and pictures (e.g., Sitnikova et al., 2003, 2008; Reid & Striano, 2009).  
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In terms of the wider topographical distribution of the evoked effects, there is good 
consensus that brain activity in prefrontal networks is widely implicated in relational 
reasoning and the integration of multiple associated representations into higher-order 
mental representations (e.g., Waltz, Knowlton, Holyoak, Boone, Mishki, Santos, 
Thomas, & Miller, 1999). Moreover, widespread distributions of fronto-central 
activity within the N400 time-window have been implicated in the processing of 
discourse-level semantic coherency of stories conveyed by picture stimuli (e.g., West 
& Holcomb, 2002).  
 
ERP findings in preschoolers 
Average waveforms contained visible deflections that were more negative for 
incongruent than congruent final scenes. Incongruent actions elicited a prolonged 
negative waveform that reached a maximum within 300ms post-stimuli onset over 
centro-parietal sites. A peak was present in both age groups approximately 250 to 
350ms after the onset of incongruent final actions. The latency of this effect thus 
compares to the N300 component observed in adults. The maximum of this effect was 
located over midline regions in both age groups. Widespread negativities over centro-
parietal regions indicated further effects of congruence within the putative 
developmental N400 time-window (450 - 650ms following stimuli onset).  
 
Neural activity in parietal and temporal regions is commonly present in the perception 
of biological motion (e.g., Allison et al., 2000; Grossman et al., 2000). Parietal brain 
regions also appear to be particularly implicated in the production of standard hand 
actions such as reaching and grasping (e.g., Jeannerod, Arbib, Rizzolatti & Sakata, 
1995). Further evidence suggests that networks within the parietal cortex are critically 
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involved in both observing purposeful hand movements (e.g., Bonda, Petrides, Ostry 
& Evans, 1996) and imagining hand actions (e.g., Gerardin, Sirigu, Lehéricy et al., 
2000). Thus, posterior brain regions appear fundamental in the processing of 
sensorimotor experience and the translation of somatosensory information into 
adequate formats for action planning (e.g., Kilner, 2011). Left postero-lateral brain 
regions have especially been related to the analysis of more schematic aspects of the 
dynamic relations between agents and objects in goal-direct actions (e.g., Bedny, 
Caramazza, Grossman, Pascual-Leone & Saxe, 2008; Grossman, Koenig, DeVita et 
al., 2002).  
 
There is good consensus that ERPs are not only delayed in infants and young children 
compared to adults, but that components of similar functional significance appear to 
have a greater duration, smaller amplitude, and may at times even be inverted in 
polarity (e.g., Pang & Taylor, 2000; Pascalis, de Haan, & Nelson, 2002). It is possible 
that large amplitude waveforms with low frequencies overlap or mask less mature 
components at fronto-central sites (e.g., Ceponiene, Rinne, & Naatanen, 2002). 
Alternatively, it is also plausible that a topographical shift occurs as maturing neural 
generators become increasingly (or decreasingly) activated during the semantic 
analyses of goal-related information.  In the same vein, it has been speculated that 
neural generators of opposed orientations that differentially contribute to ERP 
components, give rise to polarity inversions throughout development (e.g., Thierry, 
2005). The cause and time-course of inversion and topographical shifts affecting 
specific components is yet to be investigated in longitudinal studies.  
Because any evidence regarding the preschoolers’ N300 / N400 components is 
currently lacking, relating the current results to infant and adult ERP findings is by no 
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means straightforward. Comparative research suggests that the overall time-course of 
distinct ERP components appears to be similar in infants and adults (e.g., de Haan, 
Pascalis, & Johnson, 2002; Pascalis, de Haan, & Nelson, 2002). However, inter-
individual variability and variation within age groups is far greater in infants and 
preschoolers than in adults (e.g., Kushnerenko, Ceponiene, Balan, Fellman, & 
Naatanen, 2002; Morr, Shafer, Kreuzer, & Kurtzberg, 2002). At present, we do not 
have sufficient developmental evidence that would allow the use of source 
localization procedures, and thus developing strong predictions concerning the neural 
generators implicated in the action-N400 is premature. 
 
Evaluation of the regression model suggests that 34% of the variance in Accuracy on 
the picture-matching task is explained by activation in response to congruent and 
incongruent event endings. Standardized Beta coefficients suggest that the strongest 
unique contributions to explaining overall accuracy levels originated from 
centroparietal and left parietal electrode sites. This observation strengthens the notion 
of a substantial relationship between brain activity in posterior brain regions and 
cognitive mechanisms involved in the semantic processing of goal-directed action. 
Results indicate that on average a 2-point increase in the overall accuracy on the 
picture-matching task was associated with a 1µV decrease in centroparietal 
electrodes. It thus appears that, in particular, parietal areas play a role in the semantic 
analyses of goal-directed actions and that activity in these regions can be linked to 
how 3- and 5-year-olds relate outcomes to actions. While this observation is in line 
with the theoretical predictions of this study, the question remains whether 
developmental effects and individual differences in the ability to judge goal 
requirements of specific action contexts significantly add to the relationships 
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identified by this model. Given the small sample size in this study, it was not feasible 
to build a series of separate models for 3- and 5-year-olds, which would have allowed 
a deeper investigation of the relationship between behavioural scores and brain 
activity in terms of developmental effects. It should also be noted that the two 
strongest predictor variables (LP_C, CP_C) reflect activity that was recorded in 
adjacent electrodes during congruent trials. Given the relatively low spatial resolution 
of EEG methods, the role of individual channels should be interpreted with caution. 
Thus, significant contributions from LP_C and CP_C amplitudes to the model should 
be viewed as a more general involvement of centroposterior sites that reached 
statistical significance in these particular channels 16.  
 
5. General Discussion 	
Results suggest that both adults and preschoolers processed the incongruence of final 
actions by means of perceptual processes (reflected at early stages) and conceptual 
processes (reflected in midlatency ERP components). The simultaneous processing of 
actions that takes place at multiple levels has been observed in prior studies with 
adults and infants (e.g., Hard, Recchia, & Tversky, 2011; Pace, Carver, & Friend, 
2013). It has been suggested that the observed mid-latency components could well be 
described in terms of a N300 / N400 complex evoked by dynamic visual events (e.g., 
Amoruso et al., 2013). Results of this study, thus, are consistent with the notion of a 
functional link between the N300 and N400 in the semantic analyses of goal-directed 
sequential actions as a conceptual whole. More evidence is needed to identify whether 
																																																								16	Some degree of left lateralization in the observed mid-latency effect is certainly feasible and in good agreement 
with previous studies investigating action comprehension in adults (Ibáñez & Manes, 2012; Ibáñez, Melloni, 
Huepe, Helgiu, Rivera-Rei et al., 2012; Cardona, Dos Santos, Blenkmann, Aravena et al., 2013). 
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the N300 and N400 components relate to specific processing stages or whether they, 
in fact, reflect a functional complex.  
 
A decrease of peak latencies with ongoing development (e.g., Mills, Coffey-Corina, 
& Neville, 1997; Kushnerenko et al., 2002) is thought to be linked to maturational 
changes in myelination (e.g., Thierry, 2005). Structural changes in the brain, 
specialization of neural populations, and axonal myelination may explain the 
observed differences in the topographical distribution of adults’ and infants’ ERPs. 
However, at the moment, one cannot exclude the possibility that the observed effects 
originate from different neural generators in children and adults, and thus reflect 
altogether distinct ERP components. 
 
An alternative explanation is that adults in this study were overall more sensitive to 
the observation of goal-requirements than preschoolers. There is good evidence that 
sensitivity to the realized goals of prehensile actions is reflected by activity in 
frontally distributed networks. Numerous prior works substantiate the role of the 
premotor / prefrontal cortex in the processing of goal-directed actions (e.g., Catterjee, 
2001; Grézes & Decety, 2001; Giovannetti, Schwartz & Buxbaum 2007; Jeannerod, 
1997; Kemmerer, Rudrauf, Manzel & Tranel, 2012). In particular, left hemisphere 
premotor and prefrontal areas have been implicated in the higher-level visuomotor 
processing of actions that involve manual object manipulation (e.g., Chao & Martin, 
2000). Moreover, activity within the inferior section of the prefrontal cortex appears 
to be distinctly evoked by the perception of hand-object interactions, rather than in 
response to the kinematic motion involved in manual actions  (e.g., Johnson-Frey, 
Maloof, Newman-Norlund, & Farrar, 2003).  
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One may speculate that the topographical differences in the N300 / N400 distribution 
across adults and preschoolers may originate from differences in the semantic 
analyses of the contextually inappropriate actions. As such, adults may have focused 
on relating higher-level goals into a coherent abstract representation of the event 
(indicated by a frontally distributed N400-like component), whereas preschoolers 
cantered the focus of the semantic analyses on more concrete action-related 
requirements (reflected in a posterior N400-like component). This is not to say that 
preschoolers did not perceive the observed events in terms of higher-level goals. 
However, it may well be that the representational content of conflict detection on 
incongruent trials differed for adults and preschoolers. This hypothesis assumes that 
adults and preschoolers primarily differed not in respect to the degree to which 
semantic processes were engaged but rather at the levels of abstraction at which 
semantic integration took place. In other words, while adults may have detected 
conflict in terms of higher-level goal violations, children may have been more 
sensitive to violations of concrete action-object relationships. 
 
While previous studies suggest that preschoolers at times struggle to structure 
sequential behaviour in respect to hierarchically organized action-outcome relations 
(e.g., Freier, Cooper, & Mareschal 2015a, 2015b), there is currently no developmental 
evidence relating posterior midlatency negativities to the semantic analyses of 
naturalistic sequences of actions. However, it should be noted that Reid et al. (2009) 
observed parietal N400-like effects in 9-month-olds in response to pictorial stimuli. 
These authors argued that effects at frontal sites were likely masked by a large Nc 
component, which was evident in both the expected and unexpected condition. While 
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this ontogenetically unique Nc component may indeed represent a precursor to the 
later developing N400 component, Reid et al. found N400-like ERPs at posterior sites 
only in the unexpected action condition. Therefore, the observed midlatency 
negativities elicited by unexpected actions may in fact be more localized to centro-
posterior regions in infants than these authors proposed. Interestingly, in this study 
prolonged ERP differences between conditions were suggested to reflect the degree to 
which low-frequency neuronal activity is in phase. However, in Reid et al.’s study 
only the expected condition (bringing a spoon to the mouth) was goal-directed, 
whereas the unexpected condition (bringing a spoon to the ear) did not achieve a 
discernable goal, rendering this action not only unexpected but also lacking a 
detectable outcome.  
 
The regression model suggests that the observed relationship in preschoolers between 
ERP mean amplitudes and levels of accuracy on the picture-matching task is (1) 
associated with electrical potentials in response to congruent final scenes, and (2) 
driven by performance on matching trials. While this finding may initially seem 
counterintuitive to the predictions derived from the action-N400 literature, it indicates 
that the ERP and behavioural measures in this study are in good agreement. On the 
one hand, children in both age groups overall committed more errors on matching 
compared to non-matching trials. On the other hand, insufficient or incomplete 
semantic processing is linked to decreased ERP negativities within the midlatency 
time window, while an increase in semantic processing demands is associated with 
N400-like effects.  
ERP mean amplitudes in this study suggest that children in both age groups showed 
increased negativities on incongruent trials. Despite the fact that midlatency ERP 
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negativity appears to be critically implicated in the processing of goal violations, 
some level of semantic integration is still needed to process outcomes on congruent 
trials. Reduced electrical potentials in responses to congruent trials might suggest that 
generally lower levels of integrative mechanisms are engaged as long as no obvious 
mismatch between the predicted and actual outcome is detected. If, however, 
predictions are violated, then semantic processing demands rapidly increase, resulting 
in an increase in the engagement of semantic processing networks and midlatency 
negativities such as the action-N400. A relatively low engagement of semantic 
mechanisms on congruent trials may well be mirrored by behavioural performance on 
the picture-matching task in the form of errors and prepotent responses on matching 
trials, leaving performance measures on non-matching trials relatively unaffected.  
 
In conclusion, we report the first electrophysiological investigations of action 
processing in preschoolers, a time of great change in children’s control of goal-
directed action sequences (Freier et al., 20015a, 2015b). We find that adults and 
preschoolers appear to engage similar cognitive mechanisms in the semantic 
processing of action sequences as suggested by comparable latencies of the N300 and 
action-N400 components. However, the distinct topographical distributions of these 
effects suggest that the neural systems that give rise to semantic integration change 
over the course of childhood. The semantic analyses of dynamic sequential events 
appear to implicate higher-level cognitive operations that are mediated by frontal, 
temporal, and parietal brain regions. Results of this study therefore corroborate the 
view that both perceptual and conceptual mechanisms operate together in the 
semantic processing of sequential goal-directed actions by 3 years of age. The extent 
to which these mechanisms are engaged in the detection of conflict between actions 
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and a greater event context appears to undergo marked development from preschool 
to adulthood.  
 
Our findings thus provide a first step into investigating the implicit brain responses of 
preschoolers that underlie semantic integration of higher-level goal-directed actions in 
terms of a preceding event context and in relation to behavioural performance on a 
decision-making task. What mechanisms are generated in order to resolve the conflict 
caused by goal violations remains one of many open questions concerning the 
comprehension of complex intentional behaviour. For instance, it is unclear how 
lower-level event specific information influences the detection of higher-level goals. 
Recent works with adults suggest that sensitivity to kinematic patterns of movement 
may provide additional information regarding an agents’ intentions (e.g., Ansuini, 
Cavallo, Bertone, & Becchio, 2014). In the next chapters we turn the to question of 
whether covert cognitive states are reflected in adult and young children’s production 
of goal-directed actions. We present novel evidence suggesting that the kinematic 
parameters of children’s reach-to-grasp actions are affected by interferences caused 
by the evaluation of distractor objects.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Interference effects in reach-to-grasp action across development 
 
5.1.	Introduction	
 
While early cognitive theories assumed that decision-making is preceded by 
perceptual inputs and followed by motor outputs, current models built on 
neuropsychological evidence that links perception, cognition, and action through 
interactive and parallel processes (e.g., Song & Nakayama, 2009 for a review). For 
instance, wide-ranging evidence suggests that sensorimotor experience gathered 
during bodily actions calibrates perception (e.g. Stefanucci & Geuss, 2009) and thus 
serves the development of numerous cognitive skills (e.g., Brockmole, Davoli, 
Abrams, & Witt, 2013). At the same time, competing cognitive states affect the motor 
pattern of goal-directed behaviour, shaping the temporal evolution of action 
kinematics. In this chapter we will focus on the flow of cognitive states into the 
planning of motor outputs. One way of measuring the temporal dynamics of internal 
processes is to capture the continuity in movement as it unfolds in real time.  
 
5.1.1.	The	planning	of	prehension		
In the introduction chapter we discussed the link between action and perception, as 
two interrelated domains that, together, provide the temporal and spatial constraints 
that give rise to goal-directed behaviour (e.g., von Hofsten, 1987; 2007). In everyday 
behaviour numerous potential actions compete for selection, and goal-directed actions 
are, therefore, highly selective (e.g., Tipper, Lortie, & Baylis, 1992). Numerous lines 
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of research have contributed to the view that from an early point in development 
humans are equipped with selective processes that allow them to tackle the 
tremendous amounts of perceptual information arriving from our external 
surroundings (e.g., Kane & Engle, 2002 for a review). However, this does not mean 
that action selection is unaffected by the presence of irrelevant perceptual input (e.g., 
Keulen, Adam, Fischer, Kuipers, & Jolles, 2004). 
 
Until now we have considered action planning in terms of the cognitive abilities 
required to plan, structure, and control actions in relation to higher-level goals. 
However, selective processes are also engendered through action requirements that 
influence the kinematic patterns of movement. In this chapter we shift our focus to the 
influence of schematic structure on reach-to-grasp actions. 
 
Goal-directed actions are characterised by prehensile actions. From around 4 months 
of age infants gather experience in the reaching and grasping of objects (e.g., 
Coluccini, Maini, Martelloni, Sgandurra, & Cioni, 2005; Corbetta, & Snapp-Childs, 
2008; Newell, Scully, McDonald, & Baillargeon, 1989). While seemingly effortless, 
the mechanisms underlying these actions require the transformation of visual features 
of objects into appropriate hand configurations and, thus, the ability to update the 
position of body segments in respect to the object’s position, shape, weight, and 
affordance. In addition, attentional selective mechanisms need to be in place. For 
example, when choosing an apple from a bowl of various fruits, many possibilities for 
reaching and grasping are presented. Fully specified action plans prior to the 
movement onset would suggest that only apple-related sensory information shapes the 
reaching and grasping kinematics. However, in reality movements are initiated 
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without such detailed plans of the precise pattern of motion involved (e.g., Wilson & 
Golonka, 2013). As such, precise motion parameters are left unspecified for later 
adaptation. In fact, in the example above, the other fruits, of different shapes, sizes, 
and weights might cause a substantial amount of interference to the kinematic pattern 
of the reach-to-grasp action. Such effects are referred to as distractor interference by 
Tipper and colleagues (e.g., Tipper, Lortie, & Baylis, 1992).  
 
The current study assessed the role of interference effects triggered by several 
distractor objects across development. Specifically, we asked whether the strengths of 
interference effects relate to the perceptual and semantic attributes of various 
distractor objects. Using optical motion capture methods, this study constitutes the 
first investigation of interference effects upon kinematic parameters of a reach-to-
grasp action in children.  
 
Before discussing the impact of distractor objects on reaching and grasping, the 
following section will provide a brief description of prehensile movement. More 
detailed accounts concerning the precise motor pattern underlying reach-to-grasp 
actions are beyond the scope of this study and are provided elsewhere (e.g., Smeeta & 
Brenner, 1999; Wang & Stelmach, 1999). 
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5.1.2.	Reach-to-grasp	action	dynamics	
 
While generally considered together, reaching and grasping constitute separate 
movement components of prehensile actions (e.g., Jeannerod, 1986; Jervis, Bennett, 
Thomas, Lim, & Castiello, 1999). During the reach component, the arm is moved 
towards the object and fingers are postured in preparation for object contact. During 
grasping, fingers are positioned to accommodate the size, shape, and use of the object. 
At this stage, force is applied to execute a stable grasp and maintain it. For instance, 
during the execution of a power grip, the fingers are flexed to form a clamp against 
the palm, incorporating all digits and a large palmar surface area. In contrast, a 
precision grip is characterised by the opposition of the thumb to the index finger and 
implicates the pads of the digits for a delicate grasp. However, in goal-directed 
behaviour the selection of the most appropriate grasp depends on both the object 
features as well as the purpose of the prehensile action (e.g., Napier, 1956).  
 
Human movement science, comprehensibly demonstrated that the spatiotemporal 
patterns of reach and grasp components are shaped by the anatomical pattern of 
prehension, specified by object features and affordances (e.g., Jeannerod, 1986; 
Napier, 1956). For instance, the spatial and temporal dynamics of the reach-to-grasp 
action during the execution of a power grip are different from those required during 
precision grips (see Figure 5.1). However, it is the timing of these components that 
has been extensively related to attentional selection during movement execution. For 
instance, once the movement towards a target object is initiated, the posture of the 
hand and the configuration of the digits are adjusted to pre-shape the object, leading 
to a maximum grip aperture at around 60-80% of the overall movement time (e.g., 
Jeannerod, 1986). Evaluating objects in terms of the positioning of the hands and 
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fingers (e.g., volumetric object representation) necessitates mechanisms of selective 
attention (e.g., Castiello, 1999).   
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Prehensile actions: (a) power grip, and (b) precision grip. Source: 
Castiello (2005). 
 
Studying movement from a kinematic perspective can provide detailed descriptions of 
the position and displacement (e.g., angular, linear) of the limbs, hands, and fingers 
during reach-to-grasp actions. Kinematic parameters (e.g., peak velocities, 
accelerations, decelerations), thus, provides insight into the relationships between 
different segments of the body and the organisation of movement in relation to the 
external environment.  
 
5.1.3.	Interference	effects	in	reach-to-grasp	action	
 
Various studies with adults have used a range of techniques to examine the 
spatiotemporal representation of prehensile actions (e.g., Jervis, Bennett, Thomas, 
Lim, & Castiello, 1999; Tipper, Howard, & Houghton, 1998; Tipper, Howard, & 
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Jackson, 1997; Tipper, Lortie, & Baylis, 1992). While participants have little or no 
awareness of motion patterns involved in reach-to-grasp actions, they nevertheless 
show systematic differences in the kinematic parameters of the movement as a 
function of object category and position (e.g., Jervis, Bennett, Thomas, Lim, & 
Castiello, 1999; Tipper et al. 1992).  
 
In one of the earliest investigations of distractor interference, Tipper et al. (1992) 
presented adult participants with a selective reaching task, involving a board 
containing several buttons and adjacent lights. Participants were instructed to press 
the button that displayed a red light and ignore buttons with yellow lights (distractor 
objects). The results of this study suggested that distractor objects caused significant 
degrees of interference (greater response times) that further depended on the starting 
position of the hand. Because the position of distractor objects relative to the hand 
appeared to critically affect the reaching kinematics, Tipper and colleagues argued 
that selective spatial attention in reaching actions is situated in an action-based frame 
of reference (e.g., Tipper, Lortie, & Baylis, 1992; Tipper, Howards, & Houghton, 
1998). Subsequent works referred to this finding in terms of a visuomotor processing 
hypothesis, in which interference is triggered by visuomotor competition from 
distractor objects (e.g., Meegan & Tipper, 1999). This assumption is based on the 
notion that at the neural level, reach-to-grasp actions are spatiotopically represented in 
terms of the location of the object in respect to the current location and configuration 
of the hand. Within the constraints of a behavioural goal, the movement patterns 
afforded by multiple objects are encoded in parallel. However, the action-centred 
frame of reference, allows action-based inhibitory mechanisms to mediate the 
selection of the target object among competing distractors (e.g., Tipper, Howards, & 
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Houghton, 1998). Tipper et al.’s account further argues that shorter reach distances 
cause larger interference effects from distractors at this location. Interestingly, 
according to this view distractors presented at near locations appear to have a 
visuomotor processing advantage compared to distractors that are located further 
away (see also Keulen, Adam, Fischer, Kuipers, & Jolles, 2004).  
 
Tipper et al.’s original paradigm was replicated and advanced several times with 
adults, suggesting that not only the relative location to the hand but also the size and 
shape of the objects appear to impact on the reaching kinematics in reach-to-grasp 
action (e.g., Jervis, Bennett, Thomas, Lim, & Castiello, 1999; Keulen, Adam, Fischer, 
Kuipers, & Jolle, 2002; Pratt & Abrams, 1994). It has further been established that the 
proximity between target and distractor objects crucially impacts on interference 
effects, because not only does the general location of the target-distractor area need to 
be specified, but also the exact location of the target relative to distractors (e.g., 
Keulen, Adam, Fischer, Kuipers, & Jolle, 2002). Thus, it appears that an 
environment-centred frame of reference is implicated at least at a later stage in the 
selection process.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that there is a considerable amount of controversy 
regarding the interpretation of interference effects. For instance, Castiello et al. (1996) 
presented adults with a more ecologically valid task that required the grasping of a 
piece of fruit to perform a task. The results of this study did not suggest interference 
effects in the kinematic profiles of adults. In fact, findings from various experiments 
suggest that the passive processing of distractor objects does not influence selection 
for action (e.g., Castiello, 1996; Jackson, Jackson, & Rosicky, 1995). This 
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observation challenges the assumption that distractor objects provoke interference 
effects as a result of competition in the processing of actions. As a result, the authors 
proposed that selecting among competing motor plans, constrained by the shapes and 
sizes of objects, may not cause interference at all.  
 
This hypothesis was then followed up in a motion capture study by Jervis and 
colleagues (1999), in which the kinematics of the reach-to-grasp action were 
contrasted across the presentation of different types of object categories (semantically 
related vs. semantically unrelated). Participants reached for an apple that was either 
presented alone, or with a compatible/ incompatible distractor object. Compatibility in 
this task referred to object properties that identified objects as belonging to the same 
semantic category, as opposed to objects that were perceptually and semantically 
unrelated.  The results of this study indicated significant differences in the kinematic 
patterns of grasps as a function of semantic compatibility. Specifically, Jervis et al 
(1999) observed a consistent trend for faster velocities in the incompatible distractor 
condition compared to the no distractor condition. In other words, while the overall 
movement times did not vary across conditions, the acceleration of the finger opening 
during grasping occurs earlier in the presence of a semantically unrelated distractor 
object than when no distractor object was present. Thus, the categorical relationship 
between the target and the distractor object influenced the organisation of the 
grasping movement (e.g., opening rate of the fingers, time of maximum grip 
aperture). Significant differences were also evident in terms of the relative times to 
peak acceleration and velocity, with incompatible distractor objects leading to earlier 
occurrences than the no distractor and compatible distractors conditions.  
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It should be noted, however, that the target object in this study was an apple, while the 
distractor object was a box. Despite the fact that these two objects belong to different 
semantic categories, they also substantially differ in shape, and thus grip affordance. 
Therefore, Jervis et al. ran an additional experiment to control for the possibility that 
interference effects were in fact perceptual in nature (presenting a ball as distractor) 
and found no significant effects. In addition, the general results of this study further 
corroborate the argument that the presence of interference effects is determined by the 
amount of visual exposure that participants have prior to movement onset. Tipper et 
al. (1997) had first noticed that when participants observed the object placement, 
competing information form the distractor objects was effectively overcome prior to 
reaching onset.  
 
In summary, research with adults suggests that action interference effects are caused 
by simultaneous presentation of a target and distractor object and the resulting 
conflict between processing demands. One possibility is that multiple motor plans that 
are considered during the selection of the reach-to-grasp action compete and, thus, 
produce interference (perceptual hypothesis). An alternative account postulates that 
the semantic relationship between the target and the distractor objects generates 
conflict that results in increased processing demands (semantic hypothesis). In respect 
to the development of selective attention in reach-to-grasp actions, there is currently 
no comprehensive account of how the perceptual experience is constrained to control 
goal-directed actions during the childhood years. Moreover, there is currently no 
evidence suggesting that children demonstrate similar effects of planning interference 
as a result of simultaneous presentation of targets and distractors.  
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While most investigations of interference effects have been carried out with response 
time measures (e.g., Tipper, Lortie, & Baylis, 1992) or digitized computer interfaces 
(e.g., Keulen, Adam, Fischer, Kuipers, & Jolle, 2004; Tipper, Weaver, Jerreat, & 
Burak, 1994), the use of these methods limits the volume of kinematic measurements 
that can be obtained. In addition, mapping devices that require cursor movements 
pose additional mapping issues that, particularly in young children, may only be 
overcome through extensive training. Using optical motion capture methods allows us 
to translate natural movement into a 3D recreation of the action with a high temporal 
resolution and sub-millimetre accuracy. As outlined in the introduction chapter, 
motion-capture techniques provide a promising means to bridge motor and conceptual 
action processing through detailed analyses of kinematic parameters.  Therefore, in 
the current study we used motion capture methods to tap planning related processes 
that implicitly impacted on the kinematic output during a reach-to-grasp action.   
 
The first aim of his study was to investigate whether simultaneous presentation of 
multiple objects produces interference effects in children’s reach-to-grasp actions 
across development. Some lines of evidence suggest that interference effects are 
exacerbated in populations with fewer inhibitory attentional resources, such as young 
children and adults with Alzheimer’s disease (e.g., Ambron, Della Sala, & McIntosh, 
2012; Ambron, McIntosh, Allaria, & Della Sala, 2009). The second aim of this study 
was to explorer the role of perceptual and conceptual processing demands and their 
influences on adults’ and children’s reaching kinematics. To address these questions, 
we built on the reaching paradigm used by Jervis et al. (1999) discussed above. 
Across various perceptual and semantic distractor conditions, 6-, 9-, 12-year-olds, and 
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adults reached for a central target object while aiming to ignore task irrelevant 
distractor object.  
 
Investigating interference effects across childhood can provide new insight regarding 
the planning and online control of goal-directed actions in natural environments. In 
Chapter 2 we presented a study in which preschoolers were asked to carry out a 
naturalistic goal-directed action sequence, while disregarding distractors that were 
located in close spatial proximity to the target objects. The results in this study 
suggested that the ability to structure the familiar sequence hierarchically depended 
on whether children had observed an agent performing distractor actions (a 
misleading demonstration). However, the pattern of results in the misleading 
demonstration condition also suggested that, older preschoolers were better able to 
select appropriate objects only from among distractors than were younger 
preschoolers. Investigating the attentional mechanisms underling action selection can, 
therefore, enhance our understanding of advances in planning abilities across 
childhood.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the preschool period constitutes a time in development 
during which action-related executive control mechanisms are increasingly engaged  
(e.g., Jones et al., 2003). However, it has also been suggested that executive inhibition 
undergoes protracted development across childhood (e.g., Carlson & Moses, 2001; 
Davidson et al., 2006; Diamond & Taylor, 1996; Luria, 1959; Simpson & Riggs, 
2007). Arguably, the development of executive inhibition is inseparable from the 
development of selective attention. It was, thus, anticipated that younger children in 
	 165	
this study would demonstrate the highest levels of interference effects while also 
demonstrating longer movement durations overall than older participants.  
 
Guided by prior kinematic experiments of reach-to-grasp actions, we presented four 
groups of children and adults with several distractor conditions that differed in terms 
of their semantic and perceptual relatedness to the target object (a red apple). We 
reasoned that, if interference effects in this paradigm result, as argued by Jervis et al., 
from the level of competition between objects of different semantic categories, the 
processing of multiple semantic categories should cause increased interference 
effects. If, however, interference effects are caused by insufficient inhibition of 
perceptual attributes related to grasp apprehension, as proposed by Tipper and 
colleagues, the presentation of distractors that afford different hand configurations 
should provoke strong interference effects, irrespective of semantic relatedness. What 
these accounts appear to have in common is that processing competition generates 
cognitive interference. Following this logic we contrasted seven distractor conditions 
in this study (see Figure 5.2.):  
 
(1) no distractor object condition (ND), 
(2) perceptually compatible / semantically incompatible condition (PC/SC),  
(3) moderate perceptually compatible / semantically incompatible condition (mPC/SI) 
(4) increased perceptually compatible / semantically incompatible condition (iPC/SI) 
(5) moderate perceptually incompatible / semantically compatible condition (mPI/SC) 
(6) increased perceptually incompatible / semantically compatible condition (iPI/SC) 
(7) perceptually incompatible / semantically incompatible condition (PI/SI) 
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The conditions in this study, thus, differed in terms of their semantic and perceptual 
compatibility between the distractor and target, as well as in the overall number of 
distractors that were simultaneously presented (set size). Given the lack of prior 
evidence regarding kinematic interference effects across development, we did not 
make any specific predictions of the level of interference in each condition.   
 
5.2	Methods	
 
Participants  
Due to excessive marker occlusion two adults, six 6-year-olds, and four 9-year-olds 
had to be excluded from the final sample. A further three 6-year-olds and one 12-
year-old were also excluded because of a consistent failure to bring the reaching hand 
back to the starting location at the onset of each trial. Seventy-three participants (9 left 
handed / 64 right handed), naïve to the purpose of the study, were included in the final 
sample. Age groups were composed of 19 6-year-olds (M = 6.6 year, SD = 0.3 years; 
female = 9), 23 9-year-olds (M = 9.4 years, SD = 0.3; female = 13), and 19 12-year-
olds (M = 12.6 years , SD = 0.5 years; female = 7). A total of 11 adult participants 
took part (M = 29.4 years, SD = 4.4 years; female = 8). All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. All participants were tested individually. Formal consent 
was obtained from caregivers and children verbally agreed to participants. The study 
was granted ethical approval from the College Ethics Committee and all experimental 
sessions were conducted in accordance with the Helsinki declaration. All participants 
received travel reimbursement and children were given small gifts for taking part.  
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Material  
Stimuli in this study consisted of three round objects with equal diameters (6cm) that 
belonged to different semantic categories (apples, a tennis ball, a tea ball infuser), as 
well as three common objects that varied in shape, size, and semantic relatedness 
(banana, grape, scissors). Prior to testing, children and adults were asked to identify 
all objects. Figure 5.2. illustrates the experimental setup in this study. Retroreflective 
markers for optical motion-capture were placed on the participants’ dominant hand. 
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Figure 5.2. Stimuli displayed across conditions. (A) The target object alone in the 
centre of the table (grey apple), 30cm away from the starting position of the hand 
(black square), represented the no distractor condition (ND). Participants were further 
presented with (B) a perceptually compatible – semantically compatible distractor 
condition (PC/SC) displaying two apples; a (C) moderate and an (D) increased version 
of a perceptually compatible - semantically incompatible distractor condition (mPC/SI, 
iPC/SI), presenting the target apple together with a tennis ball and tea infuser of equal 
diameter. In a (E) moderate and an (F) increased version of the perceptually 
incompatible - semantically compatible distractor condition (mPI/SC, iPI/SC), the 
target was presented with either one (banana) or two (banana & grape) pieces of fruit. 
Finally, we added a (G) perpetually incompatible – semantically incompatible 
distractor condition (PI/SI) in which the distractor was a pair of scissors. 
 
 
Procedure  
The experiment was carried out under normal lighting conditions. The participants sat 
on table (50cm x 50cm) with their dominant hand placed in front of them. Figure 5.3 
illustrates the participants’ position in relation to the experimental setup. A straight 
line on the table surface marked the starting position for trial. All participants were 
instructed that their reaching hand had to be placed at this starting position with the 
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three middle digits touching, but never crossing, the line. Hand placement was further 
practiced before testing. The target object was then displayed in the centre of the 
table, aligning with the midline of the participants’ bodies and the starting position of 
the hand (30cm away). Participants were instructed to reach for the apple with a 
movement that felt natural, to pick it up, and to place it back on the table. Further 
instructions specified that participants had to ignore all other objects presented to the 
left and right sides of the central apple. For children, instructions emphasized that 
only the apple had to be lifted and that none of the other objects mattered in this task. 
All participants also received three practice trials before the first test trial commenced.  
 
The experimental conditions were each composed of 10 trials with exception of the no 
distractor condition, which was presented 30 times. This resulted in a total of 90 
randomly presented trials. At the beginning of each trial, the experimenter reminded 
participants that the reaching hand had to be placed at the starting position, and only 
when this was confirmed was a new test trial begun. In order to minimise visual 
processing time before reaching onset, the experimenter placed a screen on the table 
to conceal the placement of the stimuli from the participants’ view. The lifting of the 
screen marked the onset of each trial. Participants’ reach-to-grasp actions were 
tracked and recorded with an optical motion-capture camera system. 
 
Marker placement and Motion recording 
Spherical passive retroreflective markers (4 mm diameter) were attached to four 
points on the participants’ hands, using skin-safe double-sided adhesive tape. The 
first three points were the same as in the original experiment by Jervis et al. (1999): 
(i) on the wrist — radial styloid process (ii) on the index finger — dorsal side of the 
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tip of the second finger (iii) on the thumb — dorsal side of the tip of the index finger. 
A fourth marker position, (iv) placed on the first knuckle of the index finger — dorsal 
side of the second metacarpophalangeal joint, was chosen based on previous motion-
capture research in children (e.g., Coluccini, Maini, Martelloni, Sgandurra, &, Cioni, 
2007; Jaspers, Feys, Bruyninckx, Harlaar, Molenaers, &, Desloovere, 2011). In 
addition, a single marker was attached to the target object and all distractors.  
 
Movements were recorded using a five-camera optical marker-based motion capture 
system (4 Oqus 1 cameras to record markers, 1 Oqus 210c camera for synchronized 
colour video recording, all from Qualisys Inc., Sweden). Each camera was equipped 
with an LED strobe emitting light in the near-infrared light spectrum (∼ 800nm 
wavelength). The sampling rate was set to 100 Hz. The four marker-recording 
cameras were placed in a quarter-circular fashion on tripods around the table, 
between 1 m and 1.5 m from the closest edge of the table and 0.3 m to 1 m apart. The 
cameras were vertically inclined at a height between 0.8 m and 1.1 m relative to the 
table-working surface. Figure 5.3 illustrates the camera placement in this study. 
 
The calibrated measurement volume was approximately 1.5 m long × 1 m wide × 1 m 
high. Calibration was performed using a wand with two markers attached to the wand 
299.3 mm apart. An L-shaped frame equipped with four markers (one marker at the 
junction; one marker at 200 mm distance from the junction marker on the short side; 
two markers at 90 mm and 300 mm distances from the junction marker on the long 
side; all markers were coplanar) was placed on the table during calibration as static 
reference and coordinate system origin. 
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The recording was controlled using the Qualisys Track Manager (QTM) software 
package (version 2.9). Each testing session was recorded continuously. This yielded 
one measurement file per participant containing all trials from the respective session. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3. (A) Experimental setup and camera placement from the left side. 
Retroflective markers (white) are depicted in relation to the target object (grey). (B) 
Experimental setup and camera placement from above (P = participants position; the 
target object is presented on a marked position in the centre of the table).  
 
 
Coding 
The QTM software package was used to calculate the three-dimensional 
reconstruction of the marker positions. Each successful trial was then assessed 
visually to manually record the frame at which one of three events occurred: (i) start 
of the reach component (ii) end of the reach component, and (iii) end of the grasp 
component (end of the movement). The start of the reaching component was coded as 
the instant at which the hand was lifted off the table surface (reflected in an 
acceleration of the velocity curve). The end of the reach component was coded as the 
point at which the arm was maximally extended. From this instant to the point at 
A B 
table&&cameras&&
screen&&
start&&
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which the participant’s fingers had closed around the object, the movement interval 
was coded as part of the grasp component. Three independent coders checked the 
recorded video sessions for correct placements of the participants’ hands at the onset 
of each trial. Coders also screened the reconstructed motion capture data for signal 
failures as suggested by discontinuous velocity curves. All coders received training of 
the manual coding procedure until Krippendorff’s Alpha coefficient of inter-coder 
reliability was 0.90 or higher. Trials with signal failures (due to marker occlusion) 
were eliminated, as were trials in which the participant’s hand was misplaced at the 
onset of the reach. After coding and data processing, the average numbers of included 
trials that participants contributed were: 53 coded trials in 6-year-olds; 58 average 
coded trials in 9-year-olds; and 74 average coded trials in 12-year-olds. Adults 
contributed on average 73 coded trials in this task.  
 
Processing of kinematic data 
The kinematic data was first smoothed using a second-order lowpass Butterworth 
filter (10 Hz cutoff frequency) and then processed in MATLAB (version R2015s). 
Movement perpendicular to the table workspace was ignored. Only the two-
dimensional motion parallel to the table workspace was assessed. For each successful 
trial the following kinematic parameters were calculated: (a) movement duration 
(from the reach start event to the end of the grasp), (b) time to peak velocity, (c) 
occurrence of peak velocity (in percentage of movement duration), (d) time to peak 
acceleration, (e) occurrence of peak acceleration (in percentage of movement 
duration), (f) time to peak deceleration, (g) and occurrence of peak deceleration (in 
percentage of movement duration). All kinematic parameters were derived from the 
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position data of the knuckle markers. The parameters were individually computed for 
reach and grasp components. Kinematic analyses in relative terms17  allowed the 
evaluation of temporal occurrences of kinematic events at different percentages of the 
total movement across conditions and age groups. 
For statistical analyses, cases including extreme values (values within the 1st and 99th 
percentile of the distribution) were excluded. Mean values of the kinematic 
parameters were first computed and introduced in a mixed multivariate analysis of 
variance. Thereafter, planned comparison analyses (Turkey HSD) were conducted to 
contrast the specific hypotheses that interference effects are linked to Set size (no 
distractor / 1 distractor / 2 distractors), Semantic compatibility (no distractor / 
semantically compatible / semantically incompatible) or Perceptual compatibility (no 
distractor / perceptually compatible / perceptually incompatible). Bonferroni adjusted 
alpha levels (.017) were used for multiple comparisons. Because of the large volume 
of parametric measures and factors in this study, results are presents separately, 
considering first the overall movement analyses, followed by individual analyses for 
the reach and grasp components. 
5.3.	Results		
Assumption testing suggested no serious violations of normality, univariate and 
multivariate outliers, multicollinearity, and homogeneity of variance-covariance 
matrices. Pillai’s trace was chosen to ensure robustness of the statistical test despite 
unequal sample sizes in this study. Preliminary analyses did not yield significant 
results in terms of gender or handedness.  																																																								
17 Expressing kinematic parameters as a percentage of the total movement duration provides a useful 
measure of the temporal dynamics of events (Jervis et al., 1999). 
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Overall Movement  
An initial multivariate test was conducted to analyse absolute kinematic measures 
(Movement duration, Peak velocity, Peak acceleration, Peak deceleration) across the 
complete reach-to-grasp action. This analysis included Age (6 years / 9 years / 12 
years / adults) as between-subjects variable and Condition (ND, PC/SC, mPC/SI, 
iPC/SI, mPI/SC, iPI/SC, PI/SI) as within-subjects variable. Table 5.1 presents mean 
values of kinematic parameters and as percentage of total movement duration. Mean 
values of movement duration across Conditions and Age groups are summarised in 
Table 5.2. The results revealed a statistically significant effect for Age, F (4, 415) = 
11.41, p < .001; η!"  = .13. Follow-up univariate analyses indicated that this effect was 
significant in terms of Movement duration F(3, 418) = 39.55, p < .001; η!"  = .22, Peak 
velocity, F(3, 418) = 7.11, p < .001; η!"  = .05, Peak acceleration F(3, 418) = 11.26, p < 
.001; η!"  = .08, and Peak deceleration, F(3, 418) = 8.45, p < .001; η!"  = .06. Inspection 
of mean values confirmed overall increases in reach-to-grasp velocity with age (see 
Table 5.1).  
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Table 5.1. Mean values of kinematic parameters in ms and as percentage of total movement duration (N = 73). 																																														Kinematic	parameter	 Reach-to-Grasp	 Reach	Component	 Grasp	Component	
 	
   
M SD	 M SD	 M 	SD	
	6-year-olds		 Movement	duration	(ms)	 920	 219	 752	 196	 168	 59		 	 	 	 	 	 	 			 Time	to	peak	velocity	(ms)	 351	 121	 351	 121	 765	 21		 %	 39	 9	 39	 9	 83	 5			 Time	to	peak	acceleration	(ms)	 199	 123	 189	 98	 865	 20		 %	 21	 8	 21	 8	 95	 3			 Time	to	peak	deceleration	(ms)	 499	 158	 473	 131	 899	 214		 %	 56	 10	 53	 10	 98	 3		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
9-year-olds	 Movement	duration	(ms)	 835	 142	 694	 127	 141	 48		 	 	 	 	 	 	 			 Time	to	peak	velocity	(ms)	 348	 73	 348	 73	 702	 132		 %	 42	 7	 42	 7	 84	 5		 Time	to	peak	acceleration	(ms)	 201	 79	 198	 74	 791	 131		 %	 24	 8	 24	 8	 95	 3			 Time	to	peak	deceleration	(ms)	 469	 96	 468	 92	 822	 138		 %	 58	 10	 58	 10	 96	 2		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
12-year-olds	 Movement	duration	(ms)	 764	 121	 653	 104	 111	 29		 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 Time	to	peak	velocity	(ms)	 334	 64	 334	 64	 661	 108		 %	 43	 4	 43	 4	 86	 3		 Time	to	peak	acceleration	(ms)	 183	 54	 183	 54	 729	 110		 %	 24	 5	 24	 5	 96	 2		 Time	to	peak	deceleration	(ms)	 449	 81	 446	 78	 754	 116		 %	 59	 6	 59	 6	 99	 1		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Adults	 Movement	duration	(ms)	 679	 86	 574	 69	 105	 30		 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 Time	to	peak	velocity	(ms)	 295	 41	 295	 41	 575	 70		 %	 43	 4	 44	 4	 85	 3		 Time	to	peak	acceleration	(ms)	 131	 39	 131	 39	 665	 83		 %	 19	 6	 19	 6	 98	 2			 Time	to	peak	deceleration	(ms)	 424	 61	 424	 61	 656	 85		 %	 62	 6	 62	 6	 99	 1	
	 176	
Table 5.2. Mean reach-to-grasp (total movement) durations per condition collapsed across age groups (N = 73). 
 Age	 Condition		 M	 SD		6-year-olds		 (A)	NO,	No	distractor		 797	ms	 123	ms		 (B)	PC/SC,	No	semantic	or	perceptual	competition		 906	ms	 187	ms			 (C)	mPC/SI,	Moderate	semantic	competition		 865	ms	 139	ms		 (D)	iPC/SI,	Increased	semantic	competition	 974	ms	 233	ms			 (E)	mPI/SC,	Moderate	perceptual	competition	 922	ms	 181	ms		 (F)	iPI/SC,	Increased	perceptual	competition	 1071	ms	 338	ms			 (G)	PI/SI,	Semantic	and	perceptual	competition	 899	ms	 191	ms		 	 	 	9-year-olds	 (A)	NO,	No	distractor		 771	ms	 124	ms		 (B)	PC/SC,	No	semantic	or	perceptual	competition		 834	ms	 146	ms			 (C)	mPC/SI,	Moderate	semantic	competition		 842	ms	 141	ms		 (D)	iPC/SI,	Increased	semantic	competition	 861	ms	 157	ms		 (E)	mPI/SC,	Moderate	perceptual	competition	 841	ms	 156	ms		 (F)	iPI/SC,	Increased	perceptual	competition	 891	ms	 137	ms			 (G)	PI/SI,	Semantic	and	perceptual	competition	 809	ms	 115	ms		 			 	 	12-year-olds	 (A)	NO,	No	distractor		 712	ms	 97	ms		 (B)	PC/SC,	No	semantic	or	perceptual	competition		 794	ms	 127	ms		 (C)	mPC/SI,	Moderate	semantic	competition		 759	ms	 108	ms		 (D)	iPC/SI,	Increased	semantic	competition	 802	ms	 149	ms		 (E)	mPI/SC,	Moderate	perceptual	competition	 764	ms	 135	ms		 (F)	iPI/SC,	Increased	perceptual	competition	 777ms	 107	ms		 (G)	PI/SI,	Semantic	and	perceptual	competition	 738	ms	 108	ms		 	 	 	Adults	 (A)	NO,	No	distractor		 671	ms	 116	ms		 (B)	PC/SC,	No	semantic	or	perceptual	competition		 659	ms	 62	ms		 (C)	mPC/SI,	Moderate	semantic	competition		 671	ms	 56	ms		 (D)	iPC/SI,	Increased	semantic	competition	 672	ms	 51	ms		 (E)	mPI/SC,	Moderate	perceptual	competition	 688	ms	 102	ms		 (F)	iPI/SC,	Increased	perceptual	competition	 708	ms	 92	ms			 (G)	PI/SI,	Semantic	and	perceptual	competition	 684	ms	 104	ms		 	 	 	
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No multivariate effects were observed for Condition, however, univariate tests 
suggested a main effect for Condition in terms of Movement duration, F(6, 418) = 
3.71, p = .001; η!"  = .05. For planned comparison analyses Conditions were collapsed 
across Age. Post-hoc analyses revealed significant effects for Set size, in terms of 
Movement duration, F (2, 434) = 10.18, p < .001; η!"  = .05, with significant 
differences in mean scores between no distractor (M = 746 ms, SD = 122 ms) and 
both 1 distractor (M = 810 ms, SD = 156 ms) and 2 distractors (M = 868 ms, SD = 117 
ms), and between 1 distractors (M = 810 ms, SD = 156 ms) and 2 distractors (M = 868 
ms, SD = 175 ms). Table 5.3 summarises all mean values (Movement Duration) and 
Figure 5.4 illustrates mean values of Movement duration as a factor of Set Size. 
Contrasting movement duration in terms of Semantic compatibility also yielded a 
significant effect, F (2, 434) = 6.51, p = .02; η!"  = .03, however post-hoc analyses 
revealed that the only differences to reach significance were between no distractor (M 
= 746 ms, SD = 122 ms) and semantically compatible (M = 841 ms, SD = 193 ms), 
and no distractor (M = 746 ms, SD = 122 ms) and semantically incompatible (M = 
817 ms, SD = 164 ms). Similarly, movement durations differed in terms of Perceptual 
compatibility F (2, 434) = 5.89, p = .003; η!"  = .03, with no distractors (M = 746 ms, 
SD = 122ms) leading to significantly lower movement durations compared to the 
perceptual compatible (M = 826 ms, SD = 166 ms) and the perceptual incompatible 
(M = 823 ms, SD = 192 ms) conditions. No significant differences were observed 
between perceptually compatible and perceptually incompatible distractor conditions. 
We also did not observe a significant interaction between Age and Condition. 
However, this interaction approached significance when contrasting movement 
durations in the youngest age group with adult mean values (F (2, 174) = 2.88,            
p = .059; η!"  = .03). 
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Further analyses were conducted to investigate the temporal occurrence of kinematic 
parameters in respect to the overall movement.  Multivariate analyses of relative 
kinematic measures (Occurrence of peak velocity, Occurrence of peak acceleration, 
Occurrence of peak deceleration) yielded a significant effect of Age, F(3, 416) = 
10.63, p < .001; η!"  = .07. The significance of this result was confirmed by univariate 
tests, indicating effects across all measures: Occurrence of peak velocity, F(3, 418) = 
13.29, p < .001; η!"  = .09, Occurrence of peak acceleration, F(3, 418) = 9.29, p < 
.001; η!"  = .06, and Occurrence of peak deceleration, F(3, 418) = 7.39, p < .001; η!"  = 
.05. Mean values of relative kinematic parameters suggest a trend of increases in 
relative movement times with age  (Table 5.1).  
 
Figure 5.4. Overall movement duration as a factor of set size 
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Reach Component  
Another set of analyses concerned the reach component across Age and Condition. 
Table 5.4 summarises all mean values for reaching duration (Reach duration). As 
with previous results there was a multivariate effect for Age, F (4, 415) = 9.05,          
p < .001; η!"  = .08, that was statistically significant for all kinematic measures: 
Movement duration F(3, 418) = 25.04, p < .001; η!"  = .15, Peak velocity, F(3, 418) = 
7.09, p < .001; η!"  = .05, Peak acceleration F(3, 418) = 12.42, p < .001; η!"  = .08, and 
Peak deceleration, F(3, 418) = 4.85, p = .002; η!"  = .03. Univariate analyses collapsed 
across age further indicated a significant effect for Condition in terms of Movement 
duration F(6, 418) = 4.11, p = .001; η!"  = .05.  
 
Follow-up tests of Movement duration (reaching duration) across conditions, yielded 
a main effect for Set size, F(2, 466) = 7.53, p = .002; η!"  = .03, with statistically 
significant increases in reaching durations in response to 2 distractors (M = 724 ms, 
SD = 187 ms) compared to 1 distractor (M = 676 ms , SD = 132 ms) and No distractor 
(M = 623 ms , SD = 101 ms), as well as in response to 1 distractor (M = 676 ms , SD 
= 132 ms) compared to No distractor (M = 623 ms , SD = 101 ms). In the same way, 
there were significant effects for Movement duration in respect to Semantic 
compatibility F (2, 434) = 5.66, p = .004; η!"  = .03, and Perceptual compatibility F (2, 
434) = 5.45, p = .005;  η!"  = .02. Post-hoc analyses revealed significant differences 
between no distractor and semantically compatible, no distractor and semantically 
incompatible, as well as between no distractor and perceptually compatible and no 
distractor and perceptual incompatible. In turn, contrasting Movement duration across 
Semantic and Perceptual compatibilities did not suggest significant differences.  
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The same pattern of results was observed for relative reaching times, with an effect 
for Age, F (4, 416) = 12.52, p < .001; η!"  = .08, that was driven by all relative 
kinematic measures: Occurrence of peak velocity, F(3, 418) = 13.26, p < .001; η!"  = 
.09, Occurrence of peak acceleration, F(3, 418) = 10.44, p < .001; η!"  = .07, and 
Occurrence of peak deceleration, F(3, 418) = 18.44, p < .001, η!"  = .12 (see Table 5.1 
for mean values of relative kinematic parameters during reaching).  
 
Grasp component 
Here again, multivariate analyses of the kinematic measures revealed a statistical 
significant effect for Age, F (4, 415) = 14.73, p < .001; η!"  = .12. Follow-up analyses 
indicated that this effect was highly significant in terms of Movement duration F(3, 
418) = 41.99, p < .001; η!"  = .23, Peak velocity, F(3, 418) = 25.68, p < .001; η!"  = .16, 
Peak acceleration F(3, 418) = 32.23, p < .001; η!"  = .19, and Peak deceleration, F(3, 
418) = 35.86, p < .001; η!"  = .21 (see Table 5.1 for all mean values of the grasp 
component).  
 
In addition, univariate analyses revealed a significant effect for Set size in terms of 
Peak velocity, F(2, 434) = 9.47, p < .001; η!"  = .04, with significant increases in 
response to No distractor (M = 627 ms, SD = 102 ms) compared to 2 distractors (M= 
734 ms, SD = 193 ms), and further significant increases from 1 distractor (M = 684 
ms, SD = 138 ms) to 2 distractors (M = 734 ms, SD = 193 ms). Planned comparisons 
also suggested similar differences in terms of Peak acceleration during grasping, F(2, 
434) = 10.48, p < .001; η!"  = .05. In fact, a significant increase in time to peak 
acceleration was observed from the No distractor (M = 712 ms, SD = 109 ms) 
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condition, to conditions with 2 distractors (M = 824 ms, SD = 198 ms), and from 1 
distractor (M = 769 ms, SD = 143 ms) to 2 distractors (M = 824 ms, SD = 198 ms). 
Finally, there were further significant differences in terms of Peak deceleration, F(2, 
434) = 10.37, p < .001; η!"  = .05, in the sense that the time required to Peak 
deceleration during grasping significantly increased from No distractor (M = 736 ms, 
SD = 117 ms) to 2 distractors (M = 854 ms, SD = 209 ms) and from 1 distractor(M = 
797 ms, SD = 149 ms) to 2 distractors (M = 854 ms, SD = 209 ms).  
 
In respect to Semantic compatibility, Peak velocity, F(2, 434) = 5.86, p = .003; η!"  = 
.03, Peak acceleration, F(2, 434) = 6.26, p = .002; η!"  = .03., and Peak deceleration, 
F(2, 434) = 6.39, p = .002; η!"  = .03, all yielded significant results, with significant 
increases in terms of peak times between No distractor and Semantically compatible 
and No distractor and Semantically incompatible conditions (Table  5.3. displays all 
mean values). The same pattern of results was observed for Perceptual compatibility, 
with significant effects for grasping Peak velocity, F(2, 434) = 5.66, p = .004; η!"  = 
.03, Peak acceleration, F(2, 434) = 5.94, p = .003; η!"  = .03., and Peak deceleration, 
F(2, 434) = 5.91, p = .003; η!"  = .03. Post-hoc tests again confirmed that these results 
were driven by significant differences of mean values between No distractor and 
Perceptual compatible/ Perceptual incompatible conditions (see Table 5.3 for mean 
values and standard deviations). 
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Table 5.3. Mean values of post-hoc comparison (Turkey HSD) collapsed across age groups (N = 73). 
 
 
 
 Condition Movement 
duration 
Reach duration Time to grasp 
peak velocity 
Time to grasp 
peak acceleration 
Time to grasp 
peak 
deceleration 
 
Age   M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Set Size     No distractor  746 ms 122 ms 623 ms 101 ms 627 ms 102 ms 712ms 109 ms 736 ms 117 ms 
 1 distractor 810 ms 156 ms 676 ms 132 ms 684 ms 138 ms 769 ms 143 ms 797 ms 149 ms 
  2 distractors 868 ms 175 ms 724 ms 187 ms 734 ms 193 ms 824 ms 198 ms 854 ms 209 ms 
            
Semantic Compatibility No distractor  746 ms 122 ms 663 ms 101 ms 627 ms 102 ms 712 ms 109 ms 736 ms 117 ms 
 Semantically compatible  841 ms 193 ms 701 ms 165 ms 709 ms 171 ms 798 ms 179 ms 827 ms 187 ms 
  Semantically incompatible  817 ms 164 ms 683 ms 141 ms 691 ms 147 ms 777 ms 148 ms 804 ms 157 ms 
              
Perceptual Compatibility No distractor  746 ms 122 ms 652 ms 101 ms 627 ms 102 ms 712 ms 109 ms 736 ms 117 ms 
 Perceptually compatible 826 ms 166 ms 688 ms 141 ms 697 ms 148 ms 782 ms 149 ms 812 ms 159 ms 
 Perceptually incompatible 823 ms 192 ms 696 ms 166 ms 704 ms 171 ms 792 ms 178 ms 819 ms 186 ms 
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Finally, a significant effects for Age was again confirmed in terms of relative 
grasping times, F (3, 416) = 11.62, p < .001; η!"  = .08. Separate analyses of kinematic 
measures during the grasp component suggested that this effect reached statistical 
significance across all measures: Occurrence of peak velocity, F(3, 418) = 14.99, p < 
.001; η!"  = .11, Occurrence of peak acceleration, F(3, 418) = 17.89, p < .001; η!"  = .11, 
and Occurrence of peak deceleration, F(3, 418) = 15.45, p < .001, η!"  = .10. Table 5.1 
summarises mean values during the grasp component as percentage of the overall 
movement duration. No other main effects or interactions were observed. 
5.4.	Discussion		
Human goal-directed action is highly selective and directed towards objects within a 
three-dimensional environment. Investigating kinematic parameters such as motion 
velocity, acceleration, and deceleration is one step forward in answering the question 
of why movement has the form it does. As outlined in the introduction, the discrete 
motion segments of complex actions are not solely shaped by the passive dynamics 
of our bodies. Movements that make up complex events are connected in a way that 
requires considerable planning and cognitive control. From an embodied cognition 
perspective, motion kinematics emerge in real time from the interactions between the 
properties of the body, cognitive-level selective processes, and the environment (e.g., 
Wilson & Golonka, 2013).  Capturing motion allows us to indirectly measure these 
interacting resources that are distributed across the brain and body as motion unfolds. 
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It has been suggested that the processing of simultaneously presented objects 
interferes with reach-to-grasp actions as a results of automatic processing of even the 
task-irrelevant properties of the distractor (e.g., see Castiello 1996 for a review). As 
discussed in the introduction section, there has been some controversy as to what 
object property dimensions (e.g., perceptual features, semantic category) induce the 
processing interference identified in the kinematic pattern of adults’ prehensile 
actions. Evidence concerning similar effects in children’s reach-to-grasp actions has 
thus far been lacking. The current study provides the first kinematic investigation of 
interference effects across development.  
As expected, results suggest overall reduced movement durations with age. Reach-to-
grasp kinematic patterns have been observed to gradually reflect adult-like 
characteristics over the course of childhood (e.g., Coluccini, Maini, Martelloni, 
Sgandurra, & Cioni, 2005). Specifically, we observed substantial decreases in 
movement duration and the time required to reach peak velocity, peak acceleration 
and peak deceleration with age. Age differences in duration and velocity were 
reflected in both the reach and grasp component of the movement. In relative terms, 
analyses of kinematic measures revealed an increase in times to peak velocity, 
acceleration, and deceleration across age groups, with younger participants 
demonstrating peak occurrences earlier across reaching and grasping than older 
participants. Despite a suggested trend for prolonged movement durations as a 
function of set size in the youngest age group, we did not observe a significant 
interaction effect between age groups and distractor conditions. This observation 
suggested that the influence of distractor objects was relatively comparable across the 
four age groups in this study.  
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The results of this study indicate that interference effects were reflected in some 
kinematic measures (i.e., movement duration, peak velocity, peak acceleration/ peak 
deceleration) but not in others (occurrence of peaks within the total movement). In 
addition, results suggest similar influences on participants’ kinematic profiles across 
the reach and grasp components of the action. However, overall, we also observed 
stronger effects in the grasp component. This observation is compatible with Jervis et 
al.’s (1999) finding of interference in grasping but not reaching kinematics.  
Considering both reaching and grasping together suggested prolonged movement 
durations in the increased perceptually incompatible - semantically compatible, as 
well as in the increased perceptually compatible - semantically incompatible 
distractor condition. Given that these conditions involved two distractor objects that 
featured opposite perceptual and semantic attributes it is unlikely that interference 
effects in this study arise from perceptual or semantic competition. In turn, the fastest 
movement velocities were observed in the no distractor condition followed by reach-
to-grasp actions in the PI/SI distractor condition. Thus, it appears that interference 
effects were primarily related to the number of distractor objects that were presented 
simultaneously, irrespective of their semantic and perceptual relatedness to the target. 
Similarly, when considering the reach and grasp components separately, the times to 
kinematic peak measures were highest overall when participants encountered more 
than a single distractor object. In contrast, the presentation of a single distractor 
object that was incompatible to the target caused moderate inference effects 
(prolonged movement durations). A distractor that was both perceptually and 
semantically incompatible to the target, however, resulted in movement durations and 
velocities that were comparable to those observed in the no distractor condition.  
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As others have argued, selective attention requires inhibitory mechanisms to 
effectively suppress the influence of distracting information (e.g., Tipper, Howard, & 
Houghton, 1998). In a related point, it has been observed that strongly salient 
distractors trigger higher levels of suppression during goal-directed actions, and 
therefore lower levels of interference than less salient distractors (e.g., Moher, 
Anderson, & Song, 2015). This finding, while counterintuitive, relates to the 
argument that efficiency and accuracy on a reaching task may well be enhanced when 
the perceptual information is highly conflicting. As such, enhanced conflict on a task 
results in the recruitment of higher levels of cognitive control (e.g., Botvinick et al. 
2001; see Chapter 1, Figure 1.2 for a schematic depiction of conflict monitoring). 
Indeed, in the current study a highly salient distractor, that was both perceptually and 
semantically incompatible with the target object, did not induce interference effects 
in the kinematic parameters of the reach-to-grasp action. However, the observed 
movement durations and peak velocities suggest no more than a small processing 
advantages for salient distractors (PI/SI) compared to distractors that were 
perceptually and semantically compatible with the target object (PC/SC).  
While the observation of a gradient in movement duration as a function of the set size 
is compatible with the notion that interference effects are triggered by processing 
competition, our results suggest that the nature of this competition may not be limited 
to either semantic or perceptual object properties. It is likely that, during action 
selection, distractor objects are considered in more than a single dimension 
depending on the event context and the behavioural goal of the action. However, in 
the present study, participants’ actions were not related to a particular higher-level 
goal or event context. An outstanding question, therefore, concerns whether objects 
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of behavioural relevance also trigger interference effects in children’s reach-to-grasp 
actions. For instance, evidence with adults suggests that object manipulation (e.g., 
during tool use) enhances visual perception, alters distance judgments, and prolongs 
the allocation of attention during reaching actions (e.g., see Brockenmole, Davoli, 
Abrams, & Witt, 2013 for a review). Similarly, movement kinematics are influenced 
by an agent’s intentions (e.g., Becchio et al., 2010; Marteniuk et al., 1987). Recently, 
it has been suggested that adults are sensitive to kinematic patterns when observing 
an agent’s action and are further able to use this information to discriminate people’s 
intentions (e.g., Ansuine, Cavallo, Bertone, & Becchio, 2014). This line of research 
again highlights the strong link between action perception and production that is 
discussed in Chapter 1. Kinematic evidence strengthens this notion by demonstrating 
that covert mental states can be inferred by means of overt motor behaviour. Future 
research will explorer the ontogeny of this sensitivity in respect to the ability to 
represent hierarchical action structures. For instance, there is currently no evidence 
regarding the influence of kinematic information on young children’s abilities to 
interpret an agents’ intentions. Likewise, it is plausible that kinematic patterns 
uniquely contribute to the detection of structure in perceived sequential events and 
thus relevant additional information in agents’ actions.    
 
These findings support an embodied view of the spatial representation that is 
influenced by internally specified goals. In a related sense, it is certainly plausible 
that the distance between the reaching hand and the target object influences the level 
of interference effects in young children. Developmental research suggests that visual 
and tactile exploration of objects within the peripersonal space is a crucial ingredient 
in young infants’ representation of the interface between bodily and external space 
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(e.g., Bremner, 1978; Bremner & Cowie, 2013; Bremner, Mareschal, Lloyd-Fox, & 
Spence, 2008). This early ability to incorporate information about spatial location in 
respect to the position of the body is likely to aid the locating of objects that are 
placed in close proximity to the body.  
 
The influence of distractor objects has been investigated in studies concerned with 
motor distractibility. Most notably, Ambron, Della Sala, & McIntosh (2012) noted 
increased shifts towards distractor objects in preschoolers that also demonstrated 
closing-in behaviours compared to adults and preschoolers without closing-in 
tendencies. Closing-in refers to the moving towards or overlapping of graphical 
representations (e.g., images of shapes) when asked to copy. This phenomenon 
observed in young children and adults with dementia has been critically associated 
with attentional impairments (e.g., Ambron, McIntosh, et al., 2009). Ambron et al. 
(2012) argued that the kinematics of copying in this study was fundamentally 
affected by manual attraction through the exogenous capture of attention by 
distractors. The evidence on closing-in behaviours is consistent with Tipper et al.’s 
(1998) argument that the presentation of distractors entails attention to the location of 
the distractors and preparation of movement towards this location.  
 
Most notably, while participants did not know in advance which distractor objects 
they would face on each trial, the target object itself and its location never changed. 
Despite the high predictability of the target action, various kinematic parameters in 
this study reflected interference effects. In adults and children of different ages, the 
presence of distractors triggered processing competition that was overcome through 
mechanisms of selective spatial attention. The observation that movement kinematics 
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in a prehensile action are affected by competing visual input suggests that a 
considerable part of motor planning is carried out on-line, both in children and adults. 
Furthermore, this flexibility in selective processes holds important advantages for 
action planning in real life event contexts. Despite hard-won event knowledge, one 
cannot always know in advance the type of motor pattern and level of motor control 
that a given action will require. What inference effects, therefore, indirectly reflect is 
the highly adaptive ability to adjust action performance through adjustments in 
attentional selection.  
 
In conclusion, the results of this study suggest moderate interference effects in the 
kinematic parameters of a reach-to-grasp action as a result of processing competition 
between the target and distractor object across development. Our results further 
suggest that the degree to which movement durations and peak velocities were 
affected by interference effects is mediated by set size. When selecting a target object 
among multiple competing distractors, mechanisms of selective spatial attentions 
come into play to configure appropriate action plans. Interference effects thus support 
the notion of a close link between action and perception that together constraints and 
shape goal-directed behaviour. The bases through which children gradually overcome 
processing conflict through top-down spatial attention are yet to be explored 
(although see Botvinick & Cohen, 2001 for a accounts of conflict monitoring in 
adults).  
 
The aim of the next chapter is to reflect on how the individual studies in this project 
relate to each other as well as to the wider action research. This final section will also 
discuss the general limitations of the tasks used in this work. The chapter concludes 
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setting future perspectives and a brief discussion of why further investigations should 
build on the evidence generated in this project.   
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CHAPTER 6 
What does it mean? 
 
 
All goal-directed actions require active mental representations of goal states and are, thus, at 
least partially planned prior to movement initiation. While planning of complex behaviours 
entails abstractions at multiple levels of the goal hierarchy, even simple motor acts are 
planned in terms of their anticipated action effects (e.g., Hauf & Prinz 2005; Wood & Neil, 
2007; Sommerville & Woodward, 2005). The foregoing chapters discussed empirical 
evidence concerning preschoolers’ abilities to process hierarchical goal structure when 
perceiving and planning goal-directed events.   
 
Both the comprehension of observed actions and the execution of goal-directed behaviour are 
fundamentally informed by anticipations of action effects. However, disambiguating goals in 
relation to specific contexts, detecting coherence among discrete actions, and discerning the 
intentions of others is not straightforward. Low-level structure detection may constitute an 
early mechanism by which action observation gradually develops towards more fine grained 
and meaningful analysis of the observed behaviour. In Study 1 (‘The planning and execution 
of natural sequential actions in the preschool years’, Chapter 2) we ask how internal 
intentions interact with external opportunities during the planning of a realistic action 
sequence. The findings from two behavioural experiments with 3- and 5- year-olds suggest 
the presence of a developmental change in the ability to structure observed actions in terms of 
goal hierarchies.  
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In Chapter 2 we discussed the links between internally specified goals and external 
opportunities during the planning of a naturalistic action sequence. The results of two 
behavioural experiments suggested considerable developmental change in learning from 
observed behaviour between the ages of 3 and 5 years. One aim of this first study was to 
investigate preschoolers’ tendencies to incorporate modelled actions into their own 
subsequent performance. We presented preschoolers with a familiar event sequence that was 
composed of actions that could be linked to specific goals, as well as actions that did not 
appear to serve the overarching goal of the sequence in an interpretable way. In contrast to 
previous over-imitation studies, our results strongly suggest that preschoolers’ planning was 
perceptually informed by both a prior demonstration and the presence of external cues in this 
task. Importantly, while 3-year-olds demonstrated overall a high susceptibility for over-
imitation behaviour as a result of a single misleading demonstration, this tendency was 
overcome when procedural components of the sequence were spatially cued. We concluded 
Chapter 2 with a discussion of preschoolers’ planning abilities in relation to the role of prior 
event knowledge and reflected on the notion of graded goal representations in children (e.g., 
Munakata. O’Reilly, & Morton, 2007; Munakata & Yerys, 2001). As part of this first study 
we observed that young preschoolers expected sub-actions that followed each other to form 
part of the same goal-directed sequence.  
 
These observations are in good agreement with the findings from our first study in the sense 
that young preschoolers particularly strongly relied on the available perceptual cues to make 
inferences about causes and effects; actions and outcomes. Thus, together, the results of the 
first two studies in this project provide strong evidence that with age preschoolers 
increasingly interpret events in terms of higher-level goals. However, what these studies also 
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suggest is that bottom-up knowledge critically influences how preschoolers plan subsequent 
interventions.  
 
The argument that preschoolers’ higher-level action planning is greatly informed by bottom-
up processes has important considerations for real-life learning situations. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, naturalistic events tend to comprise multiple sequential actions that contribute to 
temporally delayed and spatially distal outcomes. Therefore, providing greater perceptual 
support to structure the hierarchical relations underlying events may effectively scaffold 
preschoolers’ learning in sequential tasks. However, sensitivity to the underlying event 
structure is unlikely to singlehandedly account for young children’s increasing abilities to 
pursue higher-level goals. As argued in Chapter 3, naturalistic goal-directed behaviours 
require the engagement and maintenance of appropriate levels of cognitive control over 
relatively extended intervals of time. For instance, sequential actions that span multiple levels 
of abstraction are likely to demand high levels of cognitive control (e.g., Amso, Haas, 
McShane, & Badre, 2014). In the introduction Chapter, as well as in Chapter 3, we 
summarised various lines of developmental evidence suggesting that self-regulatory 
processes, involved in the ability to maintain, modify, and delay distal goals undergo 
important changes during the preschool years and continue to improve thereafter (e.g., 
Anderson, 1998; Brydges, Reid, Fox, & Anderson & Reidy, 2012; Diamond 2002; Giedd & 
Rapoport 2010; Levin et al. 1991; Luria, 1974; Posner & Rothbart, 1998; Yakovlev & 
Lecours, 1967; Welsh, Pennington, & Groisser, 1991).   
 
During the preschool period, children show increasing abilities to use abstract action 
knowledge to pursue complex goals. This advance in action parsing and planning abilities is 
paralleled by increasing abilities to evaluate and adapt action plans in relation to complex 
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goal hierarchies. Once action plans are formed, performance monitoring, mediated by neural 
networks within frontal and parietal brain regions, comes into play.  
 
Study 2 (‘Preschool children’s control of action outcomes’, Chapter 3) explores 
preschoolers’ strategic action planning oriented towards distal goals, and asks how this ability 
relates to mechanisms of cognitive control. Here, results suggest that the ability to maintain 
top-down control and adjust behavioural responses at multiple levels of abstraction undergoes 
a marked improvement from 3 to 5 years of age. 
 
In Study 2 (Chapter 3), we investigated the degree to which 3- and 5-year-olds endogenously 
detect the need to adjust top-down control in the face of conflicting information across two 
experiments. Using a novel sequential colouring task, we assessed preschoolers’ abilities to 
implement strategic action planning to reach goals at sub- and superordinate levels of the 
goal hierarchy. Given the lack of external feedback in this task, incorrect response selections 
were not readily apparent unless children evaluated outcomes at multiple levels of 
abstraction. The results of this study suggest that young preschoolers in particular 
demonstrate a strong tendency to direct their attention towards stimulus-implicit and intuitive 
outcomes (the colouring activity in this task). In Chapter 3 we interpret this observation in 
relation to the cognitive demands required for monitoring a distal and abstract outcome in 
addition to more intermediate steps of the sequence.  
 
The findings of Study 2 compliment Studies 1 in highlighting that 3- and 5-year-olds 
demonstrate differential abilities to evaluate the demand for cognitive control in complex 
sequential tasks. Collectively, the behavioural findings described in the first three studies of 
this project (Chapters 2, 3, and 4), thus support the view that the ability to engage adequate 
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cognitive control to support hierarchical action selection over space and time improves 
during early childhood. However, these studies do not directly inform about the mechanisms 
that drive young children’s comprehension of higher-level goals.  
 
Neuropsychological evidence with adults suggests that the human action network is likely to 
implicate frontal, parietal and temporal brain regions. To date almost nothing it known about 
the neural underpinnings that mediate advances in action comprehension and planning 
abilities during the preschool period. Using electrophysiological measures, Study 3 
(‘Convergent ERP and behavioural evidence of preschoolers’ understanding of action goals’, 
Chapter 4) set out to investigate the neurocognitive mechanisms implicated in the perception 
of higher-level goals. The findings of this event-related potential (ERP) study highlight the 
functional importance of mid-latency components during the semantic integration of action 
outcomes into a preceding event context. Convergent behavioural data on a picture-matching 
task revealed associations between preschoolers’ ERP patterns and their abilities to explicitly 
judge whether actions are contextually linked to specific outcomes.  
 
Study 3 (Chapter 4) investigated the development of the neurocognitive underpinnings during 
goal perception across the preschool years and in adults. Using a novel ERP paradigm we 
studied the integration of higher-level goals into a preceding event context. We presented 3-
year-olds, 5-year-olds, and adults with dynamic scenes of everyday goal-directed actions in 
which final actions either matched or mismatched the overall event context. The distinct 
patterns of brain activity evoked in this study suggest that observing context compatible 
actions activates representations of expected outcomes. In contrast, context incompatible 
actions were unexpected for both adults and preschoolers. The attempt to embed incongruent 
final actions into the preceding action context yielded significant conflict as indicated by 
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mid-latency ERP components. In addition, the preschoolers in this study carried out a 
behavioural task in which outcomes and actions had to be judged based on their semantic 
relatedness. This convergent behavioural experiment revealed associations between 3-and 5-
year-olds’ ERP patterns and their abilities to judge explicitly whether actions were 
contextually linked to higher-level goals. The findings of this study indicate that, like adults, 
preschoolers processed the incongruence of final actions by means of perceptual (reflected at 
early processing stages) as well as conceptual inferences (reflected in N400 ERP activity). 
This observation is in good agreement with findings form Study 3 as it suggests that the 
processing of actions takes place simultaneously at multiple levels of analyses. This finding 
is further supported by evidence from other ERP studies in adults and infants (e.g., Hard, 
Recchia, & Tversky, 2011; Pace, Carver, & Friend, 2013). However, there were also 
important differences between adults and preschoolers in the topographical distribution of 
mid-latency components. For instance, an N400-like component was frontally distributed in 
adults but had a posterior component in preschoolers.  
 
Chapter 4 concluded with a discussion of the ERP and behavioural results in relation to the 
development of semantic networks within frontal, parietal, and temporal cortices. In addition, 
we put forth the hypothesis that adults may have focused on relating higher-level goals into a 
coherent abstract representation of the event (indicated by a frontally distributed N400-like 
component), whereas preschoolers based semantic analyses on more concrete action-related 
requirements (reflected in a posterior N400-like component). We further argued that the 
mechanisms that gave rise to the detection of incongruence may well differ for adults and 
preschoolers. While, at the present, the functional importance of the N300/N400 distribution 
remains speculative, the comparable latencies of ERP components in Study 4 support the 
argument that preschoolers and adults engage similar cognitive mechanisms in the semantic 
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processing of action sequences. In addition, the findings of this study suggest that both 
perceptual and conceptual mechanisms operate together in the semantic analyses of 
sequential goal-directed actions. This ERP study further ties in with the behavioural findings 
from Studies 1 and 2 because it again underlines the importance of evaluative processes that 
drive the detection of conflict within the context of specific events. In the final study of this 
thesis we revisited this point in connection with the role of selective attention in the planning 
of goal-directed actions.      
 
Finally, an important objective of this thesis was to provide new insight concerning the 
development of action cognition by investigating fundamental action-related processes at 
multiple levels. Thus, Study 4 (‘Interference effects in reach-to-grasp action across 
development’, Chapter 5) explores cognitive interference on action planning at the level of 
raw movement as indicated by specific kinematic parameters of reach and grasp actions. 
Results from this motion-capture experiment reflect developmental effects in the influences 
of planning related processes, which are far-reaching and traceable at the stage of motor 
output.  
The context of many everyday-behaviours is characterised by tremendous amounts of 
competing sensory input. Selective attention guides the allocation of appropriate levels of 
attentional control to regulate actions in a highly adaptive goal-directed manner. Therefore, 
attentional mechanisms provide functional links between conflict and control, and thus 
between perception and action. Taking on a bottom-up perspective we investigated the role of 
interference effects in reaching-kinematics triggered by competing visual input. Using 
motion-capture methods we presented four age groups of children (6-12 years) and adults 
with a reach-to-grasp paradigm. This study provided the first developmental investigation of 
planning related processes that are traceable at the stage of the motor output. The results of 
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Study 4 (Chapter 5) suggest that the kinematic parameters of children’s reach-to-grasp 
actions are indeed affected by interference effects caused by the evaluation of distractor 
objects. We further observed that the level of interference reflected in reaching and grasping 
kinematics was mediated by stimulus set size. Moreover, while the magnitude of interference 
effects was age depended, the kinematic patterns were similar across development. In 
Chapter 6 we discussed the implications of these findings in the context of selective spatial 
attention. As with the previous studies of this project, the outcomes of this kinematic 
experiment support the notion of a close link between action and perception that together 
constrain and shape the planning and execution of goal-directed behaviour. Study 5 adds to 
the findings discussed in the previous sections by demonstrating that bottom-up and top-
down interactions are evident not just in cognitive terms (Study 1 & 2)) and neurocognitive 
mechanisms (Study 3), but even at the stage of motor output.  
 
Taken together the findings of this project suggest that the preschool years are a period 
during which basic action-outcome contingencies become transformed into increasingly 
complex means of goal pursuit. Moreover, important advances in cognitive control and 
causal reasoning drive developmental effects in implementing strategic action planning. In 
addition, we observed developmental effects in the ability to monitor actions at lower and 
higher-levels of abstraction between the ages of 3 and 5 years.  
 
A popular view in psychological science postulates that real-world cognitive mechanisms 
operate, first and foremost, to guide situation-appropriate behaviour (e.g., Wilson, 2002). The 
idea that cognition is situated (i.e., taking place in the context of a task in which actions are 
carried out while receiving sensorimotor feedback) has been advanced to the point of making 
the claim that, at the representational level, planned action and perceived events are 
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essentially the same (e.g., Theory of Event Coding, Hommel et al. 2001). Similarly, action-
oriented predictive coding theories unify action, perception, and cognition into cascades of 
predictions that span across all levels of the action hierarchy; from motor commands, through 
to anticipated sensory effects, all the way up to higher-level goals (see Clark, 2013 for a 
review). According to this view, “thinking, predicting, and doing are all part of the same 
unfolding of sequences moving down the cortical hierarchy” (Hawkins & Blakeslee 2004, p. 
158). In a related sense, embodied cognition accounts and ideomotor perspectives stress the 
role of active agency in knowledge acquisition. The notion that goals are acquired through 
action experience is relevant especially in an educational context. For instance, the idea that 
children learn best through reflective activities (e.g., Greeno, 1998), commonly referred to as 
“learning-by-doing”, is an integral part of current educational practices. As such, being the 
agent of an action, as well as adopting a first person’s perspective when observing others, 
benefits knowledge acquisition of the relationships between goals, actions, and outcomes 
(e.g., Gianelli, Farnè, Salemme, Jeannerod, & Roy, 2011).  
 
However, accounts of how higher-level action representations are acquired and updated over 
the course of development are currently missing. Collectively, the findings of the current 
project underscore that the development of action cognition during early childhood is 
characterised by advances in interacting perceptual and conceptual processes.   
Children observe many goal-directed events on a daily basis. Some of these are unfamiliar or 
at least not well understood. The foregoing chapters have discussed preschoolers’ abilities to 
perceive and interpret goal hierarchies, and how learned action-outcome relations are used to 
plan and control complex goal-directed behaviours. We reviewed existing evidence of how 
internal descriptions of sequential events are achieved based on perceptual and conceptual 
processes and how these processes compare to infant and adult cognition. We have also 
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argued that the parsing of higher-level goals is largely context dependent and critically 
influenced by prior knowledge.   
A key argument of the four studies carried out in this project is that action comprehension 
and execution is achieved through the anticipation of outcomes. In fact, goal representations 
themselves appear to drive selective processes at multiple levels of the action hierarchy (e.g., 
see Grafton & Hamilton, 2007 for a review). As discussed in Chapters 1, 2, and 3, there is a 
large volume of studies suggesting that infants are capable of perceiving simple action-effect 
contingencies. Together, the findings of the current project suggest that the preschool period 
is a time during which children begin to demonstrate good abilities to represent goals 
simultaneously at lower and higher levels of abstraction. To investigate the early 
developmental trajectories of action-related cognitive and neural processes, this project has 
employed multiple methodologies and has used a range of novel tasks that were specifically 
designed to achieve greater ecological validity than the existing cognitive measures.  
 
Collectively, the developmental effects we observed across the studies in this project 
substantiate the view that the preschool period is a time of dramatic developmental change in 
terms of the comprehension, planning, and regulation of goal-directed actions. Taken 
together the findings of five studies suggest that during the preschool years basic action-
outcome contingencies become transformed into increasingly complex means of goal-pursuit. 
By the end of preschool, children show remarkable abilities to use abstract action knowledge 
in order to pursue complex goals.  Nevertheless, numerous unresolved questions remain in 
our understanding of action cognition during this critical time in development. The studies 
presented in this thesis are limited in the sense that they only provide cross-sectional 
evidence of the developmental changes that take place. More detailed analyses of age-
dependent effects are needed to define the developmental trajectories that characterise the 
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preschool period. Relatedly, given the large amount of within-subject variability during this 
time in development (see Chapter 1 for a discussion of this issue), retesting children may 
reveal considerable fluctuations in planning and monitoring abilities. The question then begs 
the question of asking what factors predict low and high levels of performance, and where 
does within-subject variability on planning and decision-making tasks come from. 
 
In the current project we did not follow up participants, nor did we obtain other indices that 
would have potentially informed us about children’s general cognitive performance (e.g., 
nursery reports, school assessments). It should also be noted that a drawback of attempting to 
use more ecologically valid tasks is that these tasks are novel and, thus, not yet validated with 
different groups of subjects. Therefore, it is possible that our results are affected by 
extraneous factors such as parental education, preschool attendance, home enrichment 
factors, and socioeconomic background. While the same argument has been made in 
connection to well-validated standardised tasks (e.g., Noble, Norman, & Farah, 2005), it is 
nonetheless important to investigate the impact of such factors on the performance measures 
we used in this project. Finally, we did not explicitly address how planning and monitoring 
abilities relate to preschoolers’ remarkable improvements in other cognitive domains (e.g., 
social cognition). Integrating action-related processes into a larger picture of cognitive, 
motoric, and social advances is likely to reveal relationships that go beyond the development 
of action cognition. 
 
While this project sought to shed light onto the cognitive processes and neural mechanisms 
that underlie preschoolers’ advances in the processing of higher-level goals, the studies 
discussed in the foregoing chapters provide only a first step into this direction. Therefore, this 
project is only an initial investigation of critical action-related processes that, thus far, have 
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only been studied in infants, older children, and adults. Addressing this gap in the 
developmental literature is important because planning and monitoring abilities form the 
basis for a myriad of academic and social achievements later in life (e.g., Mischel, et al., 
2011). For example, a recent meta-analysis spanning 75 individual studies revealed that the 
academic success of children significantly correlates with individual performances on 
cognitive control tasks (Allan, Hume, Allan, Farrington, & Lonigan, 2014). In fact, children’s 
academic success during the first grade of elementary school significantly predicts academic 
achievements in later years (e.g., Entwistle & Hayduk, 1988). It thus appears that inter-
individual differences in planning abilities and regulatory processes are laid out early in life. 
Educational interventions during the preschool period may more effectively target learning 
deficits from the earliest point of formal education and thus before severe academic delays 
emerge. 
 
 One examples of how educational practices may benefit from the evidence put forth in this 
project concerns the role of cognitive control for planning and adaptive decision making. 
Future research should aim to identify the links between inter-individual differences in 
learning and how strongly children weigh bottom-up and top-down information. As discussed 
in this thesis, we do not currently understand how young children shift from perceptually 
driven action planning to more abstract forms of event processing. Future investigations of 
how planning strategies emerge and evolve to bridge multiple levels of abstraction will 
provide critical insight regarding the origins of low and high performance levels on 
sequential tasks, such as those used in the current project. Educational practices may also 
benefit from scientific evidence concerning how children begin to rely on top-down 
knowledge while ignoring misleading and counterfactual information. To tackle this question 
future studies should seek to identify under what circumstances novel information is 
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integrated into existing event representations. Finally, research in this direction may greatly 
advance our understanding regarding the mechanisms that allow for adaptive planning as a 
result of performance feedback. To date there are no studies linking inter-individual 
differences in the processing of action errors to learning rates and cognitive profiles. In 
summary, understanding the parallel processes that emerge in connection to action-related 
abilities is likely to generate promising interventions that will promote learning from a 
bottom-up and top-down perspective.  
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